Archive 03

ClubHombre.com: -Off-Topic-: Politics: War or Peace?: Archives 01-10: Archive 03
By Jarocho on Monday, March 03, 2003 - 02:09 am:  Edit

correction: "In this case, the talking HEADS have cut-down on our opinions for energy as if it only be obtained from oil. In short, I don't buy the oil story either."

I meant OPTIONS, but our opinions could have been cut-down to agree with all the nonsense they're telling us (at least not all in the monger community).

By Snapper on Monday, March 03, 2003 - 05:07 am:  Edit

"One of the major consequences of going to war aren't great either as this is going to only give terrorists more reasons to go after us."

Even if we are able to get Saddam to disarm WITHOUT using military force I highly doubt that will lower the radical Muslim's contempt of the United States. Our nation has been the target of their hatred for decades. I do feel that terrorist attacks are risk in the short run, however I feel if we ignore this situation our long term risks are even greater.

In a somewhat related thought, I do feel that iraq should be able to posses weapons to defend itself, but I would love for someone to tell me how a country would use tens of thousands of liters of anthrax in a defensive campaign.

By Innocent on Monday, March 03, 2003 - 09:19 am:  Edit

DickJohnson,

I must say I am enjoyed your most recent commentary. Quite to the point. They say, "The true should be obvious."

It's not always but in this case sad to say IMHO I believe it is.

All ahead warp 9. LOL

By Milkster on Monday, March 03, 2003 - 10:26 am:  Edit

I just went past a gas station in South Bay
2.16 for regular gas

What is this war about ? I am more worried about North Korea. The we can worry about the gasoline war later.

What good is gasoline if you are nuked ?

Milk

By Jarocho on Monday, March 03, 2003 - 01:11 pm:  Edit

Snapper you're correct about in the PAST things being different, but since 9-11 things have changed and it has given the anti-Americans the confidence they never had before. We cannot be that arrogant and think that we're untouchable when the opposite has already been proven to be the case.

Jarocho

By Explorer8939 on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 10:35 am:  Edit

So, a question for you experts:

Since you all hang out in Mexico, what do the Mexicans think about the war?

By Milkster on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 11:42 am:  Edit

They are against it

They just think whitey wants more oil

By Snapper on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 11:51 am:  Edit

This following post is just to further back up my position that the UN is irrelevant as it pertains to the Iraqi situation

As stated in UN Resolution 687:

"Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in
violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of
its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would
follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons"

"Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention
and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority,
efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on
Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and
therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles
located in Iraq"

"Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted
above using all available means
"

"8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction,
removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all
related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and
manufacturing facilities;

For those of you that think Saddam IS allowed to have his Al Samoud 2 Missiles
witch have a range of over 650km.

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and
related major parts, and repair and production facilities"


This is where Gremany and Japan have interest in avoiding war.
Even if the conponents they sold after 1991 are nothing but shit.

"24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent
related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security
Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the
promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals,
or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

(a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the
sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military
equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components
and their means of production
, for such equipment"

"(c) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the
production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a)
and (b) above

(d) Personnel or materials for training or technical support services
relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support
of items specified
in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above"



As stated in UN Resolution 707:

"Gravely concerned by the information provided to the Council by the Special
Commission and the IAEA on 15 July 1991 (S/22788) and 25 July 1991 (S/22837)
regarding the actions of the Government of Iraq in flagrant violation of
resolution 687 (1991)
,

Gravely concerned also by the evidence in the letter of 7 July 1991 from
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General and in
subsequent statements and findings that Iraq's notifications of 18 and 28 April
were incomplete and that it had concealed activities, which both constituted
material breaches of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991)
,

Noting also from the letters dated 26 June 1991 (S/22739), 28 June 1991
(S/22743) and 4 July 1991 (S/22761) from the Secretary-General that Iraq has not
fully complied with all of its undertakings relating to the privileges,
immunities and facilities to be accorded to the Special Commission and the IAEA
inspection teams mandated under resolution 687 (1991)
"

1. Condemns Iraq's serious violation of a number of its obligations under
section C of resolution 687 (1991) and of its undertakings to cooperate with the
Special Commission and the IAEA, which constitutes a material breach of the
relevant provisions of resolution 687 which established a cease-fire and
provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in
the region,

2. Further condemns non-compliance by the Government of Iraq with its
obligations under its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, as established by the resolution of the Board of Governors of 18 July,
which constitutes a violation of its commitments as a party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

3. Demands that IraqSaddam must have thought "Oh no! not UN a demand"(btw, that's sarcasm)

(i) provide full, final and complete disclosure, as required by
resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to
develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles
with a range greater than 150 kilometres, and of all
holdings of such weapons, their components and production
facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear
programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes
not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material, without
further delay,

(ii) allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection
Teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to
any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means
of transportation which they wish to inspect,

(iii) cease immediately any attempt to conceal, or any movement or
destruction of any material or equipment relating to its
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or ballistic missile
programmes, or material or equipment relating to its other
nuclear activities without notification to and prior consent
of the Special Commission,

(iv) make available immediately to the Special Commission, the
IAEA and their Inspection Teams any items to which they were
previously denied access,

(v) allow the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection
Teams to conduct both fixed wing and helicopter flights
throughout Iraq for all relevant purposes including
inspection, surveillance, aerial surveys, transportation and
logistics without interference of any kind and upon such
terms and conditions as may be determined by the Special
Commission, and to make full use of their own aircraft and
such airfields in Iraq as they may determine are most
appropriate for the work of the Commission,

(vi) halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of
isotopes for medical, agricultural or industrial purposes
until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full
compliance with this resolution and paragraphs 12 and 13 of
resolution 687 (1991), and the IAEA determines that Iraq is
in full compliance with its safeguards agreement with that
Agency,

(vii) ensure the complete implementation of the privileges,
immunities and facilities of the representatives of the
Special Commission and the IAEA in accordance with its
previous undertakings and their complete safety and freedom
of movement,

(viii) immediately provide or facilitate the provision of any
transportation, medical or logistical support requested by
the Special Commission, the IAEA and their Inspection Teams,

(ix) respond fully, completely and promptly to any questions or
requests from the Special Commission, the IAEA and their
Inspection Teams"




As stated in UN Resolution 715:

Oh no! not another UN demand(there's that sarcasm again)
"5. Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the
plans approved by the present resolution and cooperate fully with the Special
Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in
carrying out the plans"




As stated in UN Resolution 1051:

Oh no! not another UN demand(there's that sarcasm once again)
"15.Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the mechanism
approved by this resolution and cooperate fully with the Special Commission
and the Director General of the IAEA in the carrying out of their tasks
under this resolution and the mechanism by such means as they may determine
in accordance with their mandates from the Council"




As stated in UN Resolution 1060:

1.Deplores the refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, which
constitutes a clear violation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)
;
Oh no! not another demand(note the sarcasm yet once again)
2.Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions; and that the Government of Iraq allow the Special Commission inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect"




As stated in UN Resolution 1115:

"1. Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, which constitutes a clear and flagrant violation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996);

more demands
2. Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions; and that the Government of Iraq allow the Special Commission inspection teams immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of the Special Commission;
and yet even more demands
3. Demands further that the Government of Iraq give immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom the Special Commission wishes to interview, so that the Special Commission may fully discharge its mandate"




As stated in UN Resolution 1134:

"1. Condemns the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities, as detailed in the report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission, and especially Iraqi actions endangering the safety of Special Commission personnel, the removal and destruction of documents of interest to the Special Commission and interference with the freedom of movement of Special Commission personnel;

2. Decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996), and notes that the Special Commission in the report of the Executive Chairman was unable to advise that Iraq was in substantial compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1115 (1997);

more demands
3. Demands that Iraq cooperate fully with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance;
more demands
4. Demands in particular that Iraq without delay allow the Special Commission inspection teams immediate, unconditiona unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation which they wish to inspect in accordance with the mandate of the Special Commission, as well as to officials and other persons under the authority of the Iraqi Government whom the Special Commission wishes to interview so that the Special Commission may fully discharge its mandate"




As stated in UN Resolution 1137:

"1. Condemns the continued violations by Iraq of its obligations under the relevant resolutions to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the Special Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate, including its unacceptable decision of 29 October 1997 to seek to impose conditions on cooperation with the Special Commission, its refusal on 30 October 1997 and 2 November 1997 to allow entry to Iraq to two Special Commission officials on the grounds of their nationality, its denial of entry on 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 November 1997 to sites designated by the Special Commission for inspection to Special Commission inspectors on the grounds of their nationality, its implicit threat to the safety of the reconnaissance aircraft operating on behalf of the Special Commission, its removal of significant pieces of dual-use equipment from their previous sites, and its tampering with monitoring cameras of the Special Commission;

more demands
2. Demands that the Government of Iraq rescind immediately its decision of 29 October 1997;
more demands
3. Demands also that Iraq cooperate fully and immediately and without conditions or restrictions with the Special Commission in accordance with the relevant resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance"

"8. Expresses the firm intention to take further measures as may be required for the implementation of this resolution"
I bet Saddam got a good laugh from this last line.




As stated in UN Resolution 1194:

"Stressing the unacceptability of any attempts by Iraq to deny access to any sites or to refuse to provide the necessary cooperation"

"1. Condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998 to suspend cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA, which constitutes a totally unacceptable contravention of its obligations under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 1060 (1996), 1115 (1997) and 1154 (1998), and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary-General on 23 February 1998;
one more demand
2. Demands that Iraq rescind its above-mentioned decision and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the IAEA in accordance with its obligations under the relevant resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding as well as resume dialogue with the Special Commission and the IAEA immediately"




As stated in UN Resolution 1205:

"1. Condemns the decision by Iraq of 31 October 1998 to cease cooperation with the Special Commission as a flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions;
yeah, yeah, yeah
2. Demands that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally the decision of 31 October 1998, as well as the decision of 5 August 1998, to suspend cooperation with the Special Commission and to maintain restrictions on the work of the IAEA, and that Iraq provide immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA"




As stated in UN Resolution 1441:

"All 15 council members voted for the resolution: permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and non-permanent members Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Guinea, Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Singapore, and Syria."

"Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,
Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq"

"Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991)"

"3. Decides that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to
submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall
provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from
the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration
of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned
aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including
any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components,
stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work
of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other
chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims
are for purposes not related to weapon production or material
"

more demands
"9. Requests the Secretary General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on
Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its
intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands further that
Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and
the IAEA"

There is one way that the UN isn't irrelevant as pertaining to Iraq, and that's as consistent means of appeasement.

By Snapper on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 11:54 am:  Edit

Explorer wrote:

"So, a question for you experts:

Since you all hang out in Mexico, what do the Mexicans think about the war?"


Sorry to bury your question with a somewhat long post.

By Innocent on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 11:57 am:  Edit

Not much.

By Batster1 on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 01:14 pm:  Edit

Snapper,

I certainly agree with you that the UN is absolutley irrelevant. It has no intention of enforcing its own resolutions. I am not sure why so many people think we should surrender our foreing policy to the UN.

The truth is if George wants his war, under international law he has to look no further than the cease fire agreement signed at the end of GW1. Saddam has been in violation for years.

I have mixed feelings about the whole thing and plan on posting my opinion later when I have time. But first I have to break out my flame resistant body armor and check that all safety gear is in place. LOL.

Explorer,

I have lived in Mexico since 98 and am the only "Gringo"in my place of employment. I also have lots of contact with Mexican government types. So I hear alot of talk. The overall sentiment is overwhelmingly against the war. But the sentiment is very thin. It is more a kneejerk anti-americanism than anything. Some of the people in my office who follow world affairs more than most mexicans tend to agree that there is probably good reason to go after Saddam. Its funny how recent experience living under totalitarian regimes makes people less tolerant of tyrranical authority.

By Tight_fit on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 03:28 pm:  Edit

Snapper, the UN has never had much relevence when it comes to major issues. Not once have they ever been willing to deal with repeated tribal genocide throughout Africa in the 60s, 70s, 80, and 90s. And they are not going to change. Their best moments are when they stick to things like health and general social issues.

Milky, the other day on CNBC an analyst was asked about the rapid increase in gasoline prices. Oil is in a plentiful supply and it was predicted that prices would actually be substantially lower by the end of the year. However, the guy couldn't give a straight forward answer as to current prices. I hate being part of the anti business crowd but it definitely looks like someone is doing some serious price gouging.

By Batster1 on Tuesday, March 04, 2003 - 04:14 pm:  Edit

Tight Fit,

They are always playing games with Oil prices. supplies are never as tight as they say they are. Althought the general strike in Venezueal has not helped. The big oil companies have been screwing the public for years. My old man who worked for one for 33 years can tell all sorts of stories.

Another little known fact. Proven crude reserves are higher now than 30 years ago. So much for running out of oil. It will happen some day but not in our life times.

And is it not odd when market proces on crude tumble, it takes several months for gas prices to come down. But when crude prices spike the gas prices shoot up within days.

batsterwhogrewupintheoilpatch

By Phoenixguy on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 04:17 am:  Edit

>>>And is it not odd when market proces on crude tumble, it takes several months for gas prices to come down. But when crude prices spike the gas prices shoot up within days.

It's called supply and demand. They supply it, we demand it, and since they're all in collusion (albeit perhaps only covertly, by happily raising prices whenever the next supplier does) they can charge whatever they want - until congress starts to investigate. The problem is there are too few suppliers for real, meaningful competition.

By Batster1 on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 01:26 pm:  Edit

PhoenixGuy,

I fully understand supply and demand. They will charge whatever the market will bear and will push the price until the point that demand diminishes, my point was the same as yours. It is an oligopy with too few suppliers.

By Explorer8939 on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 04:17 pm:  Edit

Can someone give me a list of the countries that neighbor Iraq and have volunteered troops for the war?

By Snapper on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 05:12 pm:  Edit

How do you mean "volunteer"? ...if you mean in combat we both know how long that list is going to be, but if you mean base operations that list will be longer.

Even Turkey will still allow non-combat operations to be based there such as Search and Rescue and Medical facilities. Saudi Arabia and Qatar(I acknowledge the fact that Qatar doesn't share a common border iraq) will play the most major roles.

By Snapper on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 05:21 pm:  Edit

Can somebody give me a list of countries that are on the Security Counsel that mean what they say when they state:

"a final opportunity to fully comply with its disarmament obligations."

"binding upon Iraq"

"will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations"

(Message edited by snapper on March 05, 2003)

By Batster1 on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 06:44 pm:  Edit

Snapper,

England, US, Spain. The only three countries that seem to take the security council and its resolutions as something more than a joke.

Explorer,

Supposedly Kuwaiti airforce units will participate. But even if they do not send troops, dont you think that, considering public opinion in the muslim world, any muslim country that allows basing for an attack against Iraq is giving tacit agreement to an attack.

And why worry about neighboring countries sending troops. Rumour has it that Iraquis in the north and the south are spoiling to join the fight. But after Bush Papa left them high and dry during their last uprising they are not going to attack saddam again until the US is on the ground. Members of the Iraqui army have been deserting to the north for months. According to deserters a large portion of the population wants Saddamm out. So who cares about the neighbors? Why not give the Iraquis what they want.

In the WSJ today, an Iraqui was interviewd about the mass demonstrations against the war. He said something to the effect of "Its nice to demonstrate for peace and we see 5 million people demonstrating against the war, but we don't see any Iraquis demonstrating against the war.

I wonder why?

By Explorer8939 on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 06:47 pm:  Edit

Given that the weapons inspectors have not finished their job and that Iraq is in the process of destroying its missiles, a reasonable person could conclude that there is no basis for considering Iraq in breach of Resolution 1441. When France and company passed that resolution, they included a provision for weapons inspectors. The US is taking the position that Iraq was in breach of 1441 the nano-second after the resolution was passed, since Iraq had not complied with 1441 at that point.

Its kind of like if someone says: "If you don't do X, I will kill you", and then they go ahead and kill you one second later because you hadn't done X yet.

By Snapper on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 07:16 pm:  Edit

The resolution states that Iraq remains in material breach of council resolutions relating to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and requires that Baghdad give UNMOVIC and IAEA a complete and accurate declaration of all aspects of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and ballistic missiles systems, as well as information on other chemical, biological, and nuclear programs that are supposed to be for civilian purposes, within 30 days

Has Saddam accounted for the 5000 tons of VX, the tens of thousands of liters of Anthrax, or the 550 Mustard Shells we know he has?

Has thirty days pasted since November 8th?

Is Saddam in his typical fashion just taking a tiny step in the eleventh hour to exploits people hope for peace?




By Snapper on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 11:08 pm:  Edit

Let me make a prediction that the following swing votes on the UN Security Counsel will vote in favor of the US position. Mexico, Chile, Angola, Cameroon, Guinea(witch received over 5 mil in aid from France last year) and Pakistan.

By Explorer8939 on Wednesday, March 05, 2003 - 11:33 pm:  Edit

Snapper:

I guess you forgot that Iraq provided a massive report to the UN on Dec 8. So far, the only holes in the report found by the weapons inspectors are the Al Samoud missiles, which is a questionable call, due to their limited range.

George Bush and company, of course, claim that the Dec 8 report is bogus, but their "proof" is discounted by anyone with knowledge in the field, and parts of the US claims are clearly false.

By Snapper on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 02:48 am:  Edit

You mean the 12,200 pages of lies. You are skipping a couple holes. Here are some FACTS to back up my stance.


As Dr. Blix reported to this council on January 27th, quote, ``Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it"

As Dr Blix reported "Iraq must account for status of anthrax and VX (a nerve agent) and long-range missiles"

As Dr. Blix reported "To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for"."

As Dr. Blix reported "I have noted that significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that such issues "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside?"."

this is the hole you are referring to
As Dr. Blix repoted "Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts from a number of Member States to discuss these items. The experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring plan adopted by resolution 715 (1991)."

And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7, quote, ``did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998.''

Other Facts
Iraq had declared 8,500 liters of anthrax, but UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon-full of this deadly material.

UNSCOM discovered a document at Iraqi Air Force headquarters in July 1998 showing that Iraq overstated by at least 6,000 the number of chemical bombs it told the UN it had used during the Iran-Iraq War?bombs that remain are unaccounted for.

Iraq has not accounted for 15,000 artillery rockets that in the past were its preferred means for delivering nerve agents, nor has it accounted for about 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent.

Iraq has the capability to convert quickly legitimate vaccine and biopesticide plants to biological warfare (BW) production and already may have done so. This capability is particularly troublesome because Iraq has a record of concealing its BW activities and lying about the existence of its offensive BW program.

After four years of claiming that they had conducted only "small-scale, defensive" research, Iraqi officials finally admitted to inspectors in 1995 to production and weaponization of biological agents. The Iraqis admitted this only after being faced with evidence of their procurement of a large volume of growth media and the defection of Husayn Kamil, former director of Iraq's military industries.

UN monitors at Iraq's borders do not inspect the cargo?worth hundreds of millions of dollars?that enters Iraq every year outside of the Oil-for-Food Program; some of these goods clearly support Iraq's military and WMD programs. For example, Baghdad imports fiber-optic communication systems outside of UN auspices to support the Iraqi military.

Iraq imports goods using planes, trains, trucks, and ships without any type of international inspections?in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.
Iraq has been able to repair modern industrial machine tools that previously supported production of WMD or missile components and has imported additional tools that it may use to reconstitute Baghdad's unconventional weapons arsenal.
On several occasions, Iraq has asked to purchase goods?such as neutron generators and servo valves?that the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) views as linchpins for prohibited Iraqi programs; alternative, non-dual-use items would serve the civilian purpose purportedly intended for this equipment.

By Innocent on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 07:54 am:  Edit

Question:

Who doesn't think we should start flattening Sadam immediately? And Why?

By Batster1 on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 09:06 am:  Edit

Explorer,

Why do you think inspections work? 12 years of experience would indicate otherwise. Saddam has been dribbling stuff out for years just to appease and keep the UN at bay.

I find it interesting that many who are complaining about Bush pressuring Iraq now, never complained about Clinton.

"What if [ Saddam] fails to comply and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route, which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction?….Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild his arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I guarantee you he will use it…"

Bill Clinton, 1998

This said shortly before Clinton proceeded with a 3 day bombing campaign that included launching 300 cruise missiles into Iraq. The bombing campaign accomplished nothing other than increase the suffering of Iraq’s innocent populace. And of course it was carried out without specific permission from the UN. What was Clintons legal basis? Saddam’s intransigence in complying with existing UN resolutions. Of course Clinton, the French and The Germans never sought UN approval to bomb the shit out of Kosovo either. And they did it in face of stiff opposition from China and Russia. It seems only Bush is expected to surrender foreign policy to the UN and the Euro weasels.

I am not too sure about the war. It has some big cons and some possible scary outcomes. But one thing I am sure about is that the vast majority of the peace movement could give a rat’s ass about what happens in Iraq. This peace movement is really an anti-american and anti George Bush movement and nothing more. A few people from the board know me and can vouch that I am not a Bush fan. Never have been. But I am tired of the double standard being applied by the peace crowd. It seems to me they do not spend much time reading history. They should cut the man the same slack they cut Clinton.

By Ben on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 09:53 am:  Edit

Batster,

Your post was a very observant and well thought out commentary on the Bush haters.

I do not like the idea of our military going into Iraq, but if Saddam doesn’t get kicked out and if we don’t destroy his bio and chemical weapons and replace him with a pro American dictatorship/I mean government, Iraq will continue to be a very dangerous place.

Hell, if the first Bush had just gone on in and finished the job we wouldn’t be where we are now. I would bet you the same anti war, anti George W. Bush protestors are the same people that supported not going into Baghdad 12 years ago.

By Ben on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 10:08 am:  Edit

Oh, I forgot,

I was flicking around last night and hit the Chris Mathews show as four students jumped up and started chanting "Peace not War" and disrupting his show. He said OK either come down to the microphone and state your case or leave, but quit making the noise.


After a little hesitation this one female student came down and basically said that "the
world needs to stop fighting or there will never be peace". That was her well thought out message to the audience. Nothing else was said about the current government in Iraq, U N or anything else pertinent to the discussion regarding Iraq. If I was an anti-war protester I would have hung my head in embarrassment at this simplistic comment. Even Chris Mathews was embarrassed for her.

I just laughed my ass off. Better than Seinfield if it wasn’t so pathetic.

Oh and she had that "Valley Girl" accent that I find so irritating.

By Kendricks on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 10:17 am:  Edit

I fucking hate Valley Girl accents. Give me a nice Spanish or Asian accent any day. I hate war protesters too, and a war protester with a fucking valley girl accent is enough to drive me to manslaughter.

Back to the point, anti-war protesters are pussies and faggots. Let's get down to business, and start lighting some motherfuckers up.

By Batster1 on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 12:22 pm:  Edit

I liked the students from Sant Monica high that were chanting "War is wrong hit the bong". At least they offer an interesting alternative to war.

And what about that brainiac Sheryl Crowe saying "War is never the answer. Not making enemies is the answer" I like her music and she is pretty fine in my opinion. But what the fuck does that mean? She is obviously fuckin stupid.

Kendricks. Thanks for directing your scathing invective at the anti war protesters and not at me. LOL. whateer the reaon for protesting the war, I like what Tony Blair said. Something to the effect of " If a million people march, that will still be less than the number killed by Saddam Hussein either through wars he started or outright murder and genocide"

Sounds like a good reason to the light the fucker up to me.

By Catocony on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 12:55 pm:  Edit

Ah, nothing like bored rich suburban white kids protesting issues they know absolutly nothing about, the pussyfied sons and daughters of a failed generation, the baby boomers. "Hey, we protested the war in the 60's and fucked up our world in the 70's, maybe our precious seed can do the same in the 00's" I don't care if it's economics, war, etc they are bored and have too much time on their hands. I think the girls all need a good ass-fucking and the guys need to have their balls castrated so they can't contaminate the gene pool going forward.

I was a junior in college in 1990/91. Some campus group scheduled a protest "rally" in November 1990. If memory serves me right, out of a campus of 15,000, 31 people showed up at the rally, and 5 of those were local townie kids looking to maybe score some college granola-chick pussy.

By Ben on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 01:05 pm:  Edit

Kendricks,

You are hilarious.

Next time don't sugar coat it.

By Snapper on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 01:55 pm:  Edit

Does anyone else think that if the Allied forces take more time in dealing with the issue of Iraq that more lives will be put in jeopardy?

IMO, the USofA is not going to play the role of appeaser with North Korea forever. In fact, I bet it's killing the current administration that our military isn't what is was 10 years ago and able to deal with all of these situations at the same time. Every day that passes North Korea's nuclear weapons program gets stronger and stronger and puts more and more people at risk.

By Milkster on Thursday, March 06, 2003 - 02:27 pm:  Edit

Yes last night I watched the Nuuz and there is nothing worse than seeing sum dum old whitey women in their 60's ready to duke it out.
if anyone knows how to protest it is the Mexicans not only will they hold Wilson Pickett signs but they will strap your family to a gas station and threaten to blow them up ! They get results !!

Tu Moar weaks or less then wea gho tu whar is mi predicktion

Fistfully yures
Milkfargo

By Explorer8939 on Friday, March 07, 2003 - 01:57 pm:  Edit

Worst press conference last night I have ever seen. Some guy from CNN asked the Prez what are the downside possibilities of the war, and the response was "I am sworn to protect the US" and "Saddam is evil".

So, Bush seems like he's not looking at the problem for all sides, just the war side.

Pathetic.

For Snapper's benefit, I still see the war as being quick, and look forward to a world without Saddam, just not happy with the methods.

By Tight_fit on Friday, March 07, 2003 - 10:03 pm:  Edit

The press conference was an utter disaster. It's kind of scary listening to your leader invoking his religious beliefs as the final say as to what is right and what is wrong. "Screw the rest of the world. God is on our side." This is same blind fanaticism that we attribute to Islam. I jsut hope for everyone's sake that this war ends fast and relatively clean. And that we find all sorts of dirty laundry about the scumball French and their own crooked business deals. And, finally, if the North Koreans do lob a nuke missle that it goes way off course and hits Paris. :-)

By Snappa' on Saturday, March 08, 2003 - 05:01 am:  Edit

I didn't get a chance to hear the press conference, although I can imagine the way it went given how Bush has a knack for fuck'n up spoken word. I understand that when Bush refers to people as "evil" it rubs people the wrong way. What I would like to hear is an argument of how Saddam ISN'T an evil person.

By Explorer8939 on Saturday, March 08, 2003 - 06:45 am:  Edit

Sorry, can't give you that argument about Saddam, he is worthless.

But, this is kind of like a case of free speech, where you have to defend the Nazi's right of free speech. Its really easy to defend Belgium's national sovereignty against a foreign agressor, its much harder to defend Iraq, since everyone wants Saddam to go anyway.

BTW, if Bush really screws the pooch, here's one really bad downside: Saddam calls for the UN to abide by its charter, and defend Iraq against a foreign agressor. The downside is that Bush may provoke other nations into actually listening, or worse.

By Catocony on Saturday, March 08, 2003 - 09:30 am:  Edit

I'm just glad he's staying the course and going after all those damn "tourists" :-)

Can somebody please teach this dumb fuck how to speak English?

Tight Fit, I was having lunch with a Jesus-freak buddy of mine on Wednesday and brought up your point exactly. The reason the godboys justify that is by quoting the bible. "how do you know the bible is right?" "because it says it is, in the bible" You can't argue with fundementalist religious circular logic, be it radical Islam or Southern Baptist or Methodist.

By Ben on Saturday, March 08, 2003 - 10:49 am:  Edit

"BTW, if Bush really screws the pooch, here's one really bad downside: Saddam calls for the UN to abide by its charter, and defend Iraq against a foreign agressor. The downside is that Bush may provoke other nations into actually listening, or worse."

Explorer,

After I picked up my fat ass off the floor from laughing so hard, I was trying to then figure out whom the hell it was that was going to intervene on the side of Iraq.

Please tell me it is going to be those tough motherfuckers, the french (purposely not capitalized).

BenanarrogantAmerican

By Snappa' on Saturday, March 08, 2003 - 12:18 pm:  Edit

"The downside is that Bush may provoke other nations"

This almost comes to another point I'm going to make about how the UN is irrelevant, but I have to wait until after the SC vote. I'm not going to be partisan either. I will point out the most major way that global politics is fucked-up from both the conservative and the liberal side. This IS taking into account that the motions that the UN is going through are about as symbolic as a Charles Manson probation hearing.

All I'll say for now is; isn't it funny how Mexico changed their stance all of a sudden.

By Jamesbr1961 on Saturday, March 08, 2003 - 11:28 pm:  Edit

Snapper

I am new to the site, but everyone here has a difficult time believing that this is not about oil there are some facts that should be considered. I have worked in the oil and gas industry for over 18 years and have quite a few friends in Houston that are chomping at the bit to rebuild the Iraqi oil fields. The Carlyle group would make billions the first year alone. G Bush Sr and part owner of this corporation would make close to a billion. The Bin Laden family is also part owner of the Carlyle group as well.

And as far as oil and gas stockpiles not being down; in fact oil stockpiles are at a 25 year low and gas is at a 11 year low, with no increase in drilling activity. But do not take my word for it read the following:

03/07/03
U.S. INTENTIONS
FTW’s Contributing Editor for Energy, Geologist Dale Allen Pfeiffer
reveals that the Bush administration was aware of Peak Oil and what it
meant before taking office. He also takes a hard look at the condition of
Iraqi oil fields and blows away the Wall Street fantasy that a U.S.
occupation of Iraq will produce a quick fix for the markets and world oil
supply – As NATURAL GAS prices triple around the country Pfeiffer also
confirms (again) what FTW has been saying for a year. Natural Gas
depletion may tank the U.S. economy in a one-two punch along with oil prices.

US INTENTIONS


by Dale Allen Pfeiffer

© Copyright 2003, From The Wilderness Publications, www.copvcia.com. All Rights Reserved. May be reprinted, distributed or posted on an Internet web site for non-profit purposes only.


Mar. 7, 2003, 1400 PST (FTW) -Journalist Julian Darley has a very good website, www.globalpublicmedia.com, featuring video interviews with notables such as Colin Campbell and Matthew Simmons. Matthew Simmons is the president of Simmons & Co. International, a company which specializes in investment banking to the energy industry. The Campbell interview1 is a very informative chat at the petroleum geologist’s home in County Cork, Ireland. It is well worth perusal. The Matthew Simmons interview2 was recorded in an office of his business suite, and is also very informative—though it is disappointing to see a person so perceptive standing firmly behind George W. Bush. However, in his interview, Matthew Simmons made two very big revelations.


In the first instance, Mr. Simmons was discussing his email correspondence with a senior assistant to former secretary of energy Bill Richardson. The senior assistant informed Mr. Simmons in 1999 that she was accompanying Secretary Richardson on a visit to every OPEC country. Mr. Simmons told her that if he was undertaking such a tour, he would ask each country what was their spare oil capacity. Upon returning to the United States, the senior assistant called Mr. Simmons and told him that she was quite shocked by the responses to this question. In country after country, she was told that they were already pumping at or near capacity. For practical purposes, OPEC has no spare capacity.

Several of my associates have suspected as much. But in this interview, Matthew Simmons verifies the fact that OPEC is already pumping at or very close to full capacity. This means that to meet growing demand, oil must be found somewhere else. And OPEC most probably cannot increase output to cover a crisis such as the Venezuelan strike, or the disruption of Iraqi oil production in the event of another Gulf War. In fact, it was only a year after Secretary Richardson made his OPEC tour that world oil production appeared to peak, beginning the cycle of rising oil prices and tanking economies which we have been in since. Though Matthew Simmons did not spell it out, this is the clearest indication to date that we are at peak oil production.


The second revelation was more political than technical. Matthew Simmons states in this interview that he advised the Bush campaign and the subsequent Bush administration of the energy situation. This admission makes it very clear that George W. Bush and his administration knew about the approaching energy crisis before even stepping into the White House. Thus, as we have said at FTW, oil depletion has loomed in the background of every decision made by this administration and every action undertaken.


In his recently released book, The Party’s Over3, Richard Heinberg backs up this assertion and goes on to say that the CIA has monitored the oil business for some time. Indeed, the CIA subscribes to the yearly report of oil analysts Petroconsultants, and so must have seen the 1995 report The World’s Oil Supply. This publication, at a cost of $35,000 per copy, predicted that global oil production would peak in the first decade after the turn of the century.4


As we have stated before, Bush needed some catastrophe such as 9-11 to justify an endless war on multiple fronts. He needed it to provide cover for an oil grab. Of course, a superpower such as the United States always acts on a nexus of reasons and in pursuit of multiple goals, but greed for oil has been a major impetus behind pretty much everything this administration has done since taking office. Could oil really lie behind Bush’s push to unseat Saddam Hussein? Perhaps we should rephrase this question: How could oil not lie behind Bush’s push for the conquest of Iraq?


Iraq


Even unnamed senior US defense officials are stating that the plan is to take the oil fields as quickly as possible, supposedly to protect them from Saddam.5 British troops will be used to seize the oil fields so as to thwart the appearance of a US oil grab. However, ExxonMobil is in the lead position for rehabilitating the Iraqi oil fields. Oil executives are quoted as saying there is a desperate need to find another 80 million barrels per day to meet growing oil demand.6 Might we add that this growing demand cannot be met elsewhere because of the abovementioned lack of spare capacity.


Even after seizing Iraq’s oil fields and quelling unrest throughout the country, the oil majors will find it very difficult to increase Iraqi oil production in the short term. They may even have to cut production from its current level, as Iraq has been using unsound methods to pump the amount of oil which they are currently generating. Before the 1991 Gulf War and the decade long Iraq-Iran War, Iraq was pumping an average of 3.5 million barrels per day (b/d). 7 In 2001, Iraq averaged 2.45 million b/d, and experts say their current sustainable production capacity could go no higher than 2.8-3.0 million b/d.8







Most of Iraq’s current oil production is centered around three large fields, the Kirkuk field in the north of Iraq (10+ billion barrels), the East Baghdad field in the central part of the country (11+ billion barrels), and the Rumailah fields in the south of Iraq (10+ billion barrels).9 There are two other very large fields in southern Iraq which are basically untapped to date: the Majnoon field near the Iranian border (20+ billion barrels, possible as much as 30 billion barrels), and the West Kuma field closely associated with the Rumailah field (15+ billion barrels).10 Other notable fields are Nahr bin Umar (6+ billion barrels), Rattawi (3.1 billion barrels), Halfaya (2.5-4.6 billion barrels), Zubair (4 billion barrels), Nassiriya (2-2.6 billion barrels), Suba-Luhais (2.2 billion barrels), Bai Hassan (2 billion barrels), Buzurgan (2 billion barrels), Khabboz (2 billion barrels), Abu Ghirab (1.5 billion barrels), Khormala (1.5 billion barrels), Tuba (1.5 billion barrels), Gharraf (1.0-1.1 billion barrels). All told, including a number of smaller fields not mentioned here, Iraq holds proven assets of 112 billion barrels of oil. The unexplored regions of the Western Desert could add as much as another 100 billion barrels to this total. The area is known to contain oil-bearing Jurassic, Triassic and Paleozoic formations, though they are buried much deeper than the eastern formations and so might provide more natural gas than oil.11






Much of Iraq’s oil industry was damaged during the 1991 Gulf War. Completely destroyed were the gathering centers and compression/degassing stations at Rumailah, storage facilities, and pumping stations along the Iraqi Strategic (North-South) Pipeline.12 Many sizable fields were damaged and have remained unrepaired. Sixty percent of Northern Oil Company's facilities in northern and central Iraq were damaged during the Gulf War.13 Iraq’s oil export infrastructure was also severely damaged during both the Iraq-Iran War and the 1991 Gulf War. Pipelines, ports and pumping stations have all been affected. And Iraq’s two main Persian Gulf tanker terminals, Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya, were heavily damaged during the Gulf War. Damage to Mina al-Bakr appears to have been largely repaired over the past decade. Khor al-Amaya, on the other hand, was severely damaged during the Iraq-Iran War and then completely destroyed during Operation Desert Storm.14


During the decade of sanctions following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq tried to maintain production at existing fields despite an embargo on spare parts and oilfield equipment. Many of the reservoirs in production have been damaged through mismanagement and the use of questionable techniques in an effort to increase current production at the price of future production. In addition to the naturally occurring problem of water cut in Iraq’s southern wells (the damaging intrusion of water into oil reservoirs), many fields have been damaged by the practice known as water flooding in order to boost current production. Iraq’s oil minister stated that in 2002 only 24 of 73 Iraqi oil fields were producing. Oil consulting firm Saybolt International has pointed out the risk of a 5% to 15% annual production decline at damaged Iraqi oil fields. A U.N. report in June 2001 said that Iraqi oil production capacity would fall sharply unless technical and infrastructure problems were addressed. And U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned of a possible "major breakdown" in Iraq's oil industry if spare parts and equipment are not forthcoming. The United States has resisted any efforts for a long term solution to the problems, insisting on only short-term improvements to the oil industry. According to the head of the UN Iraq program, Benon Sevan, the number of holds placed on contracts for oil field equipment threatens the entire program with paralysis. Sevan stated in January 2002 that the United States placed over 80% of the holds, which affect nearly 2,000 contracts worth approximately $5 billion.15


Solving these problems will require major investment from a consortium of international oil companies. It will take at least a decade to double output, providing there is no further damage done. It will take at least $7 billion worth of investment to bring Iraq back to its 3.5 million b/d production level. Pushing past that level to 5.5 million b/d will require at least $20 billion of investment. Analysts say Iraq has the capacity to produce double that amount, albeit at an extraordinary cost over an extended period of time.16 Many international companies have stepped up to offer the needed investment. Iraq has signed multi-billion dollar deals with companies from China, France and Russia. And in recent months Iraq has signed a number of deals with companies from Italy (Eni), Spain (Repsol YPF), Russia (Tatneft), France (TotalFinaElf), China, India, Turkey, and others.17 However, none of these deals can move forward until they are okayed by the U.N. Security Council.


Could all of this go toward explaining why it has become so urgent for the United States to make war on Iraq and take over control of Iraqi oil fields? For over a decade, the U.S. has blocked any reparations or new development of Iraqi oil resources. In 2001, reports finally came out announcing that without increased access to spare parts, repairs and new technology, Iraqi oil fields could be damaged permanently. Pressure is building in the U.N. to allow this remediation and modernization of Iraqi oil infrastructure. Iraq is awarding contracts to major oil companies from various countries, excluding U.S. and British companies. And all of this is being blocked largely by the U.S., while U.S. and British oil companies line up for a piece of the action in the aftermath of an Iraqi conquest.

Let’s see, are there any pieces of the picture which we are missing? Oh yes, the U.S. is studying international law to determine oil field rights in the event of a U.S. & British conquest of Iraq. And they believe that international law would give them considerable leeway in managing Iraq’s oil fields (for the benefit of the Iraqi people, of course).18


And now, to round out this picture, let’s look at Iraqi oil exports as compared to US imports. As of July 2002, Iraq was producing 1.99 million b/d (oil production was 2.45 million b/d in 2001). Of this, they export 1.5 million b/d, over one-third of that, 566,000 b/d to the U.S. This is down from 795,000 b/d (or 53%) in 2001. The route to the U.S. is very circuitous, as the oil is first purchased by companies from many countries, including Cyprus, Sudan, Pakistan, China, Vietnam, Egypt, Italy, Ukraine, and others and then is resold to U.S. importers, including ExxonMobil, Chevron, Citgo, BP, Marathon, Coastal, Valero, Koch, and Premcor.19 There is also an unknown amount of oil being smuggled out through Syria and other countries. It is difficult to say how much of this, if any, is making its way to the U.S.


Now let’s look at the U.S. side of this equation. The U.S. imported an average of 10.3 million b/d as of September 2002. Of this, Iraqi oil would only amount to 6% of U.S. imports (8% in 2001). However, the U.S. derives around 26% of its daily oil imports from the Middle East—that is 2.3 million b/d as of August 2002. So Iraqi oil accounts for about one-quarter of our Middle East imports. Comparing Iraqi imports to our top sources of imports, Saudi Arabia exports 1.49 million b/d to the U.S. (14% of total imports), Mexico exports 1.46 million b/d (also 14% of total U.S. imports), Canada exports 1.37 million b/d to the U.S. (13% of the total), and Venezuela—prior to the oil strike—exported 1.14 million b/d (11% of the total).20 If this ranking of major oil imports was continued, Iraq would probably rank in the top ten. However, were the sanctions removed and the oil infrastructure repaired, Iraq would undoubtedly rival Saudi Arabia for the number one position; especially under a US military protectorate with US and British companies running the oil business. Beyond this, the conquest of Iraq—if successful—would allow us to add badly needed spare capacity to world oil production and it might stop the flight of oil countries from the petrodollar to the euro.

Other Oil News


Venezuela is still recovering from the oil strike. The EIA now states that Venezuelan oil production gradually rose to 1.2 million b/d in February.21 The EIA’s current short-term energy outlook assumes that the Venezuelan oil crisis will be over by March.22 However, they warn that Venezuelan supplies will not approach pre-crisis levels for another several months. Furthermore, it is possible that around 700,000 b/d of production may be permanently lost due to the strike.23 The EIA warns that OPEC efforts to increase output to make up for lower Venezuelan exports has reduced global spare capacity to only 2 million b/d—this spare capacity coming almost entirely from Saudi Arabia. There is very little room remaining to make up for unexpected supply drops or demand increases.24


On top of this, Nigeria’s white collar union began an oil export strike on Saturday, February 15th. Nigeria is the seventh largest oil exporter in the world. Royal Dutch/Shell, the country’s biggest producer, pumps an average 900,000 b/d. The oil companies expect to replace strikers with senior staff, and point out that previous strikes had little impact on exports. However, fear of the strike caused oil prices to temporarily jump by 16 cents per barrel.25 It is evident that the market is now so tight and the world economy so gun-shy that it is to be wondered how the world will survive an invasion of Iraq.


On top of all this, there was a small item in the Australian newspaper The Courier Mail stating that leftist rebels in Colombia have blown up a large section of that country’s most important pipeline. Operated by Occidental Petroleum, the pipeline carried 105,000 b/d.26 Little more is to be found about this story on the various news wires. The Bush administration has been bolstering military aid to Colombia, including increasing numbers of advisors. They have impressed upon the Colombian military that it is of primary importance to protect the oil pipelines, and they have labeled the rebels as international terrorists. What response there will be on the part of the U.S. to this latest strike at U.S. oil interests is hard to say.

Finally, in the EIA weekly petroleum updates, we find that for the week ending February 7th, crude oil imports declined by another 1.2 million barrels from the previous week. U.S. commercial crude inventories for that week sank to 269.8 million barrels, just crossing the Lower Operational Inventory Level (LOIL). This is the lowest inventory level since October 1975. However, in the week ending February 14th, crude oil imports rose to nearly 8.8 million b/d, the largest weekly average since December 20th. U.S. commercial crude inventories increased by 3.1 million barrels to 272.9 million barrels. This was back above the LOIL, but still 50.4 million barrels below the level of a year ago.27

Natural Gas


The picture for natural gas (NG) is even worse. As of February 14th, NG storage stood at 1,168 billion cubic feet (Bcf), down by 203 Bcf from the week previous. This was 868 Bcf less that a year ago and 436 Bcf below the 5-year average of 1,604 Bcf.28 In an article in The Oklahoman, Tony Say, president of gas marketing company Clearwater Enterprises said he expects NG reserves to reach an all-time low of 600 Bcf by the end of the season. Bruce Bell, Chairman of the Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association’s Oklahoma Division, warned that once you get down to 700 Bcf there are serious doubts as to how much gas can be withdrawn. The nation's gas reserves are stored in underground caverns, where there must be a certain amount of gas to create enough pressure to force the reserves out.29


Raymond James & Associates, in a recent report on natural gas, points out that NG production will continue to fall by 1.0 -1.5% per quarter for the foreseeable future. They warn that even if production returned to the feverish pitch of 2001, it would take three to six months before the new production would begin to slow down the natural declines in existing wells.30 Yet the NG rig total has hovered between 800 and 900 for the past year; at least 100 less than the number needed to meet national demand, according to Bruce Bell. Despite rising NG prices for the last couple months, work has begun on only 15 new wells.31


And according the Lehman Brothers, Canadian gas production is continuing to fall by as much as 4%. And this drop will coincide with a 500 million cubic feet per day decrease in NG exports to the U.S. Canadian NG demand rose in 2002 by 2 to 3% from the previous year. Net exports to the U.S. are expected to fall by 5% in 2003.32


Based on all of this data, the NG crunch of this year could lead to an NG crisis a year from now.


ENDNOTES


1 Colin Campbell Discussing Oil Depletion, Julian Darley. Global Public Media, 12/18/2002. http://globalpublicmedia.com/INTERVIEWS/COLIN.CAMPBELL/

2Matt Simmons discussing oil peak; natural gas; what the President knows; hydrogen; and Iraq, Julian Darley. Global Public Media, 2/10/2003. http://globalpublicmedia.com/INTERVIEWS/MATT.SIMMONS/

3 The Party’s Over: Oil, War, and the Fate of Industrial Societies, Richard Heinberg. New Society Publishers, April 2003. http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0865714827/qid=1045851880/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/
002-4461621-4414410?v=glance&s=books

4 Ibid. Page 86.

5 US Admits Plan to Snatch Iraqi Oil Fields, Mark Ellis & Gary Jones. The Daily Mirror, 1/25/2003. http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/allnews/page.cfm?
objectid=12568779&method=full&siteid=50143

6 Ibid.

7 Iraqi Oilfields, Dev George. Oil & Gas International, 1/22/03. http://www.oilandgasinternational.com/departments/
regional_spotlight/jan03_iraq.html

8 Iraq Country Analysis Brief. EIA, October 2002. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html

9 Ibid.

10 Op.Cit. See note 7.

11 Op. Cit. See notes 7 & 8. Oil & Gas International, and EIA.

12 Op. Cit. See note 8.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Op. Cit. See note 7.

17 Op. Cit. See note 8.

18 US Studying International Law to Determine Oil Field Rights in Event of War with Iraq. Drudge Reports, 1/29/2003. Citing the Wall Street Journal. http://www.drudgereportarchives.com/data/
2003/01/30/20030130_061815_flash.htm

19 Op. Cit. See note 8.

20 United States Country Analysis Brief. EIA, November 2002. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/usa.html

21 OPEC Brief. EIA, 2/7/2003. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.html

22 Short-Term Energy Outlook—February 2003. EIA, 2/7/2003. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/steo.html

23 Op. Cit. See note 21.

24 Op. Cit. See note 22.

25 Nigerian Oil Export Strike Starts Saturday –Union, Dino Mahtani. Reuters, 2/14/2003. http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/
nm/20030214/wl_nm/energy_nigeria_strike_dc_2

26 Rebels Blow up Key Oil Pipeline. The Courier Mail, 2/6/2003. http://www.thecouriermail.news.com.au/common/story_page/
0,5936,5944948%255E401,00.html

27 Summary of Weekly Petroleum Data. EIA, 2/14/2003. http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/
weekly_petroleum_status_report/current/txt/wpsr.txt

28 Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report. EIA, 2/20/2003. http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/oog/info/ngs/ngs.html

29 Cold snap gives boost to gas prices, Adam Wilmoth. The Oklahoman, 2/8/2003. http://newsok.com/cgi-bin/show_article?ID=984108&pic=none&TP=getbusiness

30 Energy "Stat of the Week" January 21, 2003. Raymond James & Associates. http://170.12.99.3/researchpdf/iEne012103b_0738.pdf

31 Op. Cit. See note 29.

32 Canada Gas Production Seen Falling 2%-4% - Lehman Bros. The Morning Star, sourcing Dow Jones, 2/12/2003. http://news.morningstar.com/news/DJ/M02/D12/1045083663075.html

By Jamesbr1961 on Saturday, March 08, 2003 - 11:34 pm:  Edit

Sorry I meant Snappa'

By Dickjohnson on Sunday, March 09, 2003 - 12:49 am:  Edit

Since I have made the statement that Snapper(now snappa) is non too bright, he has been on the computer 24/7 digging out junk to prove otherwise. LOL.

By Ldvee on Sunday, March 09, 2003 - 07:53 am:  Edit

Well, just heard on TV a couple retired Generals saying that we're back to the attack on the new moon scenario, that makes it the end of this month. I find it ironic that with all the high-tech weaponary the phase of the moon is a prime consideration. I guess it's because of a single piece of high-tech gear, night vision googles. Maybe a vet out there could confirm that.

There's a few things that are keeping me on the fence. First and foremost are all innocent Iraqis that will die. What a tragedy. Second is the US and Iraqi troops that will die. Mostly young guys in their early 20s who are just following orders. Third are the unknown unexpected consequences. Who knows what turns a war could take.

Osama got us real good. Bush essentially said last week that it is because of 911 that we have been forced to take this hard line position. I bet Osama is laughing all the way to the cave.

I know 3 Iraqis who are now US citizens. Granted a small sample but they don't want the war, they hate Saddam but I guess prefer him to war.

Let's hope there's a radical change in Iraq in the coming week. A coup, an assassination, or complete capitulation.

just my 2 cents

By Ben on Sunday, March 09, 2003 - 10:52 am:  Edit

Jamesbr,

I appreciate your information about the oil and gas industry. Most of this information is not a secret to the world , but I do feel the American public in general has been sticking there head in the sand or in complete denial that we have a oil and gas shortage and are dependent to the rest of the oil producing world for appro 55-60% of our oil.

I don't agree that oil is the major reason we are going into Iraq. Oil from SA, Russia, Iraq Africa,etc. will be sold to the highest bidder and it really doesn't make any difference who is running the Iraq government. The oil will be sold into the world supply. We are not going to take over the oil fields of Iraq and get the oil at less than the world spot price.

Incidently, I have owned and own several oil service and oil and gas stocks for many years and one of my favorites is a gas producer down in southern Colorado called Evergreen Resources EVG. It is perfectly positioned to benefit from the increase in the price of NG, but it can make money at $3 a mcf. Over the last couple of years I have bought it several times at under $40, but I think it is unlikely(for the reasons you stated) it will see $40 again until maybe it splits.

My biggest disappointment other than Halliburton(fuckin Dick Chaney and asbestos) is a small oil company in your town of Houston, Exxon Mobile XOM, but I still patiently wait for it to go up while I collect my dividend. By the way, Iraq has been selling oil to Exxon for years, although Exxon last fall stop buying their oil for fear of a war interruption and also public opinion at home.

Anyway I just don't see how the U.S. benefits oil wise by kicking out Saddam, except that yes, American oil service companies will probably get a bigger piece of the pie. That is really peanuts in the big picture.

Oh one other thing, I am so sick of hearing people complain about the cost of gasoline and how the oil companies are ripping everybody off. They act like it is a conspiracy. Maybe if the public would start pressuring their congressman to make it easier for U. S. oil producers to find the few remaining new oil fields in the U.S like the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska(which none of us will ever see) coast of Florida and California, the price of oil might have a chance to go down. How about allowing the transportation of natural gas from Alaska's North Slope and eliminating some of the costly and in many cases ridiculeous enviornmental requirements. The oil companies cannot make a profit on this North Slope gas under current conditions. Of course if the price of naturak gas continues to escalate the oil companies will probably be willing to pay, no let me put it differently, the oil companies will be willing to collect the extra revenue from you and me to cover many of these tree huggars required enviornmental protections.

I could ramble on, but most people never complain and just keep paying the higher prices.

Benandtheoilindustrythankyou

By Snappa' on Sunday, March 09, 2003 - 12:21 pm:  Edit

Jamesbr1961, I never stated that their won't be any post-war benefits related to oil for both Iraq and the United States. Of course Iraq is going to deal with companies from their new closest allied countries, but I do not feel that the goal of this military campaign is to capture oil. My argument is that this war is based on the principles of national and global security. Tony Blair has committed political suicide because he believes so strongly in these principles. My argument also is that Russia, China, and France are selling out those very same principles to protect their current arms for oil deals with Saddam Hussein.

As DJ stated I'm on my computer 24/7(a little sarcasm, although I do check on many things, at many odd times), but it has nothing to do with his comments. I've been this way for a long time. When I see or hear a news report that peaks my interest via TV, radio, newspaper, or any other media form I try and find the source of their information so I can see it before it gets tainted by a editorial bias. Your post definitely peaked my interest, and the first article (U.S. INTENTION) posted is definitely tainted by an editorial bias. I will look at some of the other links you provided when I have more time.


Since you have knowledge of the oil industry answer a couple questions for me if you may(I'm not trying to test you. these are sincere questions)

1. How many of the current top 10 countries that the US imports oil from are members of OPEC, is it still 4 or has Venezuela dropped out of the top 10 leaving 3 from OPEC? Dale Allen Pfeiffer, the author of said article almost seems to imply, or at least he fails to mention that not all of the countries that the US imports oil from are OPEC nations. Does this not throw off the stats he uses in his last two paragraphs where he writes "And now, to round out this picture..."

2. Is the country that sells the US the most imported oil still Canada?


Quotes and commentary on the "U.S. INTENTIONS" article:

"And OPEC most probably cannot increase output to cover a crisis such as the Venezuelan strike, or the disruption of Iraqi oil production in the event of another Gulf War."
The problems in Venezuela are temporary, and since they are(or were before this strike) the third biggest country we import oil from this will make a difference stateside for the economic theory.
"National oil company PdVSA President Ali Rodriguez said that production was expected to reach 2.5 million barrels per day by the beginning of March."
as taken from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec.html

"Thus, as we have said at FTW, oil depletion has loomed in the background of every decision made by this administration and every action undertaken."
nice editorial

" In his recently released book, The Party?s Over3, Richard Heinberg backs up this assertion and goes on to say that the CIA has monitored the oil business for some time. Indeed, the CIA subscribes to the yearly report of oil analysts Petroconsultants, and so must have seen the 1995 report The World?s Oil Supply."
This is pretty damn thin. In this same fashion of quoting fact I could say "Usama Bin Laden has 829 sons. DickJohnson backs up this claim with one of his post from yesterday" I would expect a true piece of journalism to list a direct source, and not to play 7 degrees.
...and who is Richard Heinberg?
Richard Heinberg is a journalist, educator, editor, lecturer, and musician. He has lectured widely, appearing on national radio and television in five countries. His essays have appeared in The Futurist, Intuition, The Sun, Brain/Mind Bulletin , Magical Blend, New Dawn, and elsewhere.

"As we have stated before, Bush needed some catastrophe such as 9-11 to justify an endless war on multiple fronts. He needed it to provide cover for an oil grab."
You have got to be kidding me. Here is a picture of President Bush at a photo-op in a Florida school as he is being informed of the tragic events that happened on Sept. 11, 2001. Does he look like he's grateful for those events? Does he look grateful that he is going to have to give an order to shoot down American passenger planes?
b
...and who the fuck is Dale Allen Pfeiffer to trivialize the deaths of those that were lost that day.

"Solving these problems will require major investment from a consortium of international oil companies. It will take at least a decade to double output, providing there is no further damage done."
Why then would Bush want to grab Iraq's oil to help our economy in ten years. Meanwhile, lowering his popularity to a point where it may make it impossible to win the next election?

"And in recent months Iraq has signed a number of deals with companies from Italy (Eni), Spain (Repsol YPF), Russia (Tatneft), France (TotalFinaElf), China, India, Turkey, and others.17 However, none of these deals can move forward until they are okayed by the U.N. Security Council. "
"Pressure is building in the U.N. to allow this remediation and modernization of Iraqi oil infrastructure. Iraq is awarding contracts to major oil companies from various countries, excluding U.S. and British companies. And all of this is being blocked largely by the U.S., while U.S. and British oil companies line up for a piece of the action in the aftermath of an Iraqi conquest."

It's called a UN Sanction, but seeing that much of the public thinks that these sanctions should be ignored proves either a huge double standard in the way the much of the public views this whole situation in regards to the UN, or it proves that much of the public agrees that the UN is irrelevant, and should only enforce its Resolutions and Sanctions when it doesn't inconvenience them.

"In 2001, reports finally came out announcing that without increased access to spare parts, repairs and new technology, Iraqi oil fields could be damaged permanently. Pressure is building in the U.N. to allow this remediation and modernization of Iraqi oil infrastructure. Iraq is awarding contracts to major oil companies from various countries, excluding U.S. and British companies. And all of this is being blocked largely by the U.S., while U.S. and British oil companies line up for a piece of the action in the aftermath of an Iraqi conquest."
I like the way he throws in the year 2001 in the first sentence of this paragraph to try and mislead the reader into thinking that these "blocks" just started happening, as if it were part of a post 9-11 plan. These "blocks" are the same thing that the author refers to as "holds" in an earlier paragraph where he also throws in a more current date to try and mislead the reader "Sevan stated in January 2002 that the United States placed over 80% of the holds ." These "holds" and "blocks" are the same thing I refer to in my prior comment as UN Sanctions. UNMOVIC began screening contracts pursuant to UNSCR 1284 in 1999 and since has identified dual-use items as defined in UNSCR 1051. Who was the President in 1999?(sarcasm)



Ldvee, "First and foremost are all innocent Iraqis that will die. What a tragedy."
It is a tragedy, but a lot fewer innocent Iraqis will die in an allied campaign than would die if Saddam stays in power.

BTW, do you know how many innocent Iraqis Saddam killed this day 15 years ago? anyone?

-snapper-


(Message edited by snapper on March 09, 2003)

By Jamesbr1961 on Sunday, March 09, 2003 - 01:20 pm:  Edit

Ben

Yes you are right about the price of gasoline and people trying to make it look like a conspiracy. It simply is a way that the networks get people into a crazy mindset by trying to sell ideas that could be logically explained by looking at the spot price of oil.

I would not agree with you about the US intentions to invade. I would say 95% of the reasons are to control the second largest reserves in the Mid East. This is about control of the reserves. He with the biggest army gets what he wants, like Cesar once said. It is not about weapons of mass distraction, and only recently have they been talking about helping to rescue the people of that country in a continued effort to sell this war to us. Lets remember that we heard almost nothing about Saddam until last July for many years. We have been flooded with the network propaganda now for over 6 months and still maybe 50% here agree with a preemptive war against this country. The world is against us, England has less than 20% if the population in favor of this war and we are saying that their support is proof of an allied effort. Blair may lose his PM seat soon over this as well. Many other “allies” Are being bought and paid for.

I am a conservative; I voted for GW Bush, I hated Clinton. I think the leader of Iraq is truly evil. I am a very patriotic American. But if you ask me or most people that know anything about what is truly going on, most will agree that this war will make the US a very dangerous place. This war in an effort to stop terrorist attacks on this country, will in fact make terrorist attacks a virtual certainty. We may now see true hell on earth here in our country as a result of these now certain attacks, if the war goes on. In my humble opinion nothing about what this administration is selling us about this strike makes any sense. Saddam is not a threat to its neighbors; Iraq is not a threat to the US. We have no proof of any weapons of mass distraction. The missiles that are being destroyed allegedly fly 11 miles too far, so they must be destroyed, 11 miles seems a bit strict but ok so be it. So lets see what I am being told. I am being told that we suspect that Saddam has these weapons, we have no proof but we suspect this to be so. I am being told that he as a secular leader that has been fighting fundamentalist Islam for years, that he just MIGHT give these weapons that we have no proof that he has, to the very fundamentalist that would in turn use them on him first. He has no ties to 9/11 even though the administration tried for a time to make an unbelievably weak argument to the contrary, which in fact turned out to be laughable at best. Now we are being told that we are going in to save the Iraqi people, to make it a democracy, ummm like Kuwait LOL. So we are going to kill them to save them. We are going to destroy their country to build it again. We are going to war for peace. We are being told to believe TV networks like NBC, MSNBC (which is owned by the largest defense contractor in the world GE) to believe all of these things because all of this is to protect us and that it is for our own good. We are being told that even though we are alone in the world on this idea of a war, not to worry.

With all of these reasons to go to war and “proof” we will risk destabilizing the region, committing our troops to many years of occupation and control while other countries that are truly a threat but do not have oil and gas reserves like North Korea become an even bigger threat. The call to arms for organizations like al-Qaeda, will be unprecedented, and the attacks on America will intensify.

So now I must ask, what is the real reason that this administration risks all of this with such flimsy evidence, to go to war? Could it be trillions of dollars in oil and gas reserves? I think the question is simply, how could it not be the oil and gas reserves as the motives of this war

Snapper, I will respond to your post a little later.

By Ben on Sunday, March 09, 2003 - 01:56 pm:  Edit

You make a good case, except again I just don't see how who is running Iraq effects the oil. Iraq will sell all the oil it can produce over the next thirty-fifty years and it doesn't matter who they sell it to, it is just part of the world wide market. Supply and demand.

In otherwords they don't need control of Iraq's, Venezuela's, Mexico's or anybody's oil. These countries have to sell their oil, in most cases it is their only source of revenue.

Now if you can make a case where Russia, OPEC and others refuse to sell us oil so the only way we get oil is to take it, I might buy into your theory.

I am not a Bush fan and I am not so sure we should be going into Iraq, but if i did think Iraq threatened our oil supply, I might be more supportive of this war.

By Snappa' on Sunday, March 09, 2003 - 03:52 pm:  Edit

Jamesbr1961,

"He with the biggest army gets what he wants, like Cesar once said."
-I highly doubt that China is going to get what it wants from this situation.


"It is not about weapons of mass distraction, and only recently have they been talking about helping to rescue the people of that country in a continued effort to sell this war to us."
-Are you refering to the missing Kuwaiti POW's? Notice the date?

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL URGES IRAQ TO REPORT ON KUWAITI POWS
("It is the decent, humanitarian thing to do," U.S. says)
By Judy Aita
Washington File United Nations Correspondent
April 26, 2000

United Nations -- The coordinator of efforts to get information on Kuwaiti POWs and other persons missing since the Gulf War told the Security Council April 26 that the situation is a humanitarian tragedy which deserves the attention of the highest levels of government.
Russian Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, who was recently appointed by Secretary General Kofi Annan as coordinator of the efforts to find POWs and others missing since the Gulf War, briefed the council on his initial efforts to talk with Kuwaiti and Iraqi officials and other interested parties on the fate of those unaccounted for after more than nine years.
In a written report to the council, Vorontsov said that "the fate of Kuwaiti and other nationals unaccounted for -- whether prisoners of war, civilian detainees or missing persons -- is a humanitarian tragedy which needs highest attention of all parties involved and concerned."
"The bereaved family members continue to seek closure of the file after nine years of uncertainty, not knowing the fate of their loved ones, and women not knowing what their status is -- wives or widows," the coordinator said. "It is important to bring about concrete results -- to repatriate to Kuwait the missing people who are still alive or to recover the mortal remains for return to the families."
Vorontsov told the council that both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Tripartite Commission set up by the council under the cease -fire agreement should continue their efforts. Iraq should participate in the commission's work, he said.
Vorontsov said, "Iraq's response to the issue of missing persons, as a purely humanitarian one, would become a yardstick by which the international community would measure Iraq's position on other outstanding problems."
A full accounting of Kuwaiti POWs and missing is one of the criteria that must be met for the lifting of economic sanctions on Iraq.
U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham said, "Iraq has an obligation to release these prisoners immediately, return the remains of those who are deceased and to work through the ICRC to provide a full accounting for these people."
While Iraq's obligations are spelled out in Security Council resolutions, Cunningham said in a statement released by the U.S. Mission to the U.N., "moreover, it is the decent, humanitarian thing to do."
Iraq, however, has refused to meet with Vorontsov, a career diplomat who is a former Russian ambassador to the United Nations and to the United States.
After the Gulf War cease-fire agreement in 1991, some 6,000 Kuwaiti POWs were repatriated through the ICRC, the Tripartite Commission and other channels with Iraq's participation. However, more than 600 Kuwaiti and other nationals as well as 17 Saudis whose names were submitted by Saudi Arabia have remained unaccounted for. Of those, 592 were civilians and most were neither soldiers nor policemen.
Iraq has provided no information since 1998 and has stopped participating in the Tripartite Commission as well.
Vorontsov has examined some of the files submitted by Kuwait which include well -documented requests that include eyewitness testimonies and official Iraqi arrest records, according to his report to the council.
Iraq, too, has asked the ICRC to find out the fate and whereabouts of more than 1,000 Iraqis not accounted for after its forces withdrew from Kuwait. However, Kuwaiti authorities told Vorontsov that they had no Iraqi prisoners of war on their territory, but did have several common criminals of Iraqi origin. The Kuwaiti authorities said they were prepared to allow Iraqi and ICRC representatives, along with observers from international organizations, to conduct search and identification operations in the country.
After the closed meeting, Security Council President Robert Fowler of Canada said that "members of the council stressed the importance of dialogue among all parties and urged Iraq to cooperate with Ambassador Vorontsov and resume cooperation with all other agencies and bodies dealing with this issue."
"Members of the council hope that this deeply important humanitarian issue can be considered in a humanitarian context and therefore that that contact can be made and pursued with the shortest possible delay," Fowler said.
"Members of the council expressed their unanimous support for Ambassador Vorontsov's work, for his report ... and for the future efforts he will make in our behalf," the president said.
Speaking on behalf of the council, Fowler said "members of the council expressed their deep concern for the plight of Kuwaiti and third party nationals and expressed their hope that this issue would be dealt with as a strictly humanitarian one by all sides concerned."
Vorontsov also pointed out that the recent release of Iraqi and Iranian POWs after more than a decade of extensive search and negotiations "gives a beam of hope that similar developments may happen in regard to those missing in the aftermath of the Gulf War."
"Understanding, reciprocity and display of good will are of critical importance" for the success of his mission, Vorontsov said.
(The Washington File is a product of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

"Lets remember that we heard almost nothing about Saddam until last July for many years."
-I remember Iraq, North Korea, and ????? being brought up in a speach that Bush delivered on 9-12-01. I think he refered to these countries as the "Axis of Evil".

"Blair may lose his PM seat soon over this as well. Many other ?allies? Are being bought and paid for."
-You are 100% correct on both counts. As far as Tony Blair is conserned, he will lose his seat. That should go to show the level in witch he believes these princeibles.


?I am a conservative; I voted for GW Bush, I hated Clinton.?
I think you being a charleton.

?Saddam is not a threat to its neighbors;?
Date Area Used Type of Agent Approximate Casualties Target Population
Aug 1983 Hajj Umran Mustard fewer than 100 Iranians/Kurds
Oct-Nov 1983 Panjwin Mustard 3000 Iranians/Kurds
Feb-Mar 1984 Majnoon Island Mustard 2500 Iranians
Mar 1984 al-Basrah Tabun 50 to 100 Iranians
Mar 1985 Hawizah Marsh Mustard/Tabun 3000 Iranians
Feb 1986 al-Faw Mustard/Tabun 8000 to 10000 Iranians
Dec 1986 Umm ar Rasas Mustard thousands Iranians
Apr 1987 al-Basrah Mustard/Tabun 5000 Iranians
Oct 1987 Sumar/Mehran Mustard/nerve agents 3000 Iranians
Mar 1988 Halabjah Mustard/nerve agents hundreds Iranians/Kurds

Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm#05


?Iraq is not a threat to the US.?
We know the USA is the first place he wants to use the WMDs that he has.

?We have no proof of any weapons of mass distraction.?
Notice the date?


LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE NETHERLANDS AND SLOVENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL


Material Balance of Chemical Munitions

"32. In July 1998 during an inspection the Commission found a document which detailed the consumption of special munitions by Iraq in the 1980s. Iraq took the document from the Chief Inspector and did not return it to the Commission despite demands by Security Council that it do so. The figures in this document indicate serious discrepancies with Iraq?s declarations on the expenditure of CW-munitions in the 1980s. According to this document, Iraq consumed about 6,000 chemical aerial bombs less than it is stated in its declarations. This invalidates the starting point of the Commission?s accounting for chemical weapons which remained in 1991. The provision by Iraq of this document together with clarifications of the discrepancies is required to increase the degree of confidence with respect to Iraq?s declarations of chemical weapons which remained in Iraq in 1991 and their disposition."
33. Iraq declared that 550 shells filled with mustard had been "lost" shortly after the Gulf War. To date, no evidence of the missing munitions has been found. Iraq claimed that the chemical warfare agents filled into these weapons would be degraded a long time ago and, therefore, there would be no need for their accounting. However, a dozen mustard-filled shells were recovered at a former CW storage facility in the period 1997-1998. The chemical sampling of these munitions, in April 1998, revealed that the mustard was still of the highest quality. After seven years, the purity of mustard ranged between 94 and 97%. Thus, Iraq has to account for these munitions which would be ready for combat use. The resolution of this specific issue would also increase confidence in accepting Iraq?s other declarations on losses of chemical weapons which it has not been possible to verify.
34. Among 1,550 R-400 bombs produced by Iraq, more than 1,000 bombs were declared as destroyed unilaterally by Iraq, including 157 bombs stated as having been filled with biological warfare agents. The accounting for about 500 bombs unilaterally destroyed has not been possible due to the state and extent of their destruction. In order to bridge the gap, the Commission asked Iraq to provide documentation on the disposition of the parachute tail sections of R-400 bombs. The accounting for these components would enable the Commission to verify the maximum number of R-400 bombs, which Iraq could have produced. Though this would not solve the specific issue of the quantity and composition of BW bombs, including allocation of BW agents, it may facilitate the final accounting for the chemical R-400 bombs. Iraq presented the information sought on the disposition of tail sections but field inspection activities are still required to verify the full accounting for these weapons.
35. The degree of verification achieved is not satisfactory. Iraq declared that it had produced a total of 3.9 tonnes of VX. Iraq provided documents on production in 1988, but failed to provide verifiable evidence for its activities in 1990. Iraq also denies that it weaponized VX. Sampling by the Commission of special warheads has thrown significant doubt upon this claim. Iraq needs to provide verifiable evidence and clarifications to support its declarations on the production and weaponization of VX. Technical meetings with the Iraqi specialists and field verification are required.
4. By the end of 1991, the Commission had completed the task of the destruction of proscribed missile weapons and materials that Iraq had chosen to declare immediately after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991). At that time, the Commission came to the conclusion that Iraq had not declared all its holding of such weapons nor disclosed all its proscribed capabilities and programmes. In March 1992, Iraq admitted that it had withheld from the Commission a considerable amount of proscribed weapons and their component, and declared that it had destroyed them unilaterally in Summer 1991 without the Commission?s supervision. This unilateral destruction by Iraq was in direct violations of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
24. The Commission's verification efforts, with respect to Iraq's declarations on combat missile launchers, have been frustrated by Iraq's misleading statements. Prior to March 1992, Iraq claimed that several imported mobile launchers had been destroyed during the Iran-Iraq war. In March 1992, it declared that those launchers had been unilaterally destroyed by Iraq in the summer of 1991. This statement was repeated in Iraq?s June 1996 FFCD. In the course of its follow-up verification, the Commission established that Iraq's statement on the unilateral destruction of mobile missile launchers was wrong. This finding was presented to Iraq by the Commission in July 1997. Iraq then made a new statement, in August 1997, that five imported launcher chassis had in fact been destroyed in October 1991, and not in July 1991, as had previously been declared by Iraq. A fuller explanation of Iraq's actions to retain mobile launchers after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) and to conceal the events and timing of their unilateral destruction was requested. In September 1997, the Commission asked Iraq to explain the operational requirements for the retained proscribed missile assets that Iraq had concealed after April 1991. In response, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq gave an explicit order, in the presence of the Executive Chairman, to the Iraqi experts not to discuss such issues with the Commission.
27. Issues related to remnants of warheads that have not been recovered, but which have been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed (some 25 imported warheads and some 25 Iraqi manufactured warheads), remain outstanding in the accounting of proscribed warheads that Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally. The full and verifiable accounting for proscribed missile conventional warheads remains essential for the verification of the premise that Iraq has not retained any proscribed missiles and that all proscribed missiles and their warheads indeed have been destroyed.
30. Iraq?s declarations and supporting documents include a specific distribution, by their type and warfare agent filling, of the 45 special warheads unilaterally destroyed in July 1991. According to Iraq?s declarations, 20 of them were chemical weapons and contained only the alcohol component of the CW binary system. Analysis at the laboratories designated by the Commission has detected the presence of degradation products of nerve agents, in particular VX, on a number of warhead remnants which were excavated. A meeting of international experts, including representatives of the three laboratories, which was held on 22-23 October 1998 concluded that "the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq?s declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any chemical warfare agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals known to be degradation products of decontamination compounds also do not support Iraq?s declarations that those warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols." Clarification by Iraq of these issues as recommended by the meeting would allow the Commission to make a determination whether or not the current assessment of the quantity of special warheads identified amongst the remnants excavated, accounts for all special warheads declared to have been produced by Iraq and provides for the verification of their unilateral destruction.

31. Iraq described in detail the procedures and methods of unilateral destruction of the special warheads by explosive demolition. After examination of the relevant destruction sites and the special warhead remnants recovered from them, the Commission found that Iraq?s explanations were, in general, plausible. However, in one aspect dealing with the destruction of BW warheads, the Commission, after consulting a group of international experts, assessed that Iraq?s declaration that 15 warheads had been destroyed simultaneously conflicted with physical evidence collected at the declared location of their unilateral destruction. This finding indicated that not all BW warheads had been destroyed at the same time as declared by Iraq and that Iraq had retained some BW warheads after the declared July 1991 unilateral destruction date. The discrepancies between Iraq?s current declarations on its unilateral destruction of the special warheads and the physical evidence collected at the destruction site need to be clarified. In addition, the Commission?s investigations showed that Iraq had not provided the true locations of the hiding, prior to the declared unilateral destruction, of at least half of the special warheads including the abovementioned 15 BW warheads. In December 1998, Iraq again identified new locations of storage pits from where the warheads had been moved to the unilateral destruction sites. The Commission could not again confirm that the newly identified locations had been used for hiding warheads. Iraq?s continuous inability to disclose hide sites of the special warheads has also prevented the Commission?s verification of declared unilateral destruction of the special warheads.
38. The full accounting for imported single-use proscribed missile propellants is outstanding. Documents, including an inventory list on the declared unilateral destruction, specifically requested by the Commission, have not been made available by Iraq to support its declaration on the quantities (over 500 tonnes) of proscribed propellants it claims to have destroyed unilaterally.
39. In addition to importation of missiles and related operational assets that fall under prohibitions established by Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq undertook major efforts to indigenously produce proscribed missiles. For this purpose, a number of projects were established and numerous facilities were involved.
41. Iraq sought to manufacture indigenously a complete missile system called Al Hussein. As with the imported missile system of SCUD-B class, the indigenous system was composed of missiles, warheads, launchers, guidance and control instruments, liquid propellants and support equipment required for the operational use of these missiles.
46. After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq sought to retain all available capabilities, components, materials, tooling and machines for its indigenous production of missile engines and guidance and control components, and attempted to conceal the true scope of its pre-Gulf War programme.
48. In late 1995, Iraq provided to the Commission, an inventory of proscribed missiles that it destroyed unilaterally. In addition to imported missiles that it destroyed, the inventory contained a reference to seven indigenously produced missiles. Iraq explained that these were missiles or missile engines that had been given to the Army?s Surface-to-Surface Missile Forces as "training" missiles. No documentation has been provided to confirm that these particular missiles were for training purposes. Although Iraq declared that these seven indigenous missiles were destroyed together with 85 imported combat missiles, remnants of the indigenous missiles or their engines, which could prove their unilateral destruction, have not been recovered by the Commission at the declared destruction sites.
49. The declared unilateral destruction of these missiles has not been verified. The verification in this area is considered as a priority issue as it might involve operational missiles produced indigenously by Iraq.
50. In response to the requirements of resolution 687 (1991) of April 1991, Iraq did not disclose its programme to produce indigenously liquid propellant engines for proscribed missiles. In October 1991, Iraq stated that it had a limited, unsuccessful effort within its Project 1728 for the reverse engineering of proscribed missile engines and had imported some components and equipment for that purpose. For years, Iraq insisted that the main purpose of Project 1728 had not been missile production, but the development of welding and other technologies for manufacturing agricultural pumps.
53. No significant quantities of missile components for indigenous production of proscribed missiles were presented by Iraq for destruction in accordance with the requirements of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq declared that practically all of the imported missile engine components, which remained at the time of the adoption of resolution 687 (1991) in April 1991, had been secretly destroyed either by explosion in the desert or by melting in foundries. These unilateral destruction activities were claimed to have occurred from July to November 1991 and were declared by Iraq for the first time in March 1992. Based on the evidence presented by Iraq and the lack of supporting documentation at that time, the Commission was not able to verify the quantities of proscribed items declared as unilaterally destroyed. The Commission also assessed that not all items, declared by Iraq to have been unilaterally destroyed in 1991, had in fact been destroyed as declared.
54. In November 1995, Iraq provided inventory lists to account for the unilateral destruction of components in 1991. Iraq was unable to produce credible explanations of discrepancies between its official declarations and the data contained in the documents it provided. In 1996, Iraq admitted that most important components and tools for its missile engine production had been diverted from the declared unilateral destruction in 1991. Iraq stated that items thus concealed had been retained until March-May 1992, at which time they were secretly destroyed despite the fact that Iraq had already disclosed unilateral destruction of some other items from its proscribed missile activities. In July 1998, Iraq acknowledged that declarations provided to the Commission were not complete and that hiding of missile engine components prior to their unilateral destruction had occurred at an additional site undeclared until that time.
72. In addition to efforts to acquire propellants for Al Hussein class missiles and as a part of its efforts to develop a next generation of long-range missile systems with increased ranges, Iraq procured a more advanced missile fuel - hydrazine based UDMH. It also established a plan to construct a factory in Iraq for the production of 500 tonnes/year of UDMH. Iraq initially denied plans to design a missile engine using UDMH. In 1995, it admitted that it had had such plans and had actually carried out a static test of a SCUD-B engine modified for use with UDMH. Iraq declared that it had imported 10 tonnes of UDMH and ordered, but did not receive, more. Except for fuel used in the static test, the remaining quantity of imported UDMH had been declared by Iraq as unilaterally destroyed in 1991. No evidence or documentation were presented by Iraq to support this declaration.
92. After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq attempted to retain all available production equipment from its factories to manufacture liquid propellant engines for proscribed Al Hussein class missiles. As reported above, this equipment was destroyed or rendered harmless by the Commission only in July 1995. Up to November 1995, Iraq had been misleading the Commission as to the nature and capabilities of the equipment retained.
97. The Commission has obtained evidence that Iraq continued work on some key proscribed missile components after the adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991). In particular, this involved such areas as gyroscope instruments for prohibited missile guidance and control systems, a technology Iraq had not fully succeeded in developing itself prior to the Gulf war. Most of these prohibited activities were declared by Iraq only in late 1995 or early 1996.
99. In November 1993, "working groups" were established in Iraq tasked to work on gyroscope instruments of the proscribed missile. Iraq declared that the order to begin this effort was issued by Lt. General Hussein Kamil. To accomplish the task, samples of original SCUD-B gyroscopes were required. As Iraq?s officials told the Commission, one engineer, of his own accord, had kept one set of three such gyroscopic instruments in his home as a "souvenir". The engineer then decided to turn these instruments over to the new working groups. In addition, a technician is said to have turned in microfilmed drawings of proscribed gyroscopic instruments done by a foreign supplier prior to the Gulf War. Iraq declared that the gyroscope project had been stopped after only two weeks of work. Drawings produced by the working groups, along with the gyroscopes themselves, were claimed to have been confiscated by Iraqi authorities in 1993, but it was decided not to hand them over to the Commission at that time. The microfilm with drawings was said to have been destroyed. Due to the lack of supporting documentation, the Commission is not able to verify Iraq's declarations on the nature and duration of these proscribed activities nor on disposal of all proscribed items and drawings involved.
100. Evidence available to the Commission shows that during the same period of time, in 1993, Iraq attempted to procure from abroad guidance components for proscribed Al Hussein missiles. This poses the obvious question why there was a need to procure, in 1993, components specifically used in proscribed missiles when all such missiles had been allegedly destroyed in 1991. A missile facility in Iraq signed a contract with a foreign middleman to acquire a key component (potentiometers) for proscribed SCUD-B/Al Hussein gyroscopes that Iraq stated it was not able to produce or procure before the Gulf war. Under the contact, the middleman purchased and brought to Iraq a number of components and samples of proscribed missile gyroscopes. According to Iraq, its officials learned of the content of the shipment and ordered it to be removed from the country. They warned missile establishments in Iraq not to deal further with this middleman. The shipment was declared removed from Iraq in May 1994. The Commission was not able to verify the content of the shipment nor its removal from Iraq.
101. In August 1994, two major missile facilities in Iraq signed new contracts with the same middleman whom they had been warned not to deal with. According to Iraq, the director of one of them included in his order a "secret list" detailing a wide variety of production and other technologies including missile gyroscope instruments that the middleman was to deliver. The "secret list" from this contract was worth several million dollars. After several months, the middleman obtained from a foreign supplier a cache of gyroscopes and accelerometers for long range missiles proscribed under resolution 687 (1991). The middleman managed to ship some of these proscribed items to Iraq in July 1995. A shipment of additional gyroscopes under the contract was intercepted in Jordan in November 1995. Iraq initially denied that it had been involved in this acquisition of proscribed items. When it admitted its involvement in December 1995, it stated that the middleman mistakenly purchased gyroscopes which Iraq had never ordered. The Government of Iraq declared that it had formally investigated this case. Documents related to the middleman?s activities were provided to the Commission. The Commission has conducted an extensive investigation into this case. The investigations confirmed that Iraq?s authorities and missile facilities had been involved in the acquisition of proscribed components.
102. Until late 1995, Iraq retained a number of original gyroscope instruments for proscribed SCUD-B/Al Hussein missiles. In October 1995, Iraq turned over to the Commission more than a dozen proscribed gyroscopes and related technical drawings. Iraq explained that, following Lt. General Hussein Kamil's defection, an "amnesty" order was issued by the Government. By this order, retained proscribed components could be turned over "anonymously" at various collection points. The gyroscopes appeared as a result of this campaign. The Commission asked for specific explanations regarding the reasons for retention of proscribed items, the "collection" sites, dates of collection of items etc. Iraq has not provided complete clarifications of these events.
105. Iraq declared that work on the 7-ton thrust missile engine had only started in June 1995. Such an engine could increase substantially the propulsive force of the then-declared missile system under development, which already had a range just below the permitted threshold of 150 kilometres. The engineer involved in the project claimed to have no knowledge of the purpose of the development of the new engine. He stated that no designs had been completed. No documentation has been provided by Iraq regarding these activities.
107. In January 1996, a Commission inspection team discovered, during an on-site inspection of a missile facility, computer files with a missile simulation programme. They contained evidence that in July 1992, a flight simulation of a 3-stage missile had been executed. The simulated missile was based on proscribed SCUD-B missiles. Iraq described the product of the simulation as a "Space Launch Vehicle" that was an effort of an unidentified engineer working on his own. The inspection team later determined that the input/output data, as well as the simulation programme itself, had been copied to floppy diskettes in September 1992. Forensic examination also revealed that the diskettes obtained by the team were part of a larger collection of computer disks that were not found by the team nor provided by Iraq. Due to the manner in which Iraq interfered with the team?s analysis of the acquired diskettes, a proper chain of evidence was not maintained, resulting in additional questions related to the nature and implications of the proscribed activities discovered.
110. Available evidence shows that around August 1991, Iraq started a secret project to construct a surface-to-surface missile called "J-1" without notifying the Commission as required by the Security Council resolutions. No aspect of the J-1 programme ? from design, to parts manufactured, to flight-testing ? was declared to the Commission until late 1995 i.e. some two years after it was allegedly aborted. Iraq states that Lt. General Hussein Kamil issued the orders both for the project itself and for the requirement to keep it a secret from the Commission.
111. During the period when work on the J-1 project was ongoing, the Commission?s inspectors were told by Iraq that it was merely developing a non-proscribed Ababil-100 missile that it had declared to the Commission. As it is known now, the Ababil 100 had some specifications similar to the J-1. Iraq admitted later that its intention had been to hide the "covert" undeclared project from inspectors within "open" work being done at declared missile facilities. Specific measures were taken by Iraq to conceal the J-1 effort from the inspection teams. Components for J-1 missiles were hidden or removed before visits of inspection teams.
115. Available evidence revealed that after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq operated in secrecy a facility for the production of liquid propellant missile engines. The facility known as the Sadiq factory was established by a team from Project 1728 (production of proscribed Al Hussein missile engines). The facility?s activity was not declared to the Commission until December 1995. Iraq stated that the work on liquid propulsion missile engines began in early 1992. This effort was declared as directed at the reverse-engineering and production of the Volga/SA2 missile engine as well as the manufacture of certain components such as missile engine shut-off valves, which the original Volga/SA2 engine did not have, but which are required for a surface-to-surface ballistic missile. Specific measure were taken to conceal this effort from inspection teams.
STATUS OF THE VERIFICATION OF IRAQ?S
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME

9. The Special Commission reported to the Security Council (S/1997/774 of 6
October 1997) that Iraq?s declarations on its total acquisition and expenditure of CW munitions during the period 1982-1988 could not be verified fully due to the absence of sufficient evidence of: the procurement, indigenous production, the filling with CW agents and the consumption of special munitions prior to 1988, as declared by Iraq.
b) 41,998 munitions [5,498 filled munitions and 36,500 unfilled munitions] declared by Iraq as having been destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war:
The Commission has accepted the destruction of about 34,000 munitions on the basis of multiple sources, including physical evidence, documents provided by Iraq etc. However, it has not been possible to achieve a numerical accounting of destroyed munitions due to heavy bomb damage of the CW storage facilities, where these munitions had been stored during the Gulf war,
the destruction of about 2,000 unfilled munitions remain uncertain,
550 filled munitions remain unaccounted for.
c) 29,662 munitions [854 filled munitions and 28,808 unfilled munitions] declared by Iraq as having been destroyed unilaterally:
the destruction of about 13,660 munitions, both filled and unfilled, has been accepted by the Commission on the basis of multiple sources, including physical evidence, documents provided by Iraq etc. However, it has not been possible to make a numerical accounting of these munitions due to destruction method used by Iraq (demolition),
the accounting for 15,900 unfilled munitions which, according to Iraq, had been melted, has not been possible,
about 100 munitions filled, according to Iraq, with BW agents remain unaccounted for.

38. The Commission?s verification activities of the military aspects were the most sensitive elements of its investigation of Iraq?s CW-programme. The Commission?s attempts to clarify these issues created controversy on the Iraqi side. The document found by the Commission in July 1998 at the Head Quarters of the Iraqi Air force was an example of the documentation related to the military aspects. It detailed the expenditure of special munitions by the Air Force during the Iran-Iraq war. It was taken away by the Iraqi authorities from the Commission?s inspection team in the course of the inspection and was not returned to the Commission.
49. The Commission has a certain degree of confidence in the accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war. The Commission has accepted through its verification the destruction of 34,000 special munitions and 823 tonnes of key precursors. Outstanding issues remain. These include the accounting for 2,000 unfilled and 550 filled special munitions.
51. The priority should be given to the resolution of the most important outstanding issues. These include: material balance of chemical munitions (including verification of the expenditure of special munitions in the 1980s, which is required to increase a degree of confidence with respect to Iraq?s declarations of chemical weapons remained in Iraq in 1991; the accounting for 550 artillery shells filled with mustard; verification of the unilateral destruction of R-400 chemical and biological aerial bombs); accounting for the production of the chemical warfare agent VX, and; verification of the completeness of declarations provided by Iraq on the material balance of CW production equipment removed from the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) prior to the UNSCOM inspections.
STATUS OF VERIFICATION OF IRAQ?S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME
Iraq did not acknowledge its proscribed Biological Warfare (BW) weapons programme until July 1995. From the first UNSCOM inspections in 1991 until 1995 Iraq denied it had a BW programme and has taken active steps to conceal it from the Special Commission. These steps included fraudulent statements, forged documents, misrepresentation of the roles of people and facilities, and other specific acts of deception.
Since its first revelations in July 1995, Iraq has submitted three "Full, Final and Complete Disclosures" (FFCDs) of its proscribed biological programme. The first of these, presented in August 1995, was declared null and void by Iraq itself. The second, submitted in June 1996, was subjected to intensive efforts to verify its accuracy and completeness through eight inspections and other technical discussions. In March 1997 an international panel of experts reviewed that FFCD and recommended its rejection because of the inadequacy of the material presented throughout the document.

In September 1997, Iraq submitted its third "final" FFCD since the July 1995 disclosures. This FFCD contained essentially no new significant information from the previous one that the Commission had rejected as incomplete. A panel of international experts reviewed it in September 1997 and considered it as deficient in all areas. Iraq however argued that it had not been given an adequate opportunity to present its case to the UNSCOM assembled experts and at Iraq?s request, a Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) between Iraq and a Commission assembled panel of international experts convened in Vienna in March 1998. Iraq did not present any new information at that meeting and the experts therefore reviewed the same material for a third time.
The TEM team reviewed the entire FFCD, and concluded it was deficient in all areas. In summary:
Weaponization There is considerable uncertainty regarding weaponization. The Iraqi account of the Al-Hussein BW warheads cannot be reconciled with the physical evidence. On R-400 bombs, there are inconsistencies in the account and the experts had no confidence in the number filled or how many were filled with particular agents.
Production Bulk BW agent production appears to be consistently understated. There are discrepancies between production capacity and the amounts of bulk agent declared to have been produced. The lack of documentation contributes to a low level of confidence in the Iraqi account of agent production quantities.
Acquisition The declaration on imports of raw materials and equipment is incomplete.
Planning All aspects of planning are omitted. This ranges from the circumstances surrounding the decision to commence the programme, the planning and the direction of the programme, the reasons for decisions and the individuals and organizations involved. The Commission considers that a knowledge of planning and decision-making is important because without it, determining the scale and the scope of the programme is not possible.
Research and Development (R&D) R&D is said to be unplanned, but the evidence shows that the programme was thoroughly planned.
History of Iraq?s BW Programme Iraq provided a selected and incomplete history of the BW programme.
Organizations The FFCD generally lacks information concerning organizational information from the highest levels down. There is also a lack of information on the military (or intelligence) involvement in the programme in spite of the fact that the programme resulted in the deployment of weapons such as bombs and missiles.
Concealment and Deception Since its disclosures in 1995 Iraq has continued to deceive the Commission and conceal parts of its BW programme. This includes efforts to hide documents, media, equipment and operating locations.

At Iraq?s request another review of the FFCD by a team of international experts was conducted in Baghdad in July 1998. By agreement with Iraq and the Special Commission this team focused on those elements directly related to the material balance: weapons, bulk agents and materials such as bacterial growth media. This team concluded:
Weapons On weapons the team concluded that the material balances and their sub-components (production, filling and destruction) declared in the FFCD for biological bombs (R-400) and Al-Hussein warheads, could not be verified. Furthermore the account in the FFCD on biological spray devices, modified drop tanks and the aerosol generator (Zubaidy device), could not be verified.
BW agents The material balances for bulk BW agents and their sub-components (production, filling, losses and destruction) for all declared agents (Clostridium botulinum toxin, Bacillus anthracis spores, aflatoxin Clostridium perfringens spores and wheat smut) could not be verified.
Media The media material balance and its sub-components (acquisition, consumption, losses and destruction) could not be verified.
FFCD Iraq?s FFCD in its totality cannot be verified. The team also expressed the view that verification cannot be achieved in the present circumstances whilst the Commission has an incomplete understanding of the philosophy of the programme including the military and other (such as security service) requirements for biological weapons. Without such an understanding, the Commission has an inadequate basis on which to assess whether the Iraqi account is complete. Accordingly, the FFCD in its present form, is an inadequate document for verification purposes.

Both the Vienna TEM and the experts? review in Baghdad concluded that Iraq?s biological FFCD is an inadequate document for verification purposes. The FFCD does not provide a coherent or comprehensive account of Iraq?s BW programme and lacks any supporting framework such as descriptions of planning, objectives, policy and organizations involved. The experts found that much of the information collected by the Commission to verify the FFCD in fact contradicts statements therein, particularly the evidence regarding weaponization, the quantity of agents produced and the media balance. The hundreds of interviews that the Commission has conducted with Iraqi officials also fail to provide a comprehensive account and even allowing for errors of memory, often contradict the account in the FFCD.

Supporting documentation is generally lacking. Iraq explains that this was because a decision was made in 1991 that all documents relating to the BW programme were to be destroyed. After the departure of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan in August 1995, the Commission was told that some documents had however been saved and about 200 documents relating to the BW programme were recovered by the Commission from buildings at the Haidar Farm. Most of these documents related to research and did not add a great deal to the Commission?s overall understanding of the programme. In addition to these documents, since 1995 and after much prompting by the Commission, Iraq has provided a number of additional documents of variable quality. Most of them are peripheral to the verification process and are open to various assessments. Thus, except in some limited areas, documentation provided by Iraq is grossly inadequate for verification purposes.

On technical, industrial and scientific developments of Iraq?s BW programme, it has not been possible to compile a comprehensive assessment because Iraq has not been transparent in its FFCD nor in its clarifications of the account of its BW programme.

The review also attempted to quantify levels of confidence in the accounting for the various elements of Iraq?s BW programme. In reaching its assessment, the Commission has taken into consideration the quality of information in its possession; documentary, physical, and personal testimony provided by Iraq; and the correlation of this information with other information such as that provided by Iraq?s former suppliers, from inspections or otherwise obtained by the Commission.

The Commission has a degree of confidence in the accounting for some proscribed items which Iraq presented for verification and disposal. This includes, for example: the destruction of buildings, and equipment at Al-Hakam, the destruction of large quantities of growth media acquired for the programme; and evidence that R-400 aerial bombs and Al-Hussein warheads contained BW agents and consequently that Bacillus anthracis spores and Clostridium botulinum toxin were indeed weaponized.

The Commission has far less confidence in the accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been unilaterally destroyed. These include, for example: the number and fill of R-400 aerial bombs destroyed at Al-Azzizziyah; the number and fill of BW Al-H4ussein warheads destroyed; and the fate of the biological warfare agent to be used with drop tanks.
The Commission has little or no confidence in Iraq?s accounting for proscribed items for which physical evidence is lacking or inconclusive, documentation is sparse or nonexistent, and coherence and consistency is lacking. These include, for example: quantities and types of munitions available for BW filling; quantities and types of munitions filled with BW agents; quantities and type of bulk agents produced; quantities of bulk agents used in filling; quantities of bulk agents destroyed; quantities of growth media acquired for the programme; and quantities of growth media used/consumed. In addition the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed; that no BW munitions or weapons remain in Iraq; and that a BW capability does not still exist in Iraq.

From 1987 onwards Iraq undertook pilot and industrial scale production of BW agents. Iraq denies any parallel activity to develop weapons capable of delivering the BW agents it was producing. During inspections, Iraq has stated that its policy was to evaluate weapons that had been developed for Chemical Warfare (CW) purposes, to establish whether they could be adapted for BW agents. It is difficult to accept that Iraq claims it had not initiated a BW-specific weapons programme in the late 80's, possibly in the MIC Naval and Aerial Bombs Section, in order that efficient and effective dissemination weapons be made available. It is not clear whether such weapons have been developed and are not disclosed, or have been partly developed, not reaching a stage where they could be manufactured.

Several other outstanding issues also remain to be resolved. These issues are related: to the scope and extent of R&D activities; the acquisition of supplies and equipment; the involvement of military and other agencies in the BW programme; and deception and concealment of the BW programme.

Iraq has not provided evidence concerning the termination of its offensive BW programme. The evidence collected by the Commission and the absence of information from Iraq, raises serious doubts about Iraq?s assertion that the BW programme was truly "obliterated" in 1991 as it claims.
Abbreviations
Agent A.................................................................................................Clostridium botulinum toxin
Agent B.......................................................................................................Bacillus anthracis spores
Agent C.................................................................................................................................aflatoxin
Agent D................................................................................................................Wheat Cover Smut
Agent G.............................................................................................Clostridium perfringens spores
Al-Hakam...............................................................Al-Hakam Factory for Production of BW agents
ATCC..........................................................................................American Type Culture Collection
Bt...................................................................................................................... Bacillus thuringiensis
BW........................................................................................................................Biological Warfare
CN.......................................................................................1-Chloroacetophenone, riot control agent
CS...................................................................o-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile, riot control agent
CW.........................................................................................................................Chemical Warfare
DIALOG..............................................................................................................Computer Database
FFCD..........................................................................................Full Final and Complete Disclosure
FMD..................................................................................Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Factory
Haidar Farm...........................................Storage site for documents of Iraq?s weapons programmes
IAEA........................................................................................International Atomic Energy Agency
kg........................................................................................................................................kilograms
km......................................................................................................................................kilometres
Kimadia.............................................State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing
LC...............................................................................................................................Letter of Credit
MIC.................................................................................................Military Industrial Commission
MOD..................................................................................................................Ministry of Defence
NMD...............................................................................................National Monitoring Directorate
R&D........................................................................................................Research and Development
SCP.......................................................................................................................Single Cell Protein
SCR.........................................................................................................Security Council Resolution
SEHEE.........................................................State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment
SEPP..........................................................................State Establishment for Pesticides Production
SOTI...............................................................................State Organization for Technical Industries
TEM...................................................................................................Technical Evaluation Meeting
TSMID................................................................Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division
TRC...........................................................................................................Technical Research Centre
UNSCOM..................................................................................United Nations Special Commission
VRL...............................................................................................Veterinary Research Laboratories


Introduction

Iraq?s offensive BW programme was among the most secretive of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction. Its existence was not acknowledged until July 1995. During the period from 1991 to 1995 Iraq categorically denied it had a biological weapons programme and it took active steps to conceal the programme from the Special Commission. These included fraudulent statements, false and forged documents, misrepresentation of the roles of people and facilities and other specific acts of deception. For example, Iraq claims to have destroyed much of the documentation and overt evidence of the programme. At the same time Iraq maintained other aspects of the programme such as the equipment, supplies (e.g., bacterial growth media), and personnel as an intact entity and facilities of the programme such as the Al-Hakam facility that produced BW agents.

In 1995, when Iraq was confronted with evidence collected by the Commission of imports of bacterial growth media in quantities that had no civilian utility within Iraq?s limited biotechnology industry, it eventually, on 1 July 1995, acknowledged that it used this growth media to produce two BW agents in bulk, botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis spores, between 1988 and 1991. It was not, until August of 1995, however, that Iraq acknowledged that it had weaponized BW agents, and had undertaken weapon tests from 1987 onwards. This admission only occurred after Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan departed. Shortly afterwards, Iraq released a considerable quantity of documents concerned with its weapons of mass destruction programmes. The documents relating to biology represented just 200 documents with some pages out of a total of more than a million pages. Many of the biological documents were scientific reprints from foreign journals. Clearly, they represent only a minor portion of a BW programme that ran from 1973 until at least 1991.

Since July 1995, the Commission has conducted 35 biological inspections directly or indirectly related to investigations of Iraq?s proscribed BW programme. In addition, two inspections devoted to the destruction of sites, known to be integral components of the programme, have been undertaken. The past programme investigations have concentrated on issues that are directly related to disarmament and have attempted to validate these aspects of Iraq?s Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD), generally without success. This considerable effort has been negated by Iraq?s intransigence and failure to provide cooperation concerning its biological weapons since January 1996.

After Iraq?s acknowledgement of its BW weapons programme , Iraq has submitted three FFCDs of its BW programme. While the first of these FFCDs was declared void by Iraq itself in August 1995, the two latter FFCDs were reviewed by panels of international experts on four occasions. In March 1997, an expert panel recommended the rejection of Iraq's June 1996 FFCD because of the inadequacy of the material presented throughout the document. In May 1997, the Commission presented formats to enable Iraq to clarify deficiencies in its biological FFCD. All areas of concern to the Commission were clearly identified and discussed with Iraq. It was expected that these issues would be seriously and comprehensively addressed by Iraq in its next FFCD. However, in September 1997, Iraq provided a new FFCD that contained essentially the same information, ignoring all advice provided to it by the Commission. As reported to the Council, an international expert panel reviewed Iraq's biological FFCD in September 1997, and considered it deficient in most aspects. In March 1998, a biological Technical Evaluation Meeting (TEM) between the Commission and Iraq took place in Vienna dealing with all aspects of the biological FFCD. The Commission?s team comprised 18 experts from 15 countries.

On each occasion the experts unanimously considered Iraq's FFCD presented an inadequate, inaccurate account with deficiencies in all areas. Iraq?s latest biological FFCD (submitted in September 1997) is not complete and fails to present a coherent, technically detailed, overall account. The shortcomings occurred not only in areas directly concerned with the material balance (e.g., weapons, bulk-agent products, and microbiological growth media), but also in all other areas (e.g., history, planning, acquisition, research and development). The TEM team also concluded that the FFCD had substantial deficiencies in all areas and Iraq's account of its BW programme could not be verified as a ?full and complete disclosure?, as required by the Security Council. Iraq provided many explanations for the account in the FFCD but was unable to substantiate most of its disclosure, and was unwilling to add the missing components. In July 1998, another international team concluded the FFCD, in its present state, could not be verified as complete and accurate.

The Emergency Session of the Commission held in November 1997, concluded that the biological weapons file was the most serious area in which Iraq had consistently disregarded its obligations under SCR 687. The members of the Commission noted that the paucity of progress was largely attributable to Iraq?s denial of the existence of any biological weapons programme until July 1995. The members of the Commission further noted that Iraq?s FFCD of September 1997, was not substantially different from previous, unacceptable, versions, and it remained largely unsupported by evidence and documentation. The Security Council was urged to call upon Iraq to rectify the existing deficiencies.

In April 1998, the Commission?s report to the Security Council (S/1998/332) listed the priority issues identified by the TEM. These included: history of the BW programme, organizations involved, acquisitions, research and development, production, weaponization and materials balance. In May 1998, Iraq provided clarifications of some issues arising from the TEM but has failed to resolve any of the key issues outstanding. Subsequently on 3 and 4 June 1998, the Commission provided a technical briefing to the Security Council. This gave an outline of the material balance and the main outstanding disarmament issues in each weapons area. In biology, this briefing highlighted the lack of verifiable details on virtually the entirety of the programme.

The Commission presented to the Security Council outstanding issues and sought to establish a programme of work that would enable outstanding issues to be resolved. In biology the priority concerns were: the production of materials and equipment; agents; munitions, and their possible destruction. Additional requirements from Iraq were the provision of the information and materials identified by the TEM. The Commission subsequently met with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq in June and agreed on a schedule of work for the next two months. As part of the schedule of work it was agreed, at Iraq?s request, to reconvene the international experts to discuss again, with a broad range of Iraqi experts the overall problems associated with the biological FFCD.

For these discussions, the Commission proposed that the approach should be "top down", that is focus primarily on weapons, in the belief that the many other important issues in biology might be more easily resolved if progress were made with respect to weapons. Accordingly, the discussions focussed on the provision of new material in the key area of the material balance of weapons, especially material not covered in the March TEM. Iraq did not provide any new information and the FFCD, presented to the Commission in 1997, was judged again to be inadequate.

Iraq has recently pressed for the experts to make a "quality assessment," as to whether any biological weapons or agent remain in Iraq. This was emphatically stressed by Iraq during a meeting between him and the Commission?s Chief Inspector in July 1998. Given the present information disclosed by Iraq, such an assessment could not be made.

To assess the quality of any biological agent over time requires knowledge and confidence in that knowledge. This includes the physical state of the agent, e.g., liquid or dried, with or without stabilizers; storage conditions of the filled weapons or bulk agent, e.g., temperature, humidity, containers, etc.; tests done on the agent before and after filling, and the results of such tests. None of this information on Iraqi weapons is available to the Commission. SCR 687 (1991) requires the elimination of BW weapons regardless of its"quality".

The FFCD presents a limited account that deals only with some components of the programme uncovered during the Commission?s investigations. Iraq states that it ?obliterated? the BW programme in 1991, claiming that this involved the destruction of all its BW weapons and associated records and documents. This has greatly complicated the determination of the material balance, and thus hindered verification. The FFCD portrays a programme designed to culminate in January 1991, suggesting that no plans existed beyond that time. In reality the programme was a continuing one, with objectives stretching well into the future. The statement that the programme was ?obliterated? in 1991 is contradicted by later evidence of deception and concealment. This activity continued until 1995, at least, and one of the aims could have been the preservation of essential components of the BW programme. Indeed, Iraq, after 1991, retained suitable growth media, BW facilities, production equipment, teams of expert personnel, and the essential technical knowledge.

Iraq has not revealed the planning process. No mention is made of the role of the military and intelligence services in defining the requirements for the BW programme, or in the subsequent planning to meet that requirement. Iraq?s doctrine of use of BW weapons is not covered in the FFCD. Consequently, the Commission can not determine the organization, scope and fate of the programme. Iraq has yet to present any formal renunciation of the termination of its BW programme.

This paper presents a status report on the investigation and the various attempts to verify Iraq's FFCD. Greater emphasis is placed on matters that affect the Material Balance (Part I), i.e., unfilled and filled weapons, bulk agent, and microbiological growth media. Part II presents the status of verification of other areas, including history, acquisition of supplies and equipment, research and development, sites and facilities, involvement of other organizations such as military and intelligence organs. Part III presents other issues that also relate directly to verification. These include: investigation and verification inspections; Iraq?s documentary evidence; technical coherence of Iraq?s stated programme; technological progress of the programme; termination of Iraq?s programme; and concealment and deception.


STATUS OF VERIFICATION CONCERNING THE MATERIAL BALANCE OF IRAQ?S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME

Weapons Systems

To assess whether Iraq has met its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), obtaining a full understanding of all aspects of Iraq?s BW weapons is essential. Iraq?s FFCD does not contain the required detail for such an assessment. It must include numbers, types, markings and a detailed account of individual weapon systems, supported by documents and physical evidence. The term ?weapons? in this paper refers to filled munitions, empty munitions, and bulk BW agents.
Al-Hussein Missile Warheads

In August 1995 Iraq declared that it had filled 25 Al-Hussein missile warheads with BW agents. This figure is not supported by conclusive evidence. In its FFCD Iraq has declared that five warheads were filled with Bacillus anthracis spores, 16 with botulinum toxin and four with aflatoxin. Ten warheads containing botulinum toxin were deployed to an abandoned railway tunnel at Al-Mansuriyah. The remainder was stored on the banks of the Tigris canal. No credible evidence has been presented to support this account of BW agent filling and subsequent weapon deployment.

Iraq claims that the Al-Hussein warheads were not specifically developed for BW; instead the Chemical Warfare (CW) warheads were filled with BW agents. Although static and dynamic trials were undertaken with CW agents, Iraq denies that there were any BW trials. Most of the CW warheads had aluminium containers. According to Iraq, later CW, and all BW, warheads had stainless steel containers to be filled with CBW agents. The substitution of aluminium containers with stainless steel containers is explained as a response to difficulties in welding aluminium. It is not attributed to the needs of the payload. Thus this BW weapon was filled and operationally deployed without any field tests.

Iraq asserts that all 25 BW warheads were unilaterally destroyed at specific locations at Al-Nibai desert in July 1991. To verify the FFCD, the Commission in 1998 took samples from the remnants of agent warhead containers excavated from various locations at Al-Nibai. The results of the analyses do not support the statements made in Iraq's FFCD. Traces of Bacillus anthracis spores have been identified on remnants of containers from at least seven distinct missile warheads as opposed to the five declared. There are discrepancies between the Iraqi account of where groups of warheads containing particular BW agents were destroyed and the results of the analyses. This throws doubt on the accounts of weapons filling, deployment and subsequent destruction.

In response to this evidence, in July 1998, Iraq changed its account of BW warhead and other munitions filling. It stated to an Commission team that, instead of the declared five Bacillus anthracis spores and 16 botulinum toxin warheads, there had been in fact 16 Bacillus anthracis spores and five botulinum toxin missile warheads. Iraq insisted that this change in disclosure would not affect Iraq's declaration on the total quantity of BW agents produced and weaponized. These changes also included alterations to the numbers of R-400 aerial bombs filled with Bacillus anthracis spores and botulinum toxin. Iraq did not present any supporting documents or other specific evidence to substantiate the new statement. In the original account, Iraq emphatically asserted that all ten weapons in the Al-Mansuriyah railway tunnel were filled with Bacillus anthracis spores and only later was this adjusted to botulinum toxin.

This new explanation contradicts many aspects of the accounts of the unilateral destruction of special warheads, including those filled with BW agents. Further, it is inconsistent with the accounts provided during the preceding three years by Iraqi personnel directly involved in warhead filling and destruction activities. The new statement does not fit the physical evidence available of the unilateral destruction of biological warheads.

The account of Iraq?s Al-Hussein BW warheads has changed frequently over the past few years. In July 1998, even in the space of a few weeks, Iraq made ?suggestions? changing the numbers of warheads filled with particular BW agents and their deployment and destruction. The physical evidence from the destruction area and the analyses of the remnants contradicts the account contained in the FFCD. Thus the FFCD account is inaccurate and is not validated.
R-400 Aerial Bombs

Iraq has declared, that 200 R-400 aerial bombs were manufactured for BW purposes. However, Iraq acknowledges that the numbers of bombs filled with particular BW agents are "guesses".
Iraq?s accounts concerning the development of the R-400 bomb for BW purposes have changed since 1995. In 1995 when the personnel who conducted the programme were explaining the programme, they described it in considerable detail. There was a series of field trials using a total of six R-400 bombs, two each charged with Clostridium botulinum toxin, Bacillus subtilis and aflatoxin. Many animals were said to have been used. These field trials were reflected in the June 1996 FFCD. Subsequently, Iraq has denied that any such trials were conducted. It is very difficult to reconcile this change with very specific accounts of R-400 trials given by scientists, the attendant veterinary surgeon and workers, at what was said to be the site, namely Al-Mohammediyat. There was also a trial in August 1990 to determine the size of ?booster charge? charge required to disperse the agent. All attempts by Iraq to locate the exact site at Al-Hakam and find any evidence have failed.

Iraq initially claimed that 166 R-400 bombs were filled with BW agents. It was stated that three agents were used: agent 'A' (Clostridium botulinum toxin), agent 'B' (Bacillus anthracis spores), and agent 'C' (aflatoxin). Subsequently, to accommodate a document provided by Iraq that suggested that 157 R-400 bombs were destroyed, the figures were adjusted by a new claim by Iraq that only seven, and not 16 R-400 bombs were filled with aflatoxin.

Evidence of the destruction of three botulinum toxin filled R-400 bombs was found in 1997 when and remnants of another 20 R-400 bombs in the same area were identified. Remnants of another 25 R-400 bombs were also found in 1991, by a Commission inspection team, at a time when Iraq was declaring a total of only 40 R-400 bombs (stated to be all CW) at Al-Azzizziyah. It cannot be determined whether all these weapons had ever been filled. The figure of "157" R-400 bombs is based on a document provided by Iraq that suggests that 157 were destroyed. There is no evidence to support that these were in fact biological bombs.

A review by international experts of all information available to the Commission demonstrated that the account of R-400 bombs in the 1997 biological FFCD is both incomplete and inaccurate. The FFCD provides no documented account of filling. This means that a material balance for the weapons and the BW agents incorporated within them cannot be established. There is no confident upper limit on the number of bombs filled for BW purposes. There is no authenticated account of the destruction of the BW agent contained in the weapons. The possibility that such weapons remain in Iraq, cannot be precluded or that agent produced for such weapons exists in bulk storage.
The 1997 biological FFCD omits, or does not substantiate, many aspects of the R-400 programme, such as quantitative aspects of filling weapons, location and timing of filling, storage, deployment and destruction of weapons and military deployment or use. Photographic evidence shows that biological R-400 bombs were at an undisclosed site in October 1991, which is after Iraq claims that the BW programme had been "obliterated". This is of particular concern as it affects the credence of the account of R-400 weapons in the FFCD. The total number of R-400 bombs that would have been available for filling is not known.

The account of Iraq?s R-400 aerial bombs has been changed several times since 1991. Even in July 1998 Iraq has made ?suggestions? changing the numbers of bombs filled with particular BW agents. The inconsistency between the FFCD account and the physical evidence means that the Iraqi account cannot be confirmed. Thus, the FFCD account is not verified.

The frequent changes in the Iraqi account of the Al-Hussein missile warheads and the R-400 aerial bombs are more than adjustments of detail. They cast doubt on the entire Iraqi declaration on weaponization.
Aircraft Drop Tanks

In September 1995, Iraq declared the existence of two projects concerning the use of aircraft drop-tanks to disseminate BW agents. One employed a Mirage F-1 aircraft, the other a MiG 21. The Mirage F-1 drop-tank project was said to have commenced in November 1990 when a prototype, made from a modified drop-tank, was manufactured and a series of trials undertaken. Following the last trial, just before the Gulf war, the Mirage with the prototype tank attached was left in a shelter at Abou Obeydi Airbase, near Al-Kut. Iraq states the shelter was bombed and the Mirage F-1 and its drop-tank were said to have been destroyed by fire. Three further drop-tanks were modified. This work, which appears to have been straightforward, requiring only a few days? efforts, continued throughout the period of the war at several establishments. The weapons were completed in March 1991. It is stated that these items were destroyed in summer 1991. The remains of three such tanks have been inspected. Iraq?s plan was for the modification of 12 tanks in total. Iraq states that only the scarcity of a key component, an electric fuel cock, limited the number to three.

The drop-tank project appears to have been pursued with the utmost vigour by Iraq. It seems to have been the only BW weapon system that continued in development after the start of the Gulf war. Two mobile tanks for bulk BW agents, each with a capacity of 1000 litres, were found buried at the Al-Azzizziyah outstation of Abou Obeydi. This raises questions about the state of readiness of this weapon system. Iraq will not discuss the details of concepts of use and flatly refuses to acknowledge the plan for this project.

Iraq has claimed for two years that the drop tanks were intended to deliver Bacillus anthracis spores. Bacillus subtilis spores were used as simulant in a test with this intent. In the Vienna TEM Lt. Gen. Amer Al-Saadi reversed this statement by claiming that botulinum toxin was the agent to be used. His technical experts were unable to provide technical information in support of this claim. The availability of agent, and its nature, greatly influence an assessment of the material balance. Four drop tanks would require 8000 litres of agent. The FFCD fails to state which agent was intended to be used.

There is no evidence that the prototype weapon and aircraft were destroyed, nor is there sufficient documentary evidence concerning this weapon and its components. The FFCD account is not validated.
Pilotless Aircraft Project

The concept was to produce a MIG-21 aircraft that could take off and fly on a preset flight path without a pilot on board. The plane would carry a drop-tank containing BW agent. After a preset time the valves on the tank would open and disseminate the agent. The aircraft would continue to fly until it ran out of fuel. One experiment was undertaken on 10 January 1991 at the Iraqi Air Force Al-Rasheed Airbase. The reason given for dropping the project was the intervention of the 1991 war, expressed as "the situation at that time".

Apart from one letter, thanking the project workers, all the information on this matter stems from interviews. However, there is a lack of evidence. The accounts given of the project are credible, when dealing with its technical aspects. When the management of the project, its place in the BW programme and the concepts of use of the weapon are considered, the accounts are contradictory and have changed between 1995 and the summer 1998. The FFCD gives abbreviated details of this project. No mention is made of the intended use of the pilotless aircraft for the dissemination of BW agent.

The FFCD account is too brief, considering the apparent intended use of this equipment. There is no clear evidence of the termination of the development of pilotless aircraft for BW dispersal. It is known that such work continues, although for a different stated purpose (targets for anti-aircraft artillery). The attempts to dissociate the MIG-21 project from the development of aircraft spray tanks has not been convincingly explained. The FFCD account is not validated.

Aerosol Generators/Helicopter Spray System ("The Zubaidy Device")

An aerosol generator for the dispersal of biological warfare agents or toxins was developed by the Technical Research Centre at Salman Pak by modification of helicopter-borne commercial chemical insecticide disseminators. These modified aerosol generators are assessed as suitable for the dissemination of BW agents from helicopters or slow moving fixed-wing aircraft and are referred to as Zubaidy devices. A description was included in the June 1996 FFCD. It did not however cite the number of devices produced nor account for their final disposition. In the current FFCD, the devices are only briefly mentioned. A document has also been submitted by Iraq reporting the successful field-testing of these devices in August 1988 to spray Bacillus subtilis spores. However it was stated at the Vienna biological TEM in March 1998, that Iraq now considers these devices to be inconsequential.

The absence of a comprehensive account of the Zubaidy devices including their disposition and supporting evidence is an example of the incompleteness of the current biological FFCD.
The Commission has evidence of a parallel development by the Technical Research Centre (TRC) of a similar device, probably for delivery by drones. Iraq officially denies all knowledge about this second device but this denial is inconsistent with indications from interviews. It is unknown whether development of this second device continued to deployment but the possibility exists that it did and that such a weapon system still exists in Iraq.
Other Weapons Systems

Cluster Bombs: Iraq has been asked whether cluster munitions, which are inherently a more effective delivery system for BW agents than aerial bombs, were part of the BW programme. On one occasion, an Iraqi representative mentioned that, although cluster munitions were never used in the CW programme, they were part of the BW programme. He later retracted this remark formally. Since then Iraq has strenuously denied that cluster munitions played any part in the BW programme.

122mm Rocket Warheads: The majority of the declared BW field trials carried out by Iraq involved the testing of 122mm rocket warheads. This part of the programme proceeded in an ordered and logical fashion, commencing with static tests of single warheads and culminating with salvoes of rockets charged with BW agent or simulant. There are documents, video tapes and interview information detailing this work. The Iraqi reports on these trials submitted to MIC, point out the success of the system and recommend adoption of this weapon for the delivery of Agents A, B, C and D. Despite the progress made over a period of years, the development of 122mm warheads was said to have been abandoned by August 1990. The 122mm warhead was considered unsuitable by Iraq "for the impending conflict". The full scope of this work, the rationale for the use of these weapons and the seemingly abrupt end of the project have never been satisfactorily explained.

Artillery Shells: A single 155mm artillery shell was found at Iraq's main BW production facility Al-Hakam, recovered from the River Euphrates. It was of the same type used for CW agents. It contained water. Another smaller calibre shell was also found. It had been detonated. These shells were said to have been for evaluation. Four similar shells were used in a trial for the dissemination of the BW agent Ricin, . No further evidence has been found. It appears that these trials produced indifferent results, and that, apparently, these projects were not continued.

LD-250 Aerial Bomb: Static trials of LD-250 aerial bombs to disperse agents were conducted in 1988. It is likely that further such trials were conducted. These tests were considered successful. Despite this, and the adoption of the weapon for CW agent delivery, it is claimed that no further development occurred.

Fragmentation Weapons: Experimental work on the sub-dermal introduction of Clostridium perfringens spores, applicable to fragmentation weapons, was acknowledged by a senior Iraqi worker in the field. He admitted that the work was relevant to fragmentation weapons that are designed to cause gas gangrene. Iraq denies carrying out any developmental work on weapons exploiting this research

Land Mines: When Iraq was considering which weapons to use for the dissemination of BW agent, land mines were considered. One of the scientists was sent to Al-Qa'a Qa'a, the explosives factory, to look for types of anti-personnel land mines that could be used for the purpose of filling. He found that there was nothing available suitable for filling with liquid BW agents.

350mm and 1,000mm Calibre SuperGun Projectiles: The Iraqi SuperGun programme was developing long-range projectiles for both 350mm and 1,000mm calibre weapons. The drawings of various designs for the 350mm device, depict a projectile with a guidance and control section, control surfaces on the fins and a payload of around 20 kg. Plans existed for a 1,000mm calibre weapon that would have had a longer range, and a payload greater than 100 kg. Iraq denies that there was any connection between the BW programme and that of the SuperGun. This project, like the BW and CW programmes, was managed solely by MIC. Like the BW project, no objective or planning has been acknowledged. The development of this weapon system was well advanced, with several sites being used and plans prepared for new and more versatile weapons. The intended purpose of this weapon has not been revealed. A long range delivery system, with its guided projectile, capable of delivering relatively modest pay-loads suggests the use of very potent warheads, such as CW or BW agents, or even radioactive material. The range and payload delivery are of a similar order to those of the Al-Hussein. Without a more comprehensive disclosure by Iraq, the possibility that this weapon was being developed for the delivery of a BW payload cannot be ruled out.

BW Agents

Bulk warfare agent production appears to be considerably understated by Iraq. Production accounts are incompatible with resources available to Iraq's BW programme, including growth media and fermentor capacity. Production figures in the FFCD remain unsupported from 1987 to 1989 and 1991. The sole supporting document, for 1990, differs from information contained in the FFCD itself. Experts' calculations of possible agent production quantities, either by equipment capacity or by growth media amounts, far exceed Iraq's stated results. Significant periods when the fermentors were claimed not to be utilized are unexplained, especially for a period after August 1990, when Iraq's BW production facilities were ordered to operate at their maximum capacity. Stated low productivity of readily available equipment has not been adequately explained. The idle times for fermentor utilization and low productivity, which are technically not credible, cast doubt on the elemental credibility of the 1997 FFCD.

Quantities of each agent (and indeed what agents were placed) placed into munitions are unclear. Similarly, the quantities of bulk agents destroyed can not be verified. The quantities cited by Iraq are deduced and may have little relationship to actual quantities. The place and method of destruction is not established. There is no assurance that bulk agents were not recovered, in some instances, from weapons prior to destruction of the weapons.

Iraq has not reported all the known quantities of bacterial growth media that was imported for its BW programme, nor has it accounted credibly for all the media that it has reported. Iraq?s declared failed batches are excessive and inconsistent in totality. In production of botulinum toxin, Iraq reported that thioglycollate broth when used at half strength of that recommended by the manufacturer produced acceptable toxin levels. These factors add to the quantity of BW agent that might have been produced by Iraq.

Fermentor usage: Iraq has calculated the quantity of agent produced by an assigned frequency and efficiency of fermentor utilization as well as assumed numbers of failed batches of agent production. For the years 1987 to 1989 there are no records to support production and the frequency and efficiency of fermentor operation is inconsistent with the overall information. Additionally, fermentors appear to have been available earlier than stated. For example, the fermentation line acquired from the Veterinary Research Laboratories (VRL) at Abu Ghraib is stated to have been acquired only late in 1988 when it was moved and installed at Al-Hakam. However, documents provided by Iraq indicated consideration of its use in situ at the VRL and spare parts for this line were ordered by the BW programme beginning late May 1988.
Fermentor idle times: Relative to available resources, Iraq has declared less than expected production of bulk agents. Declared quantities are based on limited availability of capability such as fermentors and a shortage of specific bacterial growth components. As a proof for the limited production output Iraq claims, fermentors were not used for considerable periods of time. For example, Iraq claims lack of spare parts and a needed overhaul of some fermentors as an explanation for "idle periods". In fact, UNSCOM has evidence indicating spare parts were available. There is no corroborating documentation to support the less than optimal bulk agent production levels reported in the FFCD. The low production figures are particularly difficult to accept without supporting evidence during a period in mid-1990, when allegedly maximum production was ordered by Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan.

Clostridium botulinum toxin, Agent A: It is not possible to verify the amount of Agent A produced, placed into munitions or otherwise consumed as presented in the 1997 FFCD. Various accounts of the destruction of bulk Agent A were made in both the FFCD and by independent Iraqi testimony. There is insufficient documentation to verify either the quantity of Agent A destroyed or whether remaining bulk agent in summer 1991was destroyed. Methodology employed in destruction and location of destruction, similarly, can not be determined.

Bacillus anthracis spores, Agent B: It is not possible to verify the amount of Agent B placed into munitions or otherwise consumed as presented in the 1997 FFCD. UNSCOM cannot exclude the production of Agent B from facilities other than Al-Hakam based on analytical evidence of Bacillus anthracis spores in equipment (one fermentor and two tanks) located at the FMD facility at Daura. An Iraqi explanation for this finding presented during the inspection was not credible. Overall, bulk agent production quantities and the location of production of Agent B cannot be determined because of the lack of sufficient supporting documentation.
There are various accounts derived from both the FFCD and independent Iraqi testimony concerning the destruction of bulk Agent B. Laboratory analysis of samples obtained at Al-Hakam has demonstrated the presence of viable Bacillus anthracis spores at an alleged bulk agent disposal site. Iraqi experts cannot explain adequately how viable Bacillus anthracis spores could have been present at this site. The inactivation procedures described by Iraq for the "excess" bulk agent would preclude any live agents remaining following that inactivation procedure. The explanation provided by Iraq, i.e., endemic contamination is not credible. An alternative explanation proposed by Iraq that the viable organisms came from material discarded during agent production operations in prior years was contradicted by earlier information provided by Iraq. Further, that explanation, if true, would preclude verification of the destruction of bulk agents. There is insufficient documentation to verify either the quantity of Agent B destroyed or whether remaining bulk agent was destroyed. Methodology employed in destruction and location of destruction, similarly, can not be determined.
Aflatoxin, Agent C: Declared production of the BW agent aflatoxin could not have occurred using the process stated by Iraq. In its June 1996 FFCD, Iraq claimed that, in September 1990, it had zero balance on hand, having produced only 40 litres of aflatoxin that were nearly all consumed by weapons field trials. Assessments by the Commission show that the quantity produced would have been inadequate for the declared number of field trials. Iraq claimed to have produced 1,782 litres of aflatoxin for filling weapons from 1 October to 31 December 1990 and continued the production two weeks into January 1991 for an additional 119 litres. Taking into account the technology, organization and production limitations including facilities, equipment, and personnel available, such large production volumes are doubtful. The impact on production of aflatoxin of mixing CS, CN, and smut spores with aflatoxin is not clear. A new account of aflatoxin production and weaponization is contained in the September 1997 FFCD, but the changes are not adequately explained or supported by documentary evidence. The new account is no more credible than the June 1996 version. Iraq has not offered any credible explanations to support its statements other than the 1990 Al-Hakam report that cites 2200 litres produced without the details of where and how it was produced. During an inspection in July 1998, Iraq tried to establish among themselves the figures of aflatoxin produced, indicative of Iraq?s uncertainty with aflatoxin production quantities.

It is not possible to verify the amount of Agent C placed into munitions or warheads or otherwise consumed as presented in the 1997 FFCD. The question remains open regarding the aim and reasons of the choice of aflatoxin as an agent for BW. It is not clear what Iraq expected to obtain as a result of its use. One document refers to military requirements to produce liver cancer using aflatoxin and the efficacy against military and civilian targets. Understanding Iraq?s concept of use for this agent may enhance the credibility of otherwise unsupported statements.

Iraq has indicated that the production data in the FFCD were based on recollection and back calculations due to a lack of production records.

Clostridium perfringens spores, Agent G: Stated amounts of Agent G produced, used, consumed or destroyed cannot be verified because of insufficient documentation. Iraq maintains that small quantities of Agent G, 340 litres, were produced because of limited availability of personnel and lack of critical growth media components. There is no documentation to support this, and the Commission has information which counters the allegation that growth media components represented a limitation. Iraq has not provided a credible material balance accounting for its known Peptone acquisitions by the BW programme. Peptone is a growth media component which appears to have been only used in the production of perfringens spores by the BW group.

Smut, Agent D: It is not possible to verify the amount of Agent D produced, used or consumed owing to a lack of sufficient documentation from Iraq.

Iraq had stated it produced smut coated with aflatoxin, but neither this statement, nor the destruction of bulk Agent D can be verified.

Bacillus subtilis spores, simulant for Bacillus anthracis spores dissemination: Stated amounts of Bacillus subtilis spores produced can not be verified. Stated quantities and time of production appear to be figures contrived to be compatible with the number and dates of field trials reported in the FFCD. Interview information and documentary evidence contradict Iraq?s presentation of field trials conducted. Because of this artificial system for deriving production numbers, each additional trial that was not included in Iraq?s arbitrary calculations, add to the disparity in quantities of simulant produced.

Bacillus thuringiensis spores, simulant for Bacillus anthracis spores drying: Iraq cites the production of ~50 litres of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) spores in March 1990 for drying studies which are claimed not to have been done because of a failure to obtain a particular spray dryer. However, Bt spores were taken by Iraq to the supplier in December 1989 to test on the spray dryer it planned to acquire. The quantity of Bt spores produced can not be verified.

Ricin: Iraq asserts that 10 litres of ricin were produced from 100 kg of castor beans and that this quantity was used in a field trial using 155mm artillery shells in November 1990. Documents obtained during an inspection in 1997 indicate that far more than 100 kg of castor beans were collected and processed in October, November 1990. If the Commission had a clear understanding of Iraq?s objective for including Ricin in its programme, then perhaps much of the uncertainties surrounding Ricin could be resolved.

Other agents produced: It is not possible to determine if bacterial or toxin agents other than those stated in the 1997 FFCD were produced. Seed stocks of other agents were actively sought for and obtained by Iraq?s BW programme.

Drying of agent: It is not possible to determine if bacterial and toxin agents produced were dried to enhance storage stability or for reasons of dissemination. This issue is of significance because Iraq actively procured drying equipment and obtained training in the use of such equipment for key personnel. Drying studies on bacteria started in 1974.
Mobile storage tanks. Eight mobile double-jacketed tanks were part of the VRL line transferred to Al Hakam. In addition, Iraq has acknowledged the production of an additional 39 mobile tanks by SEHEE. These tanks were used to transfer agent between production and filling or deployment sites and for storage of agent. Owing to their properties, they can be used for long-term storage of agent under controlled conditions or modified to function as fermentors suitable for the production of BW agent.
Bacterial Growth Media
Media Acquisition

In the early days of Iraq?s BW programme based at Al-Muthanna and Salman Pak small quantities (in the order of tens of kilograms) of media of various types were purchased by Iraq through the State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP) for research and pilot scale production for BW agent. . The media, some tens of kilograms, for the initial production runs of botulinum toxin at Taji in early 1988 is stated in the FFCD to have been acquired locally but the details are not provided and it is unknown whether the amounts declared represent the totality of the amount actually acquired. No supporting documentation is provided by Iraq for any of the acquisitions referred to above.

In late 1987 and early 1988, enquiries, and ultimately orders, were made for large purchases of media. Iraq acknowledges importing over 40 tons of media in 1988 and although no documentation is provided by Iraq. The Commission can confirm the four largest orders listed in the FFCD. However, the Commission has information that shows that the bulk media acquisitions as declared by Iraq are an incomplete listing and that further amounts in excess of 600 kg were imported and have not been declared. Furthermore, some of this undeclared media was received by Iraq prior to May 1988, suggesting that the statement in the FFCD that the Taji fermentor was shut down between April and July 1988 "due to the non availability of culture media", is incorrect.

Given the incompleteness of documentation regarding media acquisitions, particularly for local purchases, and evidence indicating that imports have been understated, the Commission cannot verify Iraq?s declaration of media acquisition.
Media Used In Production

The account in the FFCD of media consumed in the production of BW agent is acknowledged by Iraq to be a mathematical calculation based on a) the claimed quantity of agent produced and b) the estimate of failed production batches that would have also consumed media. In addition other quantities are said to have been discarded during the production process (Iraq has stated this to be due to spoilage). Other than the 1990 Al-Hakam report outlining agent production at Al-Hakam for that year, Iraq has provided no records or other documentation to support its estimates.
Iraq had stated that in June 1991, before the arrival of the first UNSCOM BW team, the media remaining at Al-Hakam was transferred to the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing (otherwise known as Kimadia) within the Ministry of Health. Iraq has explained that the role of Kimadia was to provide a cover story for media that had been consumed in the weapons programme. Subsequently documentation was drawn up to indicate that media consumed in the programme had been sent to hospitals in outlying regions where riots had occurred and hence would no longer be traceable.

Thus the difference between the quantity of media imported and that remaining in stock in 1991, i.e., the shortfall, accounted for by Kimadia, represents the media consumed in the Iraqi BW programme between 1988 and June 1991. This provides a snapshot in time immediately following the stated end of the BW programme and potentially is a figure that can be used in the verification of Iraq?s FFCD. The picture however became confused in July 1998 when Iraq stated that not all the media left over from the programme was transferred to Kimadia, but certain amounts (undocumented) were retained at Al-Hakam. Thus the Kimadia "shortfall" figures would reflect media consumed in the programme plus any remaining at Al-Hakam in 1991. If this is the case then the Kimadia documents become less useful as a verification tool. Furthermore some of the data from the Kimadia documents is in conflict with the FFCD. In discussions with Iraq during an inspection in December 1998, the issue of what quantity of media remained in 1991, became more unsettled. Iraq submitted "copies of documents" that casts further doubt on the usefulness of the "Kimadia documents" for verification. The "copies" provided during this inspection cast further doubt, however, may not be valid copies.

As noted above, Iraq has recently stated that in 1991 some of the media was transferred from Al-Hakam to Kimadia. What is unclear and has not been explained to the Commission is the basis for the retention of media at Al-Hakam. Peptone, for example, which had been used for the production of Agent G had no apparent role at Al-Hakam in 1991 if the BW programme had been abandoned. Also Kimadia had "covered" for all the media remaining in 1991 and therefore any media remaining at Al-Hakam had been written off and was untraceable. It is not clear why this media was not accountable in the Iraqi system if indeed Al-Hakam had been converted to legitimate purposes in 1991.

In summary the figures presented in the FFCD for media consumed in the production of BW agent are a theoretical calculation, have little supporting evidence and do not account for all media acquired. This current account therefore can not be verified.
Media Lost, Damaged or Destroyed

The FFCD identifies two losses of media prior to the first UNSCOM BW inspection. The first was said to have occurred during the evacuation of Al-Hakam and the relocation of its headquarters to Al-Asma?a school about 30 km away. It is stated that equipment important to the functioning of departments was relocated to the school on 22-23 January 1991. Included was an unknown quantity of media of various, but unidentified, types. At some time before the return to Al-Hakam in May 1991, Iraq claims the school was broken into and some items stolen and damaged including some of the media.

Iraq states that no investigation of the loss occurred and that the amounts and types of media cannot now be recalled. The figures in the material balance table of the FFCD indicate that over 900 kg of media were "lost" including over 700 kg of peptone which is relevant to Clostridium perfringens (Agent G) production. There would appear to be no basis for these figures other than a calculation designed to account for all the media i.e. so that the material balance equals zero.

The Commission has reason to believe that no media was stored at the schoolhouse and that none was stolen.

A second loss of media is stated to have occurred during the clean up of Al-Hakam prior to UNSCOM?s arrival in 1991. This was said to be an unquantified amount of media damaged during the evacuation and it is stated to have been burnt and buried at a site adjacent to Al-Hakam. This site was visited by the Commission?s inspection team in 1995 and it was confirmed that media was burnt and buried there but the types and quantities are not known. During the inspection in December 1998, Iraq presented several improbable accounts of media lost, damaged and stolen that defies credibility. In conclusion therefore, the Iraqi account of lost media cannot be verified and in the case of the school house media, it is probably not true.
During the destruction of Al-Hakam in 1996, 22 tons of media were collected from several facilities and destroyed under the Commission supervision. However some of the 22 tons (unquantifiable) probably came from sources external to the BW programme i.e. some of the media from the original orders is still unaccounted for. It is also uncertain whether all the media acquired for the programme has been identified. Thus there is little confidence that all the media associated with the programme has been located and destroyed.
Material Balance

The following tables provides a summary of Iraq?s material balance declarations for growth media acquisition, usage, consumption and disposal by four key media types: casein, thioglycollate broth, yeast extract and peptone.
* Iraq has not reported all the media including casein, Thioglycollate broth, yeast extract, and peptone known by the Commission to have been imported for the BW programme. In response Iraq has suggested that the Commission must be confusing media ordered for the Forensic Laboratory with that ordered for the BW programme since both organizations used the same procurement system. If this is so, it implies that Forensic Laboratory had large quantities of media. However the purpose for this and its present whereabouts have not been declared.

** The "lost" media cited in the FFCD includes media that was wasted during production or handling e.g., by spoilage, and media said to have been lost or stolen during the relocation of the headquarters. There is no further breakdown of these figures so that it is not possible to establish, for example, what media may have been lost through handling errors and what may have been stolen.
Assessment of Material Balance for Bacterial Growth Media

The material balance pertaining to media cannot be established. There are several factors which introduce uncertainty. On imports, Iraq?s declaration understates the amount by at least 600 kg. Furthermore there is no documentation for the quantities of media said to have been acquired locally, nor any evidence whether this was the total amount. On media consumed, Iraq acknowledges that the figures it presents are derived from estimates of the quantity of agent produced. Since there is little supporting documentation relating to the quantities of agents produced, the amount of each type of media consumed carries similar uncertainties. On losses, Iraq?s account of substantial amounts of media said to be lost during the evacuation of Al-Hakam cannot be quantified and furthermore the account of the theft of media from the school house, is probably untrue. The only fixed point in the material balance equation for bacterial growth media is the amount of imported media. Some more data can be derived from the amount of media destroyed by the Commission in 1996. However in relation to yeast extract and peptone there is considerable uncertainty in the destruction of the media. The majority of containers had been previously opened by Iraq and the Commission?s assessment of their contents was complicated by mis-labelled media, other sources of media possibly being added and duplicate labels. In particular for peptone, the Commission?s assessment of the media destroyed varies between 200 and 470 kg depending on the assumptions made with regard to labelling. This compares with 625 kg implied in the FFCD as having been destroyed. For all the above reasons, the material balance for bacterial growth media cannot be verified.

Although a material balance cannot be established, an estimate can be made of minimum amounts of media still unaccounted for. As discussed above, the Commission is aware of additional quantities imported by Iraq. If the quantity of media declared by Iraq to have been consumed and lost is added to the amount of media destroyed by the Commission, and then this addition compared with the amount imported, a minimum figure for media unaccounted for can be derived. This will be a minimum figure because there may be additional quantities of media imported of which the Commission is unaware, and it also relies on the estimates in Iraq?s declaration some of which are not accurate.
As evident from the tables the greatest concern is with unaccounted amounts yeast extract and peptone. Although the expiry date for this media would have passed, advice from the manufacturers is that given appropriate storage conditions, particularly away from moisture, the media would still be usable today. The Commission has no information regarding its fate, whether it was retained or used to produce additional undeclared BW agent. The amounts that are "missing" however are significant and would be sufficient to produce quantities of agent comparable to that already declared by Iraq.

Material Balance

The most important elements of the FFCD are those related to material balance. That is weapons, filling of munitions, production of munitions, production of types and quantities of BW agents, acquisitions of growth media, supplies, equipment, and other material for the programme; bulk agents, munition and weapon destruction.

Establishing a material balance consists of determining the input materials and the output materials. In the case of biological weapons, the input materials are the bulk agents and munitions and the output material are the filled BW weapons. In turn, the input materials for bulk agents are the growth media components and the output materials are the bulk agents.

The quantities of bulk agent filled into munitions and allocation of munitions to agents, either by type or number for R-400 bombs or for Al-Hussein warheads cannot be determined from the information provided by Iraq. The munitions available for the BW programme cannot be verified. The lack of adequate documentation prevent the verification of the munitions available for the BW programme.

There is no documentation to indicate the number of munitions filled with BW agents. Nor, is there any adequate documentation to support the account of the destruction of the weapons, unfilled munitions and bulk agent.

Bulk BW agent must be considered to be a weapon. In addition to the munitions, Iraq developed two types of aerosol dissemination devices that would use bulk agents - the modified drop tank and the aerosol device for slow moving aircraft. There are no production records or production documents to support the stated bulk agent production. The input material for this production is the respective growth media, which is not accurately reported. Production quantities of bulk agent are acknowledged to be estimates and stated media consumption are estimates, based on these estimates. Production quantities of the four types of agents declared by Iraq as produced in bulk cannot be verified.

As a result of the above for each of the critical elements of the material balance, Iraq?s current account in the FFCD cannot be verified.

Determining the number of weapons destroyed is very important but, without knowing the quantity of munitions produced and allocated to BW, determining the quantity destroyed does little to help verify that all weapons have been destroyed, for which documentation has not been provided.

In July 1998 international biological experts reviewed with Iraq, at the request of ist Deputy Prime Minister, its biological FFCD, specifically addressing material balance as outlined above. On the material balances for weapons, agents and media the team came to the following conclusions:
Weapons
None of the subcomponents of the material balance for R-400 bombs (production, filling, destruction of filled and unfilled bombs) could be verified.
None of the subcomponents of the material balance for Al-Hussein warheads (production, filling, destruction of warheads) could be verified.
The account in the FFCD on modified drop tanks and the Zubaidy spray device could not be verified.
Agents
None of the subcomponents of the Clostridium botulinum toxin material balance (production, filling, losses and destruction) could be verified.
None of the subcomponents of the Bacillus anthracis spores material balance (production, filling, losses and destruction) could be verified.
None of the subcomponents of the aflatoxin material balance (production, filling, losses and destruction) could be verified.
None of the subcomponents of the Clostridium perfringens spores material balance (production, losses and destruction) could be verified.
None of the subcomponents of the wheat smut material balance (production, losses and destruction) could be verified.
Media
None of the subcomponents of the media material balance (acquisition, consumption, losses and destruction) could be verified.
In its accounting for various BW weapons-programme-related elements, the Commission has achieved various levels of confidence, depending on the quality of information; documentary, physical, and personal testimony provided by Iraq; and the correlation of this information with other information derived from Iraq, information provided by its former suppliers, or otherwise obtained by the Commission.

The Commission has a degree of confidence in the accounting for some proscribed items which were presented by Iraq for verification and disposal. This includes, for example: the destruction of buildings, and equipment at Al-Hakam, the destruction of large quantities of growth media acquired for the programme; and evidence that R-400 aerial bombs and Al-Hussein warheads contained BW agents and consequently that Bacillus anthracis spores and botulinum toxin were indeed weaponized.

The Commission has less confidence in the accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been unilaterally destroyed. These include, for example: the number and fill of R-400 aerial bombs destroyed at Al-Azzizziyah; the number and fill of BW Al-Hussein warheads destroyed; and the fate of the agent to be used with drop tanks.

The Commission has little or no confidence in the accounting for proscribed items for which physical evidence is lacking or inconclusive, documentation is sparse or non-existent, and coherence and consistency is lacking. These include, for example: quantities and types of munitions available for BW filling; quantities and types of munitions filled with BW agents; quantities and type of bulk agents produced; quantities of bulk agents used in filling; quantities of bulk agents destroyed; quantities of growth media acquired for the programme; quantities of growth media used/consumed; and when or whether the programme ended. In addition the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed; that no BW munitions or weapons remain in Iraq; and that a BW capability does not exist in Iraq.

Several other outstanding issues also remain. These issues are related: to the scope and extent of R&D activities; the acquisition of supplies and equipment; the involvement of military and other agencies in the BW programme; and deception associated with the concealment of the BW programme.




STATUS OF VERIFICATION IN THE AREA OF OTHER COMPONENTS OF IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME

Iraq, under SCR 687 (1991), is required to declare the locations, amounts and types of all biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities. In SCR 707 (1991) this requirement was reaffirmed and the Council demanded that Iraq provide a full, final and complete disclosure on all areas related to its BW programme. Part I of this status report reviews those elements of the FFCD that are directly relevant to a material balance. Part II reviews additional elements of the FFCD. The biological TEM conducted in Vienna in 1998 indicated the significance of those issues and it was stated in the expert report: "The FFCD also does not provide a clear understanding of the current status of the BW programme or wether, or when, it was terminated." In April 1998, the Commission?s report to the Security Council (S/1998/223)further underlined the significance of these issues by listing the history, the organization, acquisition and research and development among the priority issues to be resolved with regard to the proscribed biological weapons programme.

Other Acquisition

Iraq has failed to include in its FFCD all the acquisitions of munitions, equipment, media and agents acquired for or used in its BW programme. Iraq has not included all its acquisition of growth media for production purposes which for the four principal components are covered in this report under Part I, para 3. Iraq has not acknowledged all its acquisition of media used in R&D as well as that used in the seed fermenters during production of bulk agents. Neither has Iraq reported all its acquisition of equipment and micro-organisms, nor has Iraq declared all the agencies and individuals involved in that process. Iraq has not provided an adequate account of materials and equipment acquisition. Further, Iraq has failed to provide adequate answers regarding its BW procurement network including the Arabian Trading Company, and other front companies. A complete understanding of acquisition is essential to defining a material balance for Iraq's BW programme.

The FFCD does not contain all imports for Iraq's BW programme known to the Commission, although Iraq claims that all imports for the BW programme were reported. The basis which Iraq claims it used in the FFCD for determining what imports by Iraq to include or exclude among the declared acquisitions was shown not be sound. Thus acquisitions, as measured by the number of orders including Letters of Credit (LCs) and cash deals through attachés at Iraq's Embassies overseas, are substantially under-reported. Without a complete accounting of all BW programme acquisitions, a material balance is not possible.

LCs and cash deals for such items as rotary evaporators, glassware, oven sterilizers, and Petrie dishes, are omitted from items attributed to the programme.

Not all strains of micro-organisms that were acquired bu\y Iraq are included nor are all attempted acquisitions of strains included. The FFCD contains only the Vollum strain of Bacillus anthracis spores to be obtained by TSMID, in 1989, but in 1988 an Iraqi scientist involved in the BW programme had tried to obtain known BW and other virulent Bacillus anthracis spores strains from outside Iraq. All local acquisitions of strains are not included in the FFCD. Further, the fungal and viral strains acquired are not reported in the FFCD.

The media listing is incomplete in that Iraq fails to consider several Letters of Credit and cash deals related to media imports; some of these orders relate to media or media components used in production but other orders relate to media used in R&D and for seed fermenters used during the production process. Media acquisition during the time of the BW programme at Al-Muthanna are understated as well.

There is inadequate or in some cases no supportive evidence for munitions acquisition, both for weaponization and for field trials. Although the account of the acquisition of materials for the aerosol generator (Zubaidy device) was incomplete in the 1996 FFCD, much of the information presented in that version has been intentionally omitted in the 1997 FFCD.

History of Iraq's BW Programme

Iraq is required to provide a comprehensive account of the history of its BW programme. This may appear peripheral to disarmament and to material balance issues. But lacking documentary or physical evidence to establish a material balance, other elements of the Iraqi BW programme become essential as tools for verification. The history of the Iraqi BW programme is certainly an element of the FFCD, which, if correctly declared, would facilitate verification.
The introduction and chronology presentation of Iraq?s BW programme encompasses only a part of the programme, is inaccurate with respect to dates and fails to provide an insight into the decision making process which facilitated its evolution. The account misleads because it presents the programme as an entity which came to fruition in 1990 whereas in reality it was a programme planned to reach maturity some time in the mid/late 1990s. The account also fails to provide any perspective to the programme merely listing a miscellany of chronological events linked only by time rather than requirement, strategic planning, or military utility. As such there is no continuity to the account which limits the Commission's understanding of the BW programme.

Iraq claims that the programme started in 1974 by Presidential decree and by the establishment of the Al-Hazen Institute. Interview evidence shows that consideration of a programme was earlier, as evidenced by the establishment of a functional purpose-built scientific research complex by mid 1974. Planning, design and construction of such a complex would had to have started at least in 1973 with concepts developed earlier. The affiliation of the Institute is not defined other than to a "State Security Organization".

The Al-Hazen Institute terminated on 16 January 1979 not 1978, as declared, because of fraud by the Chairman (Major Ghazan Ibrahim, not stated in the FFCD) and some senior staff, not for reasons of inadequacy of the facility, nor inability to make scientific progress as claimed by Iraq.

Before the apparent "resurrection" of the programme in 1985 work continued at Al-Salman to create resource for biological purposes including buildings established for the Institute including an animal house. Prof. Nasser Hindawi submitted a proposal for BW research in the early 1980s. The date on which the Director of Al-Muthanna Establishment (Gen. Nizar Attar) formally requested the addition of a BW research is not indicated.

It is stated by Iraq that no plans were elaborated for the large scale production, weaponization and storage of BW agents which is contrary to the statement of Gen. Nizar Attar who stated in 1995 that a plan was formulated in 1986 to achieve weaponization within 5 years (which is precisely what happened). The evolution of the programme over the next five years appears to follow a well defined course implemented with urgency, authority, and great secrecy demonstrating considerable planning.

Research and Development at Al-Muthanna is claimed to have been restricted to consideration of just Clostridium botulinum and Bacillus anthracis spores whereas it is known that Clostridium perfringens was received on 10 November 1986 and that "DIALOG" database searches were undertaken for Clostridium perfringens on 13 May 1985 and 10 July 1985. Consultations were undertaken with Prof. Nasser Hindawi when at Mustansiriyah University in 1986.

In reality the Commission assesses that the transfer of the BW work from Al-Muthanna to Al-Salman (TRC) was to preserve secrecy. Al-Muthanna still had a requirement for the agents produced at Al-Taji and subsequently at Al-Hakam for field tests. Al-Muthanna continued to collaborate on both laboratory and field experiments from 1987 to 1991.

The establishment of the BW research group at Al-Salman in 1987 is accepted as stated although the means by which it was established and managed is far from clear. The relationship of the programme within TRC to other organizations is unclear. The responsibility and management for the expansion of the programme to include mycotoxins in 1987/88 and viruses and genetic engineering in 1990 has not been defined adequately.

The establishment of the BW agents production factory at Al-Hakam has not been related to a military requirement or a weapons testing and procurement requirement. The extent of the capability there has not been justified.

Field tests of BW agents started in late 1987/early 1988. The extent of such testing has not been revealed and some previously acknowledged tests are now stated not to have taken place.

The activities undertaken in 1989 and 1990 - field testing aerial bombs, rockets and other munitions; the expansion of the programme in terms of research and agent production, and acquisition of additional facilities remain ill defined and as such a confident determination of the extent and scope of the programme cannot be made.

Since the FFCD falsely states that the BW programme was obliterated in July 1991 no credible account is given of the preservation and concealment of the programme until 1995.
Research and Development
Research is a fundamental cornerstone of Iraq's BW programme. It provides a scientific and technical basis for all aspects of the final developed programme. Although not all aspects investigated at the research level will lead to weapons development, the scope of the research programme is an index of the concept, strategy, and extent of the programme. No account whatsoever is given of review, concept, or theoretical projects undertaken by the research staff throughout the programme.

The Commission's understanding of the early years of Iraq's BW programme at the Al-Hazen Institute in the 1970s is poor. It is not credible that a single individual is portrayed as being solely responsible for initiating and planning the research programme. A military input is also denied, although it is acknowledged that officers from the Chemical Corps were members of the staff. A clear definition of the success, or possibly lack of it, is necessary because both outcomes would influence future development of the programme. A full account of the extent of the Al-Hazen programme has not been presented in the FFCD although this programme was offensive in nature. Subsequent clarification (12 May, 1998) provides some further background information but still fails to indicate the strategic planning that initiated a BW programme within Iraq.
The period of 1979 to 1984 remains a void in the Commission's understanding although there is considerable evidence of biological activities during that period - continuation of a building programme originally for the Al-Hazen Institute, retention of Al-Hazen staff at Al-Salman, Prof. Nasser Hindawi's submission for a research programme, acquisition of dual capable equipment, and placement of staff abroad for training. In other words the programme seems to have continued albeit with different objectives, emphasis, management, and resources.

The resurgence of the BW programme is attributed to Gen. Nizar Attar, the State Organization for Technical Industries (SOTI) and MOD, and the appointment of Dr. Rihab Taha as an investigator in early 1985. This resulted in an initial programme of work at Al-Muthanna where Bacillus anthracis spores and Clostridium botulinum are acknowledged to be the cores of the activities. However, according to Iraq, under Gen. Nizar Attar?s direction a plan was formulated in 1985 to develop biological weapons which included at least one additional agent, Clostridium perfringens. Iraq states, that basic studies on cultivation, identification, and pathogenicity of only Bacillus anthracis spores and Clostridium botulinum were undertaken. Nevertheless, there are indications that a broader survey of agents was undertaken as evidenced by the range of BW agents and simulants obtained in 1986 together with literature surveys undertaken by Iraq's scientists.

In mid 1987 a group of biology researchers left Al-Muthanna to continue to undertake research within TRC at Al-Salman and to support biological weapons tests. The full circumstance of this transfer has not been presented. In addition it is stated that formal research on Clostridium perfringens started in 1988; aflatoxin, trichothecene and ricin work started, with the recruitment of further experts; and offensive work with Tilletia spp. (Wheat cover smut or bunt of wheat) continued at an increased level of activity. Additional research studies on the dissemination of BW agents using both liquid and dried BW agents was undertaken although the full depths of this work remains to be presented by Iraq. The extent of these studies has not yet been determined but documentation indicates a greater understanding of dissemination than revealed to the Commission.

At Al-Salman some fundamental research work on the enhancement of the toxicity and virulence of agents was also undertaken, some in conjunction with Al-Muthanna. Research on the scale up of agent production was undertaken and the searches for cheap efficient growth materials were undertaken, not all of which have been disclosed in the FFCD although both testimony by Iraq's experts and documents indicate activity undertaken. Studies on the storage and preservation of both seed stocks and bulk agents were undertaken. The effects of Clostridium botulinum and Clostridium perfringens spores were also determined. The rationale for this is not presented in the FFCD and no one accepts responsibility for the scientific and technical basis for this expansion other than Dr. Ahmed Murthada who by his own acknowledgement merely administered the programme. The relationship of the parent organization to Al-Muthanna, the Scientific Research Council, the University of Baghdad, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency and the Central Library of Iraq have not been defined. The extent of the research programme remains to be presented. In 1985, 1986, and 1988 a range of defined seed stocks of BW agents were acquired, some of which are not recorded as being a component of the BW programme.

In 1989 much of the research group and its attendant research was transferred to Al-Hakam where experiments on weapons materials compatibility was undertaken as well as quality control on BW agents produced at the industrial scale. The scale of the research work was further extended. In 1990 additional research locations were obtained at the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at Daura and apparently the Agriculture and Water Resources Centre at Fudhaliyah. Research on viruses was started by Dr. Hazem Ali and genetic engineering with Dr. Ali Nuria Abdel Hussein. The logic and intent for the selection of camelpox virus, infectious haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, and rotavirus are not stated in the FFCD. The objectives for the genetic engineering unit are not elaborated upon although testimony of Dr. Rihab Taha has indicated initially antibiotic resistant strains of Bacillus anthracis spores were to have been derived. Any relationship with that of the genetic engineering section of Al-Muthanna housed at the Serum and Vaccine Institute at Amiriyah under the direction of Dr. Al-Za?ag is denied.
Iraq's failure to identify and to present technically and scientifically competent staff who will accept intellectual and management responsibilities for the balance and emphasis of the research programme, the planning and development of the research programme makes the determination of the overall extent of the programme difficult. There is a denial that individuals from academia (other than Prof. Nasser Hindawi and Dr. Al-Akidi) or other Ministries (with one exception) contributed to the programme in a consultative or advisory role. There is also Iraq's denial that any coordinating or supervisory committees existed which is unlikely.

Documents concerning the research activities have been provided to the Commission. In August 1991 some ten papers concerning the research of Dr. Rihab Taha were presented to the Commission. These focussed on the three agents Bacillus anthracis, Botulinum toxin and Clostridium perfringens. In 1995 additional information was obtained by the Commission from the Haidar Farm, including research papers that indicateed that papers released in 1991 were carefully edited to mislead the Commission. No documentation concerning research on mycotoxins, smut, viruses, plant toxins and genetic engineering were included in the documents. In 1998 eight documents concerning research, apparently involuntarily provided by Prof. Nasser Hindawi, were provided to the Commission. The documents essentially confirmed earlier papers, although one three-page document which personally reviews Prof. Nasser Hindawi?s contribution to the programme, bearing the date 1989, is given great credence by Iraq as defining the scope of the programme.

Iraq claims that research is one of the best documented areas of the FFCD. The account fails to give confidence that the full extent of the research programme has been described and that all achievements have been presented. This is partly because of a lack of documentation in areas of activity outside bacteriological warfare agents and partly inconsistent and reluctant oral accounts of such activities. No indication is given of weapons research which logically would have run in parallel with agent production activities.
Sites and Buildings

There is a requirement for Iraq to provide the rationale, justification, and requirement for all sites including those for weapons tests, research and development, production, storage, weapons production and filling, deployment, and the destruction sites for weapons, documents and agents. Building diagrams must be provided where appropriate.

Such an account would correspond to one of the few tangible aspects of the programme which can be unambiguously presented - the actual buildings created and used. All that is provided in the FFCD is a physical description of some components. It does not relate activity undertaken or required to facilities available. Iraq has provided 23 site diagrams with little commentary after the Vienna Technical Evaluation Meeting (12 May, 1998) in response to the criticism.
The scale of a facility quite obviously relates to the scale of activities planned to be undertaken. In the case of a key facility within a BW programme it will accommodate the staff and resource required or projected to fulfill the objectives of the programme. The only sites that Iraq has acknowledged to be purpose built for BW purposes are the Al-Hazen Institute and Al-Hakam. It is conceivable that components of Al-Muthanna and Al-Salman were also designed with regard to biological weapons considering the common origin of the Chemical and Biological weapons programmes.

The Al-Hazen Institute was designed specifically for the start of the BW programme. In spite of this, few details have been provided by Iraq concerning the actual design and construction with regard to requirement. In addition the future requirements for Al-Hazen as evidenced by the construction of the "cube" and "L-shaped building" together with an animal house are not acknowledged.

The Al-Salman account describes the accommodation occupied by the staff associated with the biological programme but does not indicate how this matches requirement and utility. The additional buildings erected specifically to support the programme (animal house, fermentor building and incinerator building) have not been related to planning, construction and requirement.

The Al-Hakam Factory is acknowledged to have been built with the objectives of undertaking research and development together with industrial scale production of BW agents. Dr. Rihab Taha has also stated that weapons filling at Al Hakam was also considered for the future. Iraq states that weapons were filled for experimental field tests in 1990 at Al-Hakam and R-400 bombs were assembled at Al-Hakam in preparation for their subsequent filling (which apparently occurred at Al-Muthanna) and their subsequent deployment. Consideration of weapons assembly, filling and storage (empty and full) would have been a part of the consideration of Al-Hakam in 1987/88 as would the storage of bulk agent and the media required to produce such agents.
The biological agent was stored in a bunker and a warehouse at Al-Hakam. The hardened bunker was capable of housing some twenty 5000 litres containers. Just four are acknowledged to have been manufactured and two were placed in the bunker and two were placed in the warehouse. It is not clear how many more 5000 litre containers were made or planned to be fabricated. The containers were specifically designed for pathogen storage and subsequent sterilisation. Containers with a capacity of 1000 litres, which were wheeled and so mobile, were also manufactured. Although the precise number made is uncertain it appears that at least 39 were made in 1989 and 1990. Some 70 were planned to be fabricated. These would serve both as storage and transfer vessels. The total planned storage capability is difficult to ascertain but it is probably in the region of 80,000 to 100,000 litres of agent.

Al-Hakam was intended to accommodate, in 1988, three five-cubic metre fermentors in the first instance. According to a document provided by Iraq two such fermentors were planned to produce Agent A (botulinum toxin) and one for Agent B (Bacillus anthracis spores). This is described as industrial scale production and implicit is that it satisfied the minimum military requirement for Iraq. No account of this requirement has been made. In the event the fermentation line from the Al-Kindi Company was installed comprising seven 1480 litre fermentors and two 1850 litre fermentors (i.e., a total of 14060 litres) which is a similar overall volume confirming the operational scale requirement. Operating at a 5-day cycle about 820,000 litres of agent could be produced per year equivalent to 82000 litres of 10-fold concentrated agent. Assuming an annual replenishment of agent it would appear the initial annual capacity of the factory would be about 80,000 litres. When both areas A and B of the large scale plant became functional the capacity would in essence double and remain at that level until the far larger capability in area D came on stream.

The site was used for the testing of weapons in 1990 and parts of the location lend themselves to experimental weapons tests away from the main production areas. As acknowledged the site is sufficiently remote to minimise contamination in the case of an accident and implicit is that it can be used for agent simulant testing.

This FFCD also omits any reference to mobile production facilities once considered, according to Lt. Gen. Amer Al-Saadi. It omits the rationale for the selection of the geographical location of Al-Hakam and consideration of other sites such as Basrah.

Since Iraq's overall account of sites is poor, and the FFCD fails to provide a coherent account of the overall military programme, it cannot yet be assessed whether the sites identified represent the entirety of the facilities used to support the programme. In the absence of a credible account of the overall planning and evolution of the programme some site related aspects cannot be fully evaluated.
Organization of Iraq?s BW Programme

There is no comprehensive information about the organization of Iraq's BW programme, at all levels, and its relationship to other Iraqi bodies. This makes it impossible to determine the scope and nature of the programme. An understanding of the various relationships and interconnections between the diverse organizations that contributed to the BW programme is essential to gain a full appreciation of the programme and build confidence that the account provided is indeed full and complete. A variety of Government organizations would have contributed to the programme. Among these would have been the State Security and Intelligence, the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Education, Ministry of Defence and some of its various branches, as well as the industrial and academic base in Iraq. The list of contributing organizations cited in the FFCD is incomplete compared to interview testimony and documentation. This can only be rectified by a full disclosure of relevant information supported by documents and details of funding.

Iraq claims that the Ministry of Defence provided no support to the BW programme. It is also stated that there was no representation on the Military High Command or the General Council of Ministers concerning any aspect of the BW programme. It is explained by Iraq that the Director-General of TRC reported directly to Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan in his capacity of head of the State Security Organ, rather than as head of MIC. Despite this, Iraq forcefully denies any interaction between the BW programme and any Iraqi intelligence agencies.

Iraq claims that the BW programme was controlled from the bottom-up. Such a system would not account for the degree of coordination which became evident as the programme progressed.

In contrast with the Al-Hazen Institute, which had a formal personnel recruitment programme for its BW activities, the later BW programme had no such formal arrangements, according to Iraq. Promising people within the BW programme were sent abroad for higher education. It is claimed that no directive or directions to academic institutions existed to conduct research related to BW. The description of academic connections does not accord with the evidence.
Military Involvement in Iraq?s BW Programme

A clear description of the organizations driving, or influencing, the BW programme is critical to assess its dimension and significance. The lack of such descriptions reflects negatively on the credibility of accounts of R&D, production, and the selection and deployment of weapons. Without further physical or documentary evidence, the unclear explanations given, in these areas, make it impossible to confirm the information presented in the FFCD.

The account of military organizations involved in the BW programme is not seriously addressed in the FFCD. The contention that the MOD remained wholly unaware of Iraq's BW programme since 1987 is implausible. The programme started within the Al-Hazen Institute and was headed by a member of the Chemical Corps, Major Ibrahim Ghazim, and the biological component had two senior members recruited from the Chemical Corps. It is acknowledged that MOD was involved from 1983 to 1987 and that it endorsed the addition of BW to the remit of Al-Muthanna in 1983. Although, formally, the chain of command may have altered when the BW research and production component was transferred to TRC within MIC in 1987, it is unlikely that it was not visible to senior military personnel within the MOD. Programming for the formal adoption of BW would have been a factor in the strategic planning of Iraq's military development along with the foreseen nuclear and chemical capabilities.

Iraq would have developed a requirement for a militarily significant arsenal of biological weapons in 1987/88, or possibly earlier, based on strategic planning. This in turn would define the technical scope of the programme and the appropriate funding to ensure the eventual success of the programme.

According to Iraq's account, the involvement of MOD in the BW programme ceased with the transfer of the biology group from Al-Muthanna to TRC that was under the control of MIC. Iraq asserts this MOD link was only re-established specifically for the deployment of weapons in January 1991. The explanation given is that MIC had a higher status than the MOD and was a self-contained entity that could progress from initiation to deployment of weapons without external input. This has not been substantiated.

The BW weapons would have to have been integrated into Iraq's strategic arsenal. For these, military objectives, the concepts of use and the mechanisms for releasing these weapons must have been defined. This would have required extensive planning, which Iraq denies.

The FFCD portrays Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan as the sole key decision-maker and controller of the BW programme after 1987. Links between Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan, the MOD and other organizations are vehemently denied. It is assessed by the Commission that such links must have existed. Without such links, understanding how Iraq defined its military requirement and planned the use of its BW weapons, is difficult.


OTHER ISSUES RELEVANT TO VERIFICATION OF IRAQ?S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME

In Parts I and II the status of verification of elements of Iraq?s BW programme described to one extent or another in its FFCD is presented. However, a status report would not be complete without the inclusion of several other issues directly related to the verification of Iraq?s BW programme. Iraq has attempted to portray the Commission as stalling in its verification efforts. As part of this effort, Iraq cites the numerous inspections and interviews conducted by biological experts as well as citing approximately 200 documents it has provided in support of its declaration. However, Iraq has failed to cite the obfuscation and deception by Iraq that has necessitated these multiple inspections. It has also not cited the type and nature of the documents provided. Quality is not measured solely on the number of documents or volume of material.

Other issues include the technological coherence of the programme. The less coherent the programme appears to be the greater the dependency for verification on documentation and physical evidence. Iraq tries to portray its BW programme as an inept programme without guidance or direction. The Commission?s assessment of Iraq?s level of technology does not support this contention. Iraq asserts that its BW programme was obliterated in 1991. There is little confidence that its programme has been ended. Throughout all of the issues in all three parts of this report is the pattern of concealment and deception employed by Iraq to prevent a true picture of its BW programme from emerging. These issues are addressed below.
Inspections 1991 to 1998

Over the past eight years the Commission has conducted some 70 inspections directly concerned with biological warfare activities undertaken by Iraq. In addition, six joint chemical and biological inspections have been undertaken, including one that included missile experts. Sixteen monitoring teams have followed biological activities in Iraq?s industrial, agricultural, medical and academic facilities. More than twenty of these inspections were direct investigations of Iraq?s proscribed BW programme and two were involved with destruction of facilities involved in the programme. The remainder included establishing protocols and procedures for monitoring, detailed audits of key facilities, determination of indigenous capability, and searches for documents. In addition two major meetings were held to exchange information, during August 1993, in New York, and March 1998, at the TEM in Vienna. On both occasions, Iraq produced no additional information to enable a true appreciation of its entire BW programme.

The past programme investigation consisted, essentially, of three phases. Firstly, the discovery inspections of 1991 and 1992, that showed that Iraq has not been forthcoming about the scale and scope of its programme. Second, from autumn 1994 to summer 1995, consisting of attempts to uncover the past weapons programme and to establish the credibility of statements being made by Iraq about its past programme and the claimed legitimate activities of sites assessed to have contributed to the programme. After the departure of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan in August 1995, the Commission embarked on a third phase of investigation of the programme using, in part, information derived from the documents released by Iraq from the Haidar Farm. During the first and second phases, Iraq concealed from the Commission, the entirety of its programme. Iraq merely acknowledged a part of its research programme as a military research and development programme and falsely presenting its main BW agent production facility as a Single Cell Protein plant. During this period Iraq actively and deliberately concealed much of the research programme and the entirety of the remainder of the programme. This it achieved by outright lying, evasiveness, intimidation, forging of documents, misrepresentation of sites and personnel, the denial of access to individuals and the issue of successive FFCDs that were fraudulent. The account provided by Iraq wholly lacked credibility.

From September 1994 to July 1995 it became obvious that Iraq was failing to disclose a programme from the inconsistent, often conflicting and changing stories, presented without any substantiation. Eventually the failure of Iraq to account credibly for the vast amount of media imported between 1988 and 1990 led to the acknowledgment that Iraq, indeed, had produced industrial scale quantities of a significant military programme of two biological warfare agents (Bacillus anthracis spores and Clostridium botulinum toxin) although it was stated, incredibly, that this was done with no thought of weaponization.

Iraq has claimed that all documents concerned with its biological weapons programmes were destroyed in 1991. Lacking documents, other approaches have been adopted to investigate and verify Iraq?s account of its programme. Interviewing personnel associated with the programme has been the main approach. Iraq has been reluctant to provide personnel to substantiate the details of its programme. Generally, only individuals identified from Haidar Farm documents and documents, otherwise recovered, have been presented. Technical assessments of the facilities and equipment acknowledged to be a part of the programme, sampling, and exploitation of recovered weapons and fragments have also contributed to the inspection process.

In August 1995 weaponization was acknowledged by Iraq including weapons trials and the prior deployment of weapons in January 1991.

From September 1995 the Commission investigated the full programme as revealed by Iraq. Initially the inspections undertaken in the latter part of 1995 were designed to understand and get and clarify information on Iraq?s weapons programmes. Subsequently, attempts were made to verify the three succeeding FFCDs produced after August 1995. During these inspections it became obvious that the FFCDs were inaccurate and incomplete and so investigation of the programme was also begun again. The focus of the inspections was the issue of weapons and the production of BW agents, together with the acquisition of bacterial growth media, weapons, and production equipment. Others aspects such as research and development still await thorough examination. Many aspects have not been addressed because Iraq refused to cooperate. The Commission attempted to help Iraq recall further information about its programme by participating in a seminar in May 1996, which dealt with chemical and biological weapons, by submitting detailed questionnaires to Iraq (which were largely ignored, although later incorporated into the 1997 FFCD), and by organizing a TEM (Vienna, March 1998) for extensive evaluation of Iraq?s declarations by a full range of international experts. From June 1998, following discussions between the Commission?s Executive Chairman and Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq it was decided to adopt a focussed programme of inspections following a "top down" approach concentrating on establishing a material balance for biological weapons themselves. This started with an inspection concerned with weapons that concentrated on biological R-400 weapons. The decision of Iraq on 5 August 1998 to cease cooperation with the Commission on the issue of verification has meant that verification of Iraq?s biological warfare programme is now in abeyance.

Besides weapons related issues, inspections have been conducted to investigate planning, the military and intelligence contributions to the programme, and the acquisition of materiel. Concealment and deception, and the means by which this has been achieved has also been examined with no information of significance provided by Iraq.

Many aspects of the programme now included in the FFCD have been revealed because of the result of the Commission?s inspections although it is acknowledged that other aspects have been revealed by Iraq without prompting. Ironically many issues and details discussed in the series of inspections conducted on the past programme are omitted from Iraq?s official account directly showing that the FFCD is incomplete.

General Assessment of Iraq?s Documentary Evidence

Notwithstanding the reticence with which Iraq has provided documents needed for verification, the quality of documentation provided by Iraq concerning its past BW programme has presented difficulties in providing a strong evidential base for the verification process. Problems with documentation quality reside in their relevance to the proscribed BW programme, as well as their completeness and finally, their authenticity. With respect to relevance, the bulk of documents provided by Iraq to the Special Commission tends to be removed one or more levels from the key issues central to the BW programme and can be best described as derivative, e.g, rather than presenting documents that unequivocally establish the identities of key personnel in the programme, Iraq has provided documents that track the departure of individuals from one place of employment to another. Alternatively, Iraq has provided documents that add nothing of relevance to its declaration by way of verification. With respect to completeness, Iraq has frequently provided fragmentary documentation which renders assessment and hence, verification, difficult because the lack of a full contextual basis. For example, the source of documentation for the 157 R-400 bombs unilaterally destroyed by Iraq, and which serves as a basis for Iraq?s allegation that only this number of R-400 bombs were filled, was from a very few pages of a personal diary belonging to an Iraqi army officer apparently present at the time the bombs were destroyed. Finally, Iraq has "recreated" documents, such as the document on ricin production and research, that are at best questionable and may even hinder the verification process. Had Iraq provided appropriate documents of its BW programme dealing with the key elements of acquisition of materials, production of bulk agents, production of weapons, destruction of weapons, and destruction of bulk agents the verification process would have been better served.

Technical Coherence

One key factor in determining the veracity and credibility of Iraq?s account of its biological weapons programme is the assessment of the coherence of the account. Any programme of activity will be managed to achieve set objectives within a specified, possibly flexible, time frame. Once the shape and coherence of the programme become apparent, verification can be achieved by selecting disclosures of appropriate components and determining that it is a faithful and authentic account. When these reference points are determined, other aspects will fall into place and need not be determined with such extensive rigour. Regrettably Iraq?s account is not coherent, the first basic step.

Iraq fails on a number of levels to present a clear account of its programme. At the senior level there is no indication of the determination of a requirement for such weapons and planning for the acquisition and deployment of the weapons. At the management level there is no indication of how the requirement was to be met and how resources were acquired and utilized to fulfil the military need. In particular the scale and scope of the Al-Hakam Factory are not explained or justified; the inevitable weapons development programme to ensure effective BW agent dissemination is not presented at all. At the working level there is no rationale presented for research and development, or the industrial scale production of agent (especially before August 1990). The repeated statement by a senior Iraqi Government representative, that the programme was a minor programme, essentially run by unsupervised technicians who had an unrealistic programme of work, trivialises a serious programme of work and does nothing to help the Commission gain the appreciation of that programme. The denial of planning for the programme, contrary to the evidence, means that the basic coherence for the programme cannot be established.

A weapons programme by definition is a military programme yet apparently there was no military involvement in the claimed last four years of the programme. A philosophy for the programme should have been developed which would require the interaction of military, intelligence, industrial and academic sources. Iraq denies any military committees or individuals contributed to the formulation of policy with regard to the acquisition and implementation of Iraq?s BW programme.

The programme for biological weapons was immature in 1991. The failure of Iraq to account for its intended programme of work through 1991 and beyond also prevents the Commission from gaining a perspective of the interrelationships between the various components and so the coherence of the programme. This information will also be essential to determine if Iraq has indeed terminated its programme.

Technology Assessment

Iraq claims that the BW programme established was an immature programme that was ill considered and ineffectively executed. Further, Iraq claims that it lacked the industrial capability and expertise to manufacture equipment suitable for the production of BW agents and weapons. This is an argument frequently put forward by Lt. Gen. Amer Al-Saadi in his attempts to create the impression that Iraq does not pose a threat to its neighbours with regard to biological weapons.

The Commission could not make an accurate technical assessment of Iraq?s scientific, industrial, and technical accomplishments because Iraq has not been transparent in its FFCD nor its clarifications about the BW programme. Since the programme has operated from 1973, it is reasonable to assume that Iraq attempted considerably more than has been revealed and that some components achieved success in areas not revealed to the Commission. Some 400 individuals are known to have contributed to the programme in various ways from research to weaponization. Civilians, civil servants, security, and military personnel were involved. Iraq has a record of denying and understating its weapons programmes. Iraq has preserved components of its BW programme since 1991, and much of the expertise remains in Iraq. The Commission has examined the indigenous capability existing in Iraq and has assessed in the course of inspection that Iraq is capable of manufacturing "dual use" equipment and munitions. The degree of sophistication of these systems may not meet so called "western" standards but none the less are quite capable of fulfilling the requirements.

Iraq has a broad based research community in Universities, Medical and Agricultural Institutes, and the Military Industrial Commission covering microbiology, biological processing, materials science, genetic engineering, pathology, biological production, munitions and weapons.
Iraq also has an industrial base capable of manufacturing fermentors and their ancillary requirements, spray driers, and storage vessels for agents. The industrial base will also sustain the engineering and manufacture of weapons.

The End of the Iraqi BW Programme?

In mid-1995 Iraq admitted that it had possessed a BW programme. Since then, Iraq has often stated that its BW programme was ?obliterated? in 1991. Officials cite, as proof of this, the unilateral demolition of the deployed BW weapons, deactivation of bulk BW agents and the destruction some documents associated with the programme. Despite these activities in 1991, Iraq retained the facilities, growth media, equipment and groupings of core technical personnel at Al-Hakam, while denying the very existence of any BW programme.

Although Iraq continues to insist that no elements of its BW programme have been preserved, the Government of Iraq has yet to offer evidence of the formal renunciation of its BW programme. It is explained that a decree was never issued because of a 1991 decision to conceal the BW programme. Again Iraq has produced no information on the decision to conceal the programme.

Iraq insists that all its BW weapons were destroyed in July 1991. The numbers, location and timing of weapon destruction and, indeed, whether all weapons were destroyed, remain in doubt. Iraq?s account of the destruction of the BW-filled Al-Hussein warheads changed with virtually every inspection team that addresses the issue with Iraq. No supporting evidence exists for the destruction of the bulk agent, also regarded by the Commission as weapons. Large quantities of bacterial growth media remain unaccounted for.

After 1991, Iraq maintained and expanded the purpose-built major BW production, research and development and storage facility, Al-Hakam. From that time, Iraq asserts that Al-Hakam was solely a single cell protein (SCP) production plant. However, no serious attempts to produce SCP ever occurred. SCP was only produced in insignificant quantities as a camouflage, principally by harvesting SCP from brewers waste rather than de novo production from petroleum products. Individuals, identified as key workers in Iraq?s BW programme, continued as members of the staff of Al-Hakam. In the years after 1991, Iraq attempted to obtain dual-purpose equipment including industrial-scale fermentors from within the country and abroad.

In the years since 1995, the Commission?s teams have continued to discover significant undisclosed dual-use equipment that could readily be used in a BW programme. In the six months period April to October 1998, some 150 undeclared items were found and tagged by biology monitoring teams. For example, many mobile tanks used in the BW programme are not accounted for. The significance of this lies in the fact that with only minor modifications these could be used as fermentors.

Although Iraq acknowledged its offensive BW programme in 1995, it has yet to make a full disclosure. One of the most obvious omissions is information concerning the termination of its offensive BW programme. The evidence collected by the Commission and the absence of information from Iraq, raises serious doubts about Iraq?s assertion that the BW programme was truly obliterated in 1991.

Concealment and Deception

Verification is the basis of disarmament and arms control. Verification depends on serious cooperation between the parties concerned. It also depends on compliance, in principle. This includes the submission of comprehensive and accurate declarations which can be confirmed by supporting evidence. Without these, confidence in a verification regime as required under SCR 687 (1991) is limited, at best. Concealment of critical facts is a clear sign of non-compliance. It raises serious doubts in the efficiency of disarmament or any arms control work and unavoidably leads to speculations about the reasons motivating it. Concealment effectively precludes verification.

In April 1991, Iraq made a decision to conceal certain aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programmes from the world. With regard to its BW programme it decided to admit only a limited effort of research and development, that was restricted to a single location, never reached the level of production of agent or weaponization, and was terminated unilaterally in August 1990. Iraq maintained this position until in 1995, when the departure of the head of Iraq?s weapons of mass destruction programs, resulted in additional aspects of these activities being released. Iraq admitted having had an offensive programme centred around a purpose built research and production facility and including large scale production of BW agents and weaponization and deployment of aerial bombs and long-range warheads.

A high-ranking Iraqi official, Lt. Gen. Amer Al-Saadi, stated in 1998, that Iraq offers no defence for the period of denial of its BW programme. He admitted it was a political decision to conceal both the programme and consequently its obliteration from the Special Commission. In fact, the attempts to conceal the programme caused and continue to cause serious doubts amongst the Commission?s experts over Iraq's declarations. This and a lack of documentary or other physical evidence greatly hinders the process of verification of Iraq?s disarmament efforts to which it is obligated by international law and its own acceptance of those terms.

A serious concern remaining is that the unilateral destruction of documents, agents and weapons in 1991 was linked to the concealment issue rather than the issue of obliteration of its programme. The difference being, that in the first case, only part of all assets may have been destroyed, purely to deceive the Commission and feign liquidation of the programme. Indeed, the Commission is aware that Iraq at least retained suitable growth media, capable facilities, production equipment, teams of expert personnel, and the essential technical know-how. Until today, no credible declaration has been presented by Iraq as to if and when it obliterated its BW programme.

Since the disclosure of the BW programme in 1995, Iraq has released a number of documents to the Commission. Iraq has ascribed an inflated importance to certain of these documents and dismissed others. Indeed, some documents have been described as "first class", whilst on other occasions the same documents are described as unreliable or trivial. There is an attempt to disregard documentary evidence that contradicts the accounts of officials or material in the FFCD. It is apparent, that Iraq only releases documents and other information to address or respond to information the Commission had already become aware of.

The following tables detail events and actions taken by Iraq as a result and indicative of its decision to conceal the BW programme from the Commission. It portrays a systematic effort to deceive the Commission by a) false or incomplete declarations and b) removal or manipulation of evidence delineating the totality of its BW programme.
Summary

Since the adoption of SCR 687 (1991), in April 1991, and until July 1995, Iraq denied that it had any proscribed BW activities. Despite Iraq?s denial, the Commission, through its inspection and verification procedures, was able to determine that Iraq had not provided a full and comprehensive disclosure of its biological programme nor had it accounted for items and materials acquired for that programme. The Commission reported these findings to the Security Council in April 1995. On 1 July, 1995, Iraq acknowledged that it had had an offensive BW programme, but denied weaponization. Subsequently, in August 1995, after the departure of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan, Iraq admitted that it had weaponized BW agents and had deployed them for combat use. However, the Commission has a far from complete understanding of all aspects of Iraq's BW programme. The Biological FFCD neither contains the required detail, nor does it cover the full scope of Iraq?s BW activities. In particular, a refusal to disclose, or even discuss, details of the military aspects of the BW programme is of concern.

Iraq has released information over the years very selectively. When Iraq is aware that the Commission has details of a particular event or circumstance, then a document will be released. Very little new information has been disclosed since 1995. There are many inconsistencies and contradictions in documents, personal testimony and physical evidence. However, the accumulation of inconsistencies creates patterns, which show that the FFCD is incorrect.

Iraq claims to have produced, filled, deployed and unilaterally destroyed 25 Al-Hussein missile warheads intended for BW use. No evidence exists to confirm the number of warheads produced as 25, or for a greater or lesser quantity. Confusion reigns, even among Iraqi officials, over how many warheads were filled with particular BW agents. There is no evidence of the proportions of weapons filled with particular types of agents. At Al-Nibai the numbers and locations of remnants of warhead stainless steel agent containers, some of which have traces of Bacillus anthracis spores, contradict the account of the weapons? destruction in the FFCD.
The FFCD states that 200 R-400 aerial bombs were manufactured for the BW programme, and that 157 of these were filled with BW agents, deployed and unilaterally destroyed. The evidence available indicates that more than 200 were available for the BW programme. Iraq admits that the numbers filled with particular agents are guesses. Statements in 1998 by Iraq have further confused this matter. The physical evidence from the remnants, accounts for less than one third of those said to have been unilaterally destroyed.

From November 1990 until the cease-fire in 1991 Iraq worked to produce a system able to deliver large volumes of BW agent aerosol from high-performance aircraft. It is stated that four such drop-tank weapons were produced. The remains of three have been accounted for. There is no evidence to establish whether only four were produced nor have other details of this aspect been addressed by Iraq. In tandem with this work, Iraq attempted to develop, apparently unsuccessfully, a pilotless aircraft to carry the drop-tank weapon. Very little information exists on this latter project, and it is possible that it was intended for CW use or both BW and CW.

The first weapon system for delivering BW agent investigated by Iraq was a helicopter-borne aerosol generator. Successful trials led to the manufacture of 12 such items. There is no evidence of their destruction. Also the final, and presumably most effective, prototype of this aerosol generator has never been accounted for.

Besides the weapons that reached the production stage, several other potential delivery systems received some attention by Iraq. 122mm rocket warheads were extensively trialed with BW agent. Iraq claims to have abandoned this development. After briefly admitting that cluster munitions were part of the BW programme, Iraq withdrew the statement. Artillery shells filled with ricin were trialed. The LD-250 aerial bombs made by Al-Muthanna and used in early BW trials, were abandoned in favour of the more robust R-400 according to Iraq. Iraq investigated the use of gas gangrene relevant to application in fragmentation weapons.

A key determinant of the size and capability of the BW programme was the production of bulk agent. Apart from one document referring to a single year, no production records have been given to the Commission. All accounts and assessments are based on the capacities of the known production equipment, the amounts of growth media purportedly available and the time and personnel that could be used. The amounts of agent produced and declared by Iraq are unsubstantiated. Quantities far greater than those declared could have been produced without difficulty. Further to complicate this process, there are no records of storage, filling into munitions or destruction. As a result, experts have very little confidence in the production figures quoted in the FFCD.
The situation regarding bacterial growth media is similar to that of the production of bulk agent. There are disparities between Iraq's declared imports of media and information available to the Commission. The material balance of growth media is flawed. The absence of records of the use and discrepancies in the accountability of this material leaves open the possibility of significant undeclared production of bulk BW agent.

As in other areas of the BW programme there is a dearth of documentation relating to attempts (both successful and unsuccessful) to import the equipment and materials necessary to pursue the acquisition of a larger BW capability.

Research is a fundamental cornerstone of Iraq's BW programme. Although not all aspects investigated at the research level will lead directly to weapons development, the scope of the research programme is an index of the concept, strategy, and extent of the programme. No account whatever is given of review, concept, or theoretical projects undertaken by the research staff throughout the programme.

The account of the history of the BW programme, given by Iraq, encompasses only a part of the programme, it is inaccurate with respect to dates, and fails to provide insight into the decision making process that facilitated its evolution. The account is misleading because it fails to present the underlying strategy and the long-term goals of the programme. Iraq's known concealment and deception activities cast doubts on its claim that the programme was obliterated in 1991.

Iraq is required to provide the rationale, justification, and requirement for all sites including those for weapons tests, research and development, production, storage, weapons production and filling, deployment, and the destruction sites for weapons, documents and agents. The FFCD account fails to state the scale and scope of the requirements for the programme. No information is provided on planning and true objectives. All that has been provided by Iraq is a physical description of some components. It fails to explain the rational behind the selection of BW sites.

The absence of comprehensive information about the organization of Iraq's BW programme, at all levels, and its relationship to other Iraqi bodies, makes it impossible to determine the scope and nature of the programme. An understanding of the various relationships and interconnections between the diverse organizations that contributed to the BW programme is essential to gain a full appreciation of the programme and build confidence that the account provided is indeed full and complete. The list of contributing organizations cited in the FFCD is incomplete compared to interview testimony and documentation. This can be rectified by a full disclosure of relevant information supported by documents and details of funding.

A clear description of the organizations driving, influencing or otherwise participating in the BW programme is critical when assessing its dimension and significance. The lack of such descriptions reflects negatively on the credibility of accounts of research and development, production, and the selection and deployment of weapons. Further physical or documentary evidence in all these areas is needed to confirm the information presented in the FFCD.

Throughout the investigation of the programme there has been a systematic and comprehensive attempt by Iraq to conceal the programme and deceive the Commission. Until 1995 all aspects of the offensive BW programme were concealed and active measures taken to deceive the Commission. Since August 1995, Iraq has submitted a number of FFCDs of its declared BW programme. These declarations have been assessed by the Commission and by international experts as incomplete, inadequate and containing substantial deficiencies. They were not accepted as a full account of the scale and the scope of Iraq?s BW programme. This refers in particular to weaponization of produced BW agents, bulk BW agent produced and acquisitions for the BW programme. Consistently Iraq has tried to understate the scale and importance of the BW programme as a whole, and the success of individual components.

In the Commission?s view, Iraq has not complied with requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions on the disclosure of its BW programme. A full, complete and verifiable disclosure of all its biological weapons activities needs to be presented by Iraq.


Appendix IV
ACTIONS BY IRAQ TO OBSTRUCT DISARMAMENT
1. The history of the Special Commission's work in Iraq has been plagued by coordinated efforts to thwart full discovery of Iraq's proscribed programmes. These policies and actions began immediately following the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It is against this backdrop that the significant positive and negative results described in the weapons annexes should be seen. What follows is a brief summary of the Commission's current understanding of the evolution of these concealment policies and practices.
2. Immediately following the Gulf war, the Iraqi Presidency collected reports on weapons remaining with Iraq's Armed Forces after the war, including its weapons prohibited by recently adopted resolution 687(1991). Such documents were provided to the Presidency in the spring of 1991. A decision was taken by a high-level committee (one of whose members was Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Tariq Aziz) to provide to the Commission only a portion of its proscribed weapons, their components and production capabilities and stocks. The policy, as deduced from a range of evidence available to the Commission including the initial false Iraq?s declarations, was based on the following Iraqi actions:
-- provide a portion of their extant weapon stocks, with an emphasis on those, which were least modern.
-- retain production capability and the "know-how" documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible
-- conceal the full extent of chemical weapons programmes, including its VX project, and retain production equipment and raw materials
-- conceal the number and type of BW and CW warheads for proscribed missiles
-- conceal indigenous long-range missile production, and retain production capabilities, specifically with respect to guidance systems and missile engines
-- conceal the very existence of its offensive biological weapons programme and retain all production capabilities
3. Iraq had initial success in much of its concealment efforts, but, based, presumably, on early experience with the IAEA and the Special Commission in inspection activities, Iraq, took a subsequent decision in late June of 1991 to eliminate some of these retained proscribed materials, on its own, and in secret and in such a way that precise knowledge about what and how much had been destroyed would not be achievable. This decision and action by the high-level committee was a so-called "unilateral destruction". It was taken following an incident in June 1991 when IAEA inspectors, following an inspection that turned confrontational at Abu Ghraib, obtained photographic evidence of retained nuclear weapons production components.
4. Iraq did not admit to its illegal unilateral destruction until March 1992, approximately nine months after the destruction activities, and even then only after the Commission indicated it had evidence that Iraq retained weapons after its supervised destruction. Iraq states that "The unilateral destruction was carried out entirely unrecorded. No written and no visual records were kept, as it was not foreseen that Iraq needed to prove the destruction to anybody." Such an approach also indicates that Iraq intended to pursue a policy of concealment in its relations with the Commission and the IAEA.
5. In 1992, the Commission examined the evidence of the unilateral destruction available at that time and to some extent found it consistent with the rest of Iraq's programmes as then declared by Iraq. What was not recognized at the time by the Commission, was that the unilateral destruction action itself was a determined measure taken to conceal evidence which would reveal retained capabilities. Only later, when the investigations by the Commission became more searching and the Commission received reliable reports of diversions from the unilateral destruction, did it become clear that thorough verification of Iraq's claims surrounding unilateral destruction was required.
6. Iraq undertook active deception measures, during the Commission?s verification of the unilateral destruction, such as "seeding" warhead destruction areas with parts unrelated to special warheads to lead the Commission's team to believe it had accounted for all that was claimed to exist. At that time, Iraq also melted down weapons and components to make impossible accurate identification or quantification of them. Because of Iraq's false declarations, the Commission was not in a position in 1992 to question, fully, Iraq's accounts. It was only later, after 1995, that the Commission became aware of the concerted deception efforts and was forced to reexamine the 1991-1992 period.
7. The Commission has conducted extensive examination of Iraq's claims concerning the period, July 1991, when Iraq stated that so much of its weapons programmes were secretly eliminated. The material balance and verification of Iraq's claims concerning the disposition of weapons in all areas (missiles, biological and chemical weapons) rests on accepting Iraq's declarations at face value. The Commission has conducted extensive excavation efforts with Iraq at places Iraq declared to have been the locations of explosive demolitions of proscribed weapons and burials of destroyed remnants. Extensive interviews with Iraqi participants in the unilateral destruction have also been conducted. Analysis of overhead imagery of that period has been made. The results have been mixed with some evidence supporting Iraqi declarations. Other data raises serious concerns about the true fate of proscribed weapons and items.
8. One example concerns the destruction of launchers. Iraq claimed until August 1997 (including in its missile FFCD) that proscribed missile launchers were destroyed in July 1991. When the Commission attempted to confirm this by examining imagery, it found such claimed destruction did not take place. Only then did Iraq shift its claim and say that the destruction did not take place until October of 1991. Thus, Iraq changed the account given repeatedly to the Commission, for six years, without any credible explanation as to why it had deliberately given a false declaration in the first place. Two obvious consequences for the Commission's investigations are: the need to explore the reason for such deceptions; and, to demand more information in order to be able to verify other Iraqi claims.
9. Other elements of the unilateral destruction presentation by Iraq were also proved to be false. The precise locations of warhead destruction and the fill of warheads have been revised several times by Iraq. The movements of concealed warheads prior to unilateral destruction, claimed by Iraq, have been proven to be false. The explanations provided on concealment and movement of retained chemical weapons production equipment was likewise shown to be false. Iraq's admissions have only been made during 1997-1998. The Commission still does not know the precise meaning or significance of Iraq's failure to provide accurate data about proscribed weapons activities and it's provision of false information.
10. One incident which has now been partially investigated illustrates another example of the Commission's concern about the possibility of retained prohibited material.
11. The Commission focussed a dedicated effort into investigating Iraq's concealment policy and actions following the events of August 1995, when Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal left Iraq. This investigation proceeded through various stages and developed progressively more information on not only what had been hidden up until 1995, but what still remained concealed. One piece of this investigation involved a Major in the Special Republican Guard, Izzadine al-Majid. He was tasked by higher authorities in July 1991 to receive a shipment of production equipment and critical components related to Iraq's indigenous proscribed missile programmes which had beendiverted from secret unilateral destruction. He was ordered to hide these materials on the premises of a private villa in the west Baghdad suburb of Abu Ghraib. The materials remained hidden at that location until March 1992 when the Special Republican Guard retrieved them to move them to another location. Iraq did not declare any of this information, the Commission learned it from Major Izzadine al-Majid and other participants in the operation.
12. Further investigation of this "diversion" from the unilateral destruction raised further questions, which remain unanswered. According to Iraq, some material now acknowledged to have been diverted from unilateral destruction came from a site called al Alam. Iraq stated that ten vehicles containing prohibited missile items were sent to this remote location in July 1991. The Commission examined imagery of this area during that time-frame and found not just ten vehicles, but that there had been over 100 vehicles present at this remote location. No explanation of the remaining 90 vehicles has been received from Iraq. Requests by the Commission for documents concerning this movement of vehicles either through Special Security checkpoints or vehicle movement logs have been rebuffed by Iraq with the claim that no documents are available. On the last occasion that this issue was discussed with senior Iraqi officials, in July 1998, Iraq conceded that for the preceding two years it had mislead the Commission concerning the events of the unilateral destruction of components for its indigenous missile engine programme.
13. This particular incident also showed that the Special Republican Guard had been involved. Other direct physical evidence of its involvement in the unilateral destruction activity is in the possession of the Commission. Iraq has minimized any involvement of the Special Republican Guard or security organizations.
14. With respect to the provision of documents to the Commission, Iraq has long claimed virtually all relevant documents had been destroyed. Again, following the departure from Iraq of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamal and the subsequent provision of 150 crates of documents at the Haidar Chicken Farm, the Commission concluded that more exist. The Commission examined imagery of the Haidar farm and found that shortly before Iraq led the Commission to the farm to hand over the documents, several shipping containers had been removed from the site. Iraq has not provided a credible explanation of this. The documents provided from the farm have clearly defined gaps. For example, documents which would indicate WMD production techniques achieved by Iraq are not included. There are no documents related to the military or Ministry of Defense. The Commission has concluded that a segregation of documents must have taken place prior to delivery to the Commission. It has sought from Iraq further explanations of what happened to the documents and where they are located. This has never been provided.
15. One notable document received from Iraq in August 1995 should be mentioned. "The al-Atheer Center for the development of materials production: Report of achievements accomplished from 1 June 1990 to 7 June 1991" (called "the al-Atheer document"). It illustrates how this key facility for the development of nuclear weapon devices implemented the instructions of the high level committee in April 1991 on concealment action. The facility was instructed to remove evidence of the true activities at the facility, evacuate documents to hide sites, make physical alterations to the site to hide its true purpose, develop cover stories, and conduct mock inspections to prepare for UN inspectors. These types of actions are precisely what the Commission has encountered in its inspection activities throughout its work in Iraq. Iraq has claimed such deliberate concealment activities were ceased in 1995. However, Iraq has provided no documentation to substantiate these claims and the Commission continues to find evidence that the opposite is the case. Documents are found occasionally and reports from inside Iraq indicate continuing attempts to prevent the Commission from discovering documents or other materials.
16. The concealment investigation by the Commission, which has at times been contentious, has yielded a model of the decision making and organizations in Iraq which participate in actions to hide information and thwart the discovery of prohibited materials. The evidence collected included interviews with Iraqi personnel in and out of Iraq, documents found during inspection activity, imagery, analysis of vehicle movements and other Iraqi actions in reaction to Commission inspections, and overall patterns of obstructions, delays, and changing accounts, "stories", by Iraq.
17. In its first phase, the analysis of the Chicken Farm documents was carried out and the implications of the retained and sustained prohibited programmes were examined. The Commission concluded that multiple organizations in Iraq had to be involved. The concealment and deception activities had distinct technical requirements. This implied, inter alia, the continued involvement of the Military Industrial Commission (MIC). Iraq acknowledged this. However, covert procurement required an overseas presence and the establishment of front companies. These activities had been conducted by the General Intelligence Service, the Mukhabarat, during the 1980's and its expertise would continue to be valuable. Analysis of how procurement was conducted in the period immediately prior to the Gulf war was conducted as a possible indicator of how Iraq would continue such efforts to the present. This simple, logical analysis bore fruit. The Commission soon had direct evidence of Mukhabarat involvement when long range missile gyroscopes, accelerometers and test equipment were discovered being imported into Iraq in 1995.
18. The logistics of the movement of proscribed materials required communications and transportation support of a highly reliable and sensitive nature. In examining imagery from 1991, it was found that Special Republican Guard vehicles had been used to move equipment involved in planned nuclear weapons production when it was being hidden from the IAEA. In addition, the personnel involved had Special Republican Guard affiliations - like Major Izzadine mentioned earlier. Also, imagery taken during inspections in 1996 and 1997 showed significant vehicle movement at Special Republican Guard sites in reaction to ongoing inspection activities.
19. The Commission assessed that overall direction came from a more senior entity and that this appeared to be the Special Security Organization (SSO). In late 1995, the Commission was only beginning to gain an understanding of SSO direct control over concealment actions. One example was that during interviews with the manager of the Haidar farm it was learned that the farm had been seized by officers of the SSO some ten days before the Commission was given access to it.
20. This period of interviews and analysis led the Commission to investigate further the involvement of relevant security organizations in ongoing activities of a proscribed nature. The technique of interviewing participants in known concealment events proved useful even when interviewees were heavily coached. During the spring of 1996, continued interview and investigation missions were conducted in Iraq with the goal of eliciting a true picture of concealment actions and confirmation that it had or would be ended. In addition, acting on information developed during late 1995, the Commission conducted an inspection of sites related to concealment activities. This inspection was conducted in March 1996 and resulted in several refusals by Iraq to provide access to sites in accordance with its obligations.
21. Iraq did not acknowledge concealment as a legitimate matter for discussion with the Commission. Iraq stated that all concealment had been ended and only if the Commission could prove otherwise would Iraq discuss the matter. The Commission had ample evidence of concealment up to 1995 and in addition, uncovered clandestine proscribed missile guidance acquisition by Iraq in late 1995. Iraq claimed all such actions were terminated. The Commission had no evidence to support Iraq's claims, and, continued to receive reports to the contrary.
22. Given that Iraq would not willingly discuss the matter, the Commission planned another series of inspections of sites belonging to the organizations considered to have direct involvement in concealment. Two inspections took place in June and July 1996. There were lengthy standoffs. U-2 imagery taken during standoffs in June identified vehicle and other movements at SSO and Special Republican Guard facilities adjacent to Presidential areas that the Commission assessed as being related to concealment. The Executive Chairman had discussions with the Deputy Prime Minister on access issues and agreed on 22 June 1996 on a Joint Programme of Action which included the topic of concealment as a priority for verification work.
23. The Commission sent three additional investigation missions to Iraq during the remainder of 1996. Interviews were conducted and considerable discussion about the disposition of documentation took place. Little substantive progress was made. The Commission also continued to receive information about retained prohibited material in Iraq during this period. All information continued to support SSO/Special Republican Guard involvement.
24. In early 1997, the Commission again undertook an inspection of sites related to organizations identified with concealment actions. During these inspections, sites related to the hiding of proscribed material, transportation, and the organization of movements were inspected. In addition, sites were selected which were related to the procurement of material thought to be proscribed.
25. In June 1997, the Commission experienced delays and obstructions throughout the inspections including the removal of material from sites. The friction in conducting such inspections of sites is in some ways understandable given the sensitivity of such locations and organizations to Iraq. But, given the information about concealment practices and the absence of evidence about their termination, the Commission believed it had no choice but to continue. Ultimately, it was hoped that Iraq would provide a full and verifiable presentation on concealment. Inspections, while useful, would ultimately be blocked rather than permit discovery of prohibited materials. Nevertheless, evidence of non-compliance with the inspection regime was demonstrated in the form of non-cooperation. Missing files, cleansed rooms, purged computers and other techniques were encountered on a regular basis, at sites under inspection.
26. In August and September 1997, two inspections were conducted in an effort to uncover Iraq's efforts to deceive the Commission in the CW and BW areas. This reflected a decision to broaden the scope of the investigation aimed at thwarting Iraq's concealment efforts. During these inspections the same techniques of convoy movements occurred in direct reaction to the Commission's inspection activity. This provided still more evidence that concealment was ongoing.
27. In a further effort to continue to press Iraq to fully declare its programmes, the Commission reconfigured its concealment investigation work. Another mission went into Iraq in September 1997. Limited progress was made in obtaining Iraq's acknowledgment of Special Republican Guard and Mukhabarat involvement. At that time, another inspection obtained an SSO document related to dual-use biological activities and materials. A follow-on inspection was denied access to an SSO site in a presidential area.
28. In January 1998, an inspection to conduct a concealment investigation was sent to Iraq. It was stopped by Iraq after one day.
29. The Commission continued to press Iraq to provide full and verifiable explanations of its concealment activities. Iraq insisted that it was not concealing any proscribed weapons. The Commission found: significant gaps in every weapons area; and, that Iraq?s active measures to deceive the Commission were responsible for its inability to verify the disposition of prohibited weapons. Reports that prohibited material still existed in Iraq continued to be received by the Commission. The Commission, following its presentation to the Council, established its list of priority disarmament issues and discussed these with Iraq during the Summer of 1998. The concealment issue was included in that list. Iraq declined to discuss the issue at that time.
30. In July 1998, an inspection sought to uncover information related to Iraq's production, storage, and disposal of chemical and biological weapons. Iraq had long denied that any documents on these topics were available. In the course of the team's inspection of Iraqi Air Force Headquarters inspectors located a document detailing the use of "special weapons" during the Iran - Iraq war. Immediately after its discovery, the document was seized from the Chief Inspector. Iraq has not responded to the demand, expressed by the Security Council, to return the document. Information in the document, recorded by team members, shows significant discrepancies between the amount of munitions Iraq claims to have consumed between 1983 and 1988, and the actual amount presented by Iraq in its official declarations.
31. By the end of the 1998, there remained significant uncertainties in the disposition of Iraq?s prohibited programmes.
32. The Commission has received information recently from multiple sources, identifying organizations that direct and implement the concealment effort in Iraq. While the information from these sources differs in some minor details, it agrees on several major points:
The highest level of concealment-related decisions are made by a small committee of high ranking officials. The Presidential Secretary, Abed Hamid Mahmoud, chairs this committee;

The Committee directs the activities of a unit which is responsible for moving, hiding, and securing the items which are being concealed from the Commission;

The Special Security Organization plays a key role in the operation of this unit and in the tracking and surveillance of Commission activities.

Enclosure 2
IRAQ: ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION
Background and Overview

1. As part of the formal cease-fire following the end of the Gulf war, the Security Council, by its resolution 687 (1991), established, inter alia, the requirement for long term monitoring and verification of Iraq to assure that Iraq did not reconstitute or retain its prohibited chemical and biological weapons and missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres.
2. By resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, the Security Council approved the Plan for establishing such monitoring in the chemical, biological and missile areas. Under this Plan, the Special Commission established its monitoring system which is comprehensive in its approach.
3. Iraq refused to acknowledge resolution 715 (1991) for two years. It was not until Iraq officially acknowledged it, on 26 November 1993, that real efforts to design and build the full OMV system could start.
4. Some key principles which underpin the design efforts for the overall OMV system:
First, full access and cooperation by Iraq were assumed, as provided for in the Security Council?s resolutions and the Plan for OMV, particularly following Iraq?s acceptance of the Plan.
Secondly, the system would be flexible and subject to continuing modification, expanding or contracting as circumstances dictated.
Thirdly, the system would be designed assuming a verified baseline of what Iraq had acquired and achieved in each proscribed weapons area. Knowledge of Iraq?s capabilities was considered to be important to the shaping and focussing of fully comprehensive monitoring efforts.
Fourthly, the overall system would depend on a web of techniques and tools which, in total, would serve to detect or deter prohibited activities. This approach recognises that the ability to monitor in each discipline and the capability of each monitoring technique is specific.
Fifthly, time was assumed to work for the Commission in the sense that the probability of detection would continue to increase over time.
Finally, it was assumed that Iraq would have a significant incentive to abide by the Security Council?s resolutions. Conversely, it was thought that there would be a significant disincentive for Iraq to be detected conducting prohibited activities.
5. It was believed, that the net combined effect of the system would be sufficient to provide a credible measure of confidence that prohibited weapons and capabilities were not being retained or reconstituted.
6. The process of implementing the system involved a number of key tasks. The first required Iraq to provide information on sites having dual use capabilities as well as sites known to have been involved in prohibited weapons programmes. In early 1994, detailed formats for the provision of data relevant to ascertaining the capabilities and future monitoring of such sites were created and passed to the Iraqi counterparts for completion. Iraq provided data on identified sites. Throughout 1994, baseline survey missions were conducted by visiting teams of experts to sites in Iraq. These activities had, as their goal, the design and implementation of monitoring at each site and the creation of protocols for their monitoring.
7. Given that each site is unique, a regimen for inspecting each site was developed based on its importance, nature and size. Prescriptions for: how often a site should be visited; what parameters should be examined; whether sensors or cameras would be beneficial; what sorts of regular reports would be required from Iraq; and, other techniques for inspecting were identified and included in each site monitoring protocol.
8. Over three hundred sites were eventually included in the Commission?s monitoring database. These sites are subject to regular inspections and Iraq is required, in most cases, to provide regular declarations in formats established by the Commission. These declarations are usually provided on a semi-annual basis, but some sites require more frequent declarations.

9. The Commission established a permanent and extensive facility in Baghdad as a base for its monitoring work. The Commission?s earlier work had been conducted with a minimum of resident staff. With the advent of ongoing monitoring work, the necessity for a larger number of resident experts and administrative support was required. In 1994, Iraq provided a building for the use of the Commission and the IAEA. It was modified by the Commission to provide suitable arrangements and offices for monitoring work and a senior officer was appointed to head the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC). This building is shared with other United Nations Agencies. It incorporates the Commission?s communications equipment, chemical laboratory, monitoring camera system control room and administrative and logistical support for field operations.
10. The monitoring design, in each area, faced unique issues. For example, missile related sites are the smallest in number, but, since specified missile activities are permitted to Iraq, there is a challenge in detecting prohibited activities latent in permitted activities. Scrutiny of all aspects of permitted programmes is essential, using cameras, requiring regular reports from Iraq, and most importantly regular detailed on-site inspections.
11. The chemical sites are more extensive, covering facilities with equipment and specialists that could be diverted to prohibited activities. Such facilities include pesticide plants, refineries and industrial chemical plants. Moreover, monitoring of dual-use chemicals, some used in large quantity for legitimate civilian purposes, was a problem to be managed.
12. The most extensive monitoring problem is in the biological area. BW agents can be produced in small facilities using relatively simple equipment. There are limited signatures to look for, if small quantities are being produced and not weaponized. Hence the net cast for monitoring must be large. A great number of facilities incorporating dual-use capabilities are inspected and are under varying degrees of monitoring. These include such facilities as production sites, research and development facilities, laboratories and other sites, apparently innocuous, such as breweries and drug production plants.
13. Following Iraq?s acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991), the Commission, the IAEA and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 661 (1990) (the "Sanctions Committee") developed a mechanism for the monitoring of any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions. The lists of such items are contained in Annexes to the Commission?s and the IAEA?s Plans for OMV. Following consultations with States with export control experience, a report on provisions for a mechanism for Export/Import Monitoring was transmitted to the Security Council on 7 December 1995. On 27 March 1996, the Security Council adopted resolution 1051 (1996) which approved the provisions of the mechanism. A Joint IAEA-UNSCOM Unit was established in New York to run the mechanism and a corresponding office and resident monitoring team established in the BMVC.
14. The Export/Import mechanism is an integral and vital component of the overall monitoring system. It is a notification system which allows the Commission and the IAEA to be cognisant of, for monitoring purposes, the existence in Iraq of relevant equipment and materials. An important feature of the system is that, should any unreported notifiable imported equipment or materials be discovered in Iraq, and no adequate explanation is given thereof, the Commission and the IAEA have the right to destroy, remove or render such items harmless.
15. Export/Import inspections are conducted throughout Iraq, including at points-of-entry, but most emphasis is currently focussed on end-user customers inside Iraq. The current workload is mainly limited to items imported in connection with the humanitarian aid programmes. Any change in the status of the sanctions regime will have a significant impact throughout the monitoring system, but most particularly with respect to the operation of the Export/Import mechanism.
16. A further component of the monitoring system has been the aerial surveillance provided by the U-2 aircraft at high altitude since August 1991, the Mirage aircraft at medium altitude since June 1998, and the helicopter surveillance provided at low altitude since June 1992. These data have been useful in ascertaining the status of declared facilities. In addition, they provide information of particular importance in identifying possible new or undeclared facilities that may have monitorable dual-use capabilities or, indeed, be engaged in proscribed activity.
17. This touches on a key element of the monitoring system: the ability to detect undeclared, proscribed activities through the identification and conduct of inspections of newly identified sites. To monitor Iraq fully and deter violations, the Commission must have the credible and real ability to inspect any site in Iraq, on short notice. Sites for inspections may be identified by analysis based on previous inspection and monitoring activities or information generated from a wide range of sources. Sources ranged from intelligence information provided by Governments, to information available publicly such as on the Internet, to information conveyed by Iraqis no longer in Iraq. This approach can be expected to continue to support credible monitoring as mandated by the Council.
18. In summary, the Commission has designed a monitoring system of many related parts. Each part could not provide high confidence in detection of infractions, but collectively, over time, the Commission believes the system is able to provide adequate and credible monitoring. However, it is vitally dependent upon the full exercise of the rights of access and Iraq?s cooperation provided for in the resolutions of the Council. While making use of technology and sensors as much as possible, it is also important to note that the essence of the system is the presence of knowledgeable inspectors.
19. Despite several differences in the monitoring and verification techniques in the chemical, biological and missile fields, activities in all areas covered by the Plan for OMV represent an integral monitoring and verification system. It is based on the joint operational planning, inspection procedures and supporting elements, including Export/Import mechanism and aerial surveillance. In addition there is a significant overlap in the Commission?s monitoring activities in the chemical, biological and missile areas due to the multipurpose character of activities and sites in Iraq. Therefore, an integral system comprising chemical, biological and missile elements represents an optimal approach of monitoring and verification in Iraq.
20. In the chemical, biological and missile areas, in contrast with the nuclear field, Iraq produced and deployed operational weapons. These three programmes were closely connected and intertwined. Proscribed missiles were equipped with warheads filled with chemical and biological warfare agents. Chemical weapons facilities were often used for research activities related to BW programmes and for weaponization of BW agents. Missile facilities manufactured different types of chemical and biological munitions. In a period prior to the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), all three programmes, chemical, biological and missile, were managed and coordinated by a single Governmental agency: the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC).
21. There will always be a continuum between accounting for Iraq?s proscribed activities of the past and monitoring to ensure that proscribed programmes are not reconstituted. Monitoring does not necessarily imply a categorical change in inspection techniques or procedures. For example, no-notice inspections will be needed whether their proximate cause is to discover a possible residual weapon from the past or a newly built one.
22. The OMV system as designed and implemented by the Commission, has been based on the assumption that ultimately, the full verification and disposal of Iraq?s proscribed weapons would be achieved, as directed by resolution 687 (1991). This had the implication that the OMV system, in the long term, would rest on a foundation of full knowledge of the disposition of proscribed weapons and capabilities.
23. This present review of the OMV system takes into account the possibility that the mandated objective of the full accounting of Iraq?s proscribed weapons and verification of Iraq?s prohibited programmes will not be achieved but the Commission may, nevertheless, be required to operate its OMV system under the shadow of Iraq possibly retaining prohibited materials. It further takes into account that once sanctions are reduced or lifted, the Commission will face a considerable increase in its OMV work.
24. In these contexts, the Commission notes that the Plan for OMV approved by the Security Council in resolution 715 (1991), provides adequate potential for implementing a system of monitoring and verification more rigorous than had been in place in the past. It must be emphasised that the absence of the resolution of disarmament issues would lead to a degradation in the degree of confidence able to be provided by the OMV system, notwithstanding that additional measures would need to be introduced into the system in an attempt to offset the failure to bring all disarmament issues to account.
Key Elements
25. Three elements are of paramount importance for any effective and credible monitoring and verification system in Iraq. First, Iraq?s full and unreserved adherence to its obligations and cooperation with the Commission?s monitoring activities. The two other critical elements are: the Commission?s access to sites for inspection and to information from all sources relevant to its mandate; and the resources available to the Commission for implementation of its mandate.
Iraq?s Cooperation
26. The extent of Iraq?s cooperation is the key determinant for the level of OMV procedures employed, and the resulting confidence in the system. Iraq has provided varying degrees of cooperation since 1991. Where cooperation has been good, monitoring has been good. The better the information and access provided by Iraq, the less intrusive the OMV procedures and the higher the confidence in the resulting assessments of Iraq?s compliance.
27. A fundamental requirement is for the Government of Iraq to cease any prohibited activity. In this context, an important step by Iraq is the adoption of legislation prohibiting all natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited by the relevant resolutions and the Plan and to enact penal legislation to enforce such prohibitions. Such legislation was required to have been enacted within thirty days of adoption by the Security Council of resolution 715 (1991). Iraq has not yet taken this action.
28. Iraq states it ended its illegal concealment activities in 1995, but has never provided any evidence, such as documentation, to support this claim. In light of uncertainties concerning remaining disarmament issues, and less than full cooperation by Iraq, monitoring will have to take into account evasion techniques. If ongoing concealment were to be uncovered, this would be a matter of grave concern both intrinsically and in terms of the credibility of the OMV system.
Access to sites and information
29. Under the Plan for OMV, Iraq undertook to accept unconditionally the inspection of any site, facility, activity, material or other items declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission; and to provide immediate and unimpeded access to any site, facility, activity, material or other items to be inspected. Timely and unfettered access for inspection purposes is crucial to obtaining information which could serve as a basis for assessments of Iraq?s compliance.
No-notice Inspections
30. The Commission has the right to conduct inspections on a no-notice basis. In the practical implementation of this right, it is important to minimise the opportunity for Iraq to have predictable warning of specific sites to be inspected. Iraq has attempted to defeat the principle of no-notice inspection by working assiduously to track and predict the Commission?s inspection activities. Iraq seems to have succeeded in identifying blocks of time and certain locations in which and at which inspections were to be conducted, thus minimising, and indeed in many instances eliminating the risk of discovery of prohibited items or undeclared activities. This is a serious issue involving both cooperation by Iraq and operational security on the part of the Commission. An effective OMV system requires that there should not be sanctuaries in time.
Sites for inspections
31. An effective OMV system also requires that there should not be sanctuaries of sites and facilities from inspection throughout Iraq. Statistically, the Commission has conducted a large number of inspections in Iraq, but for the most part such inspections under the Plan for OMV have been to sites declared by Iraq. This is not without its importance, but monitoring demands verification of the absence of prohibited activities at all other locations in Iraq based on reliable information or assessment. Inspections conducted in a credible manner lead to no ambiguous results. This is critical to both Iraq and the Commission.
32. The range of sites to be inspected on a regular basis depends on the Commission?s knowledge of Iraq?s proscribed programmes and its understanding of Iraq?s activities which fall under the Plan for OMV. If certain disarmament issues are not resolved, the Commission may need to regularly inspect a broader range of military facilities in Iraq. For instance, if full accounting of 155mm mustard rounds were not achieved, regular inspections of ammunition bunkers and depots might be judged as necessary.
33. The identification and inspection of sites where undeclared or prohibited activity might be conducted is fundamental to any effective monitoring system. Such sites are identified through the analysis of data obtained from a variety of sources available to the Commission and are inspected by teams which may comprise resident or non-resident expertise, as required. It is necessary to maintain a coordinated approach to the identification and inspection of potential sites in order to maximise the effectiveness of these inspection efforts for the benefit of ongoing monitoring. The potential of inspections of undeclared sites makes an important contribution to the overall deterrent effect of the monitoring system.
34. The Plan for OMV does not envisage any sanctuary for inspections or limitation on assess to sites designated for inspection. In the past, following blockages of inspections by Iraq, special modalities for inspection of specific categories of sites were established. These were themselves the subject of further dispute and blockage. Given the terms of resolution 715 (1991) and the Plan for OMV, the serious question arises of the impact of such modalities on a credible monitoring system, or indeed whether they should have any role with respect to that system.
35. A part of the resolution of disputes caused by Iraq blocking inspections and seeking to establish areas which may not be inspected at all, has been acceptance of the concern that Iraq?s legitimate security, sovereignty and dignity must be respected. The Commission does not believe that the effective conduct of its work and these concerns are inherently incompatible. They could prove to be so if the claims by Iraq of such concerns were clearly being advanced as a rationale for avoiding its obligations. The Commission has and will continue to balance its need to conduct effective inspections with Iraq?s legitimate security, sovereignty and dignity concerns.
Geographic Access
36. Shortened access time to sites designated for inspections could be achieved through the following steps, either separately or in combination: the creation of regional monitoring and verification sub-centers or operational bases, the use of fixed-wing aircraft for transportation within Iraq and the improvement of rotary-wing aerial transportation.
37. The creation of two regional monitoring sub-centers or operational bases in Mosul and Basrah, in addition to the BMVC, would enable the Commission to reach practically all of the listed sites in Iraq within two hours. The creation of regional centers would necessitate a further increase in the number of personnel on resident teams in Iraq. Another option would be the creation of regional operational bases where a sub-component of the monitoring teams would be able to operate from at any time on a temporary basis. The second option would not require a significant increase of personnel.
38. The use of fixed-wing aircraft within Iraq would allow for the transportation, to any operational airfield in Iraq, of inspection teams comprising 10 or more inspectors, together with all required verification equipment and vehicles for ground transportation. It would also allow the deployment of inspection teams to particular areas in Iraq straight from the Commission?s field office in Bahrain.
39. The deployment of helicopters by the Commission would also allow the transportation of inspection teams comprising 10 or more inspectors, together with a limited amount of verification equipment and vehicles for ground transportation to any specific site designated for inspection.
Access to Information
40. The Plan for OMV approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991) stipulates that the Commission shall have the right to "request, receive, examine, copy and remove any record, data, information or documentation and to verify inventories." Access to documentation has been emphasized in relation to verifying Iraq?s proscribed activities. It will also be vitally important to OMV. Records relating to production and acquisition records, inventory lists, financial transactions documentation and tasking orders can be highly revealing for tracking Iraq?s activities under monitoring. A credible monitoring system must make full use of relevant procedures based on the right of access to records and information.
41. Effective monitoring through the examination of records has shown the general need for experienced linguists. With the increased use in Iraq of electronic information systems, there is a further requirement for computer experts who can examine electronic records. The Commission has found many useful pieces of information through examination of computers. Continued examination of such media will remain essential.
42. In the implementation of its monitoring and verification tasks, the Commission will continue to rely on information from sources other than the Government of Iraq. Information of relevance to monitoring in Iraq has been provided to the Commission from a number of sources outside Iraq. Such data is assessed by the Commission and collated with what is known to be in Iraq. Inspections may be planned on the basis of such data depending upon assessment. Without such information, the level of success achieved by the Commission in understanding Iraq?s prohibited programmes would not have been possible. This will continue to be the case for monitoring.
Resources
43. The ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq is an operation that relies mostly on human efforts not on technical devices. The Commission has found that one of the greatest shortcomings in its work on monitoring in Iraq has been the relative lack of experts who have extended and detailed knowledge of Iraq?s proscribed weapons programmes. The Commission has been provided experts for assignment to Baghdad from many Governments. Typically, these have been highly qualified technical experts in their fields, in their countries. What the Commission finds is that this expertise, while necessary, is not sufficient since additional knowledge of the Iraqi-specific programmes and activities is required. Moreover, in most cases these experts are loaned to the Commission for terms of three to six months. This does not allow enough time to become familiarized with Iraq?s programmes and techniques. Over the long term, however, it will be necessary to recruit experts and other inspection personnel who will be engaged in the monitoring activities in Iraq for extensive periods.
44. At this stage, it is impossible to provide a very precise estimation of the size and cost of the OMV system in the future, as that would depend, in significant ways, on decisions regarding tasks, scope and objectives of such a system.
45. In the evaluation and identification of the possible magnitude of the OMV system in the future, the characteristics of the OMV system implemented by the Commission over the last years are provided as a point of reference.
46. In the past, the Commission has used a staff of over 200 personnel per year on a long-term basis (including experts, inspectors, policy officers, support personnel and aircrew), distributed among its three locations: Baghdad, Bahrain and New York. Although the staff was engaged in both disarmament and monitoring activities, since 1994 most of them were devoted to monitoring duties.
47. Additionally, an average of 700 visiting experts and other specialists were employed per year for short-term missions in Iraq, mostly for monitoring inspections.
48. The majority of the Commission?s personnel has been provided by governments (as proposed by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Security Council in 1991 - S/22508). United Nations staff have also been seconded to the Commission. As the Council agreed in 1991, the Member States whose nationals serve on the Commission or assist it in the discharge of its responsibilities have been responsible for their salaries, while the Commission has borne the costs of travel and daily subsistence. These arrangements have helped to keep the overall budget of the Commission to a minimum.
49. In addition, the Commission has borne the costs of transportation, communications, acquisition of some but not all the required equipment, and administration.
50. The overall budget of the Commission has been around $35 million per year. This does not include the cost of significant in-kind support provided - without charge to the Commission - by several governments, such as the U-2 and Mirage IV operational costs, sample analysis and procurement of equipment, among others. Were that support to be borne by the Commission, the actual budget would have been considerably larger.
51. For effective implementation of the Plan for OMV in the future, substantial increases in the resources should be envisaged. Even without critical changes, the cost of the implementation of the OMV system and its size in the future may well double.
52. On a preliminary basis the Commission estimates that the OMV system in the future would require over $50 million, annually, for salaries of long-term (UN recruited) and short-term staff, including inspectors, specialists, support personnel, aircrew and administration. Travel costs, communications and other operational expenditures would require over $15 million per year. Contractual services for the provision of aerial transportation capabilities in Iraq (fixed-wing cargo aircraft and helicopters) would amount to over $10 million. Aerial surveillance support (high, medium and low-altitude aerial surveillance), if to be provided to the Commission, under contractual services, would represent a very considerable expenditure. At this stage, it is difficult to provide any estimate figure for these services. The Governments currently providing such services to the Commission have not provided data on their actual cost. Moreover, this kind of service is not available, currently, in the commercial market.
53. The Commission also estimates that the OMV system in the future, even without the introduction of more far-reaching changes (such as an increase in the resources devoted to the Export/Import mechanism), would require a staff of over 350 personnel for the implementation of all its activities. Most of them will need to be recruited under contracts with the United Nations. Additionally, the OMV system would require an average of 400 visiting experts and other specialists, per year, for short-term missions in Iraq.
Appendix 1
MISSILE MONITORING SYSTEM

The Establishment of Monitoring System: Mandate and Background

Mandate and Tasks
1. The Commission?s Plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq?s compliance (the Plan for OMV) was approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991. The Plan for OMV established specific obligations for Iraq. The Plan also laid out a set of comprehensive rights for the Commission under which it could develop and operate a monitoring system in Iraq in order to fulfil its mandate.
2. The Plan for OMV established that in order to ensure Iraq?s compliance, the Commission should, through inspections and through aerial overflights, as well as through the provision of information by Iraq, monitor and verify that activities, sites, facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations.
3. The Plan stated that, in accepting unconditionally Security Council resolution 687 (1991), Iraq undertook not to use, retain, possess, construct or otherwise acquire, inter alia, any ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres or any related major parts, including launchers, or any repair or production facilities. Provisions specifically related to missiles are contained in Section E (paragraphs 40-45) and Annex IV of the Plan for OMV. Paragraphs 41 and 42 provide important definitions of activities, sites and items subject to monitoring. Paragraphs 43 and 44 and relevant portions of Annex IV outline specific information and data that Iraq is required to provide to the Commission on a regular basis.
4. Iraq initially refused to accept its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the Plan for OMV approved by the resolution. Through early and mid-1993, the Commission undertook an effort in the missile area called "interim monitoring". It was designed to gain a better understanding of the requirements and resources that would be necessary to conduct future full-scale monitoring activities in the missile area once Iraq accepted the Plan for OMV. In May 1993, the Commission began the provisional installation of cameras to observe Iraq?s main static test stand for missile engines.
5. In November 1993, Iraq decided to accept the obligations set forth in resolution 715 (1991) and to comply with the provisions of the Plan for monitoring and verification as contained therein.
6. The Commission then began implementation of the monitoring system in the missile area. It conducted a number of baseline inspections of missile facilities and facilities with dual-use capabilities declared by Iraq. Declared operational missiles subject to monitoring were inspected and tagged. In August 1994, a resident missile monitoring team was established, for the first time, at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC).
Assumptions and Basic Considerations
7. At the time of the adoption of the Plan for OMV in 1991 and the subsequent establishment of the Commission?s monitoring system in 1994, there was no established precedent for an international inspection and monitoring regime to verify missile related activities similar to the requirements established by the Security Council. No proven or tested procedures existed that could have served as a model for the construction of a regime for verification of Iraq?s compliance with the prohibitions on proscribed missiles imposed by the Council, while allowing Iraq to conduct a full scope of activities with missiles of a shorter range.
8. The Commission decided to establish and operate the least intrusive missile monitoring system in Iraq consistent with the overall objectives set forth by the Security Council. In arriving at this decision, the Commission made a number of basic assumptions that determined practical inspection procedures that have been used since in its ongoing monitoring in the missile area.
9. The primary assumption made by the Commission was that, in the implementation of its obligations, Iraq would willingly and fully cooperate with the Commission, inter alia, by: submitting full and accurate declarations; providing prompt, accurate and detailed responses to the Commission?s inquiries and requests; granting unimpeded access to facilities, equipment, personnel, and records; and, facilitating aerial overflight and operation of monitoring equipment such as cameras and sensors. In this sense, the Commission has postulated "monitoring friendly" policies and behaviour by Iraq.
10. The second assumption was that the Government of Iraq would take a political decision to abide strictly by its undertaking not to initiate or engage in any proscribed activities and would enforce this decision throughout the territory of Iraq. If this was the case, then discrepancies that were always expected to be identified through monitoring, especially at its initial stages, would be interpreted as honest mistakes by individuals rather than as proscribed activities being deliberately concealed by the Government. The Plan for OMV provided that Iraq adopt legislation prohibiting all natural and legal persons under its jurisdiction from undertaking anywhere any activity prohibited by the relevant resolutions and the Plan, and to enact penal legislation to enforce the aforesaid prohibitions. Such legislation was required to have been enacted within thirty days of adoption by the Security Council of resolution 715 (1991) on 11 October 1991. To date, the legislation has not been enacted.
11. The third assumption was that the Commission would receive, from Iraq, full and complete disclosures of all its proscribed activities and capabilities, and that the identification and disposal of all proscribed weapons, materials and programmes would be achieved. Thus, no disarmament tasks or investigations of the past proscribed activities would need to be pursued under monitoring. The Commission?s monitoring could focus solely on non-proscribed activities in Iraq to verify that they are not being misused. Based on this assumption, the current missile monitoring system has not been tasked to search for proscribed weapons and materials. This task has been carried out by the Commission separately through disarmament activities and investigations.
12. In an effort to operate the monitoring regime in the missile area in the least intrusive manner, the Commission decided to concentrate on "check points" rather than to carry out "blanket" monitoring of all relevant activities. A "check point" was defined as a selected stage in missile development or production that specific components, critical for final assembly of a missile, would have to pass through. In many cases, this involves dual-use equipment or technologies. Examples of "check points", in a liquid propellant missile, are flow-forming machines to produce sections of a combustion chamber, and, in a solid propellant missile, casting chambers for motors.
13. "Check points" were designed to assist the Commission in accounting for specific missile components under production in order to gauge the number of complete missiles that Iraq had produced or could produce using such components. "Check points" could also allow the detection of the diversion of components for undeclared use. For its monitoring purposes, the Commission has identified some 50 "check points" at various facilities in Iraq. Most of them are under continuous camera surveillance.
14. In designing its monitoring system, the Commission aimed at denying the use of "declared" facilities for proscribed purposes. If proscribed activities were undertaken, they would have to be conducted at other facilities. Thus, the Commission also incorporated inspections of "undeclared" facilities into its monitoring system.
15. Under the Security Council resolutions, missiles, as such, are not proscribed for Iraq to develop, test, produce or acquire. Only missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres are prohibited to Iraq. From the technological point of view, there is no boundary to separate missiles with ranges below or above 150 kilometres. The Plan for OMV itself does not contain technical definitions that would distinguish proscribed missile features and characteristics such as permitted or prohibited length and diameter of a missile, weight of its warhead and propellants, technical specifications of the missile engine and other subsystems and parameters of flight trajectories. The monitoring system has to take into account that it is difficult, within this framework, to define, in a clear-cut manner, proscribed versus non-proscribed missile activities.
16. During the last year, the Commission studied the underlying assumptions of its missile monitoring system and the impact that they had on the level of confidence in Iraq?s compliance. The Commission has also evaluated its monitoring practices in relation to progress in missile-related activities and available technologies in Iraq. This resulted in a review of the missile monitoring system. Through this review, several areas were identified which required additional or improved inspection efforts in order to monitor effectively Iraq?s activities in the missile area. The implementation of some of these improvements were already in progress. Such improvements and other suggestions resulting from this review are outlined in the present paper.
Iraq?s Missile Programmes relevant to Monitoring
17. After the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq declared that it would carry out activities related to non-proscribed missiles. In the course of implementation of the Plan for OMV, Iraq declared a number of specific missile projects. Some of these projects were a resumption of programmes that Iraq had been engaged in prior to the adoption of resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991).
18. The main missile activity in Iraq under monitoring by the Commission since 1994 has been the development of a missile, with a declared range of just below 150 kilometres, for indigenous production in Iraq. This missile system, known variably as Ababil-100 or the Samoud, has been under development in both liquid and solid propellant versions.
19. Since the missile monitoring system was established in 1994, Iraq has achieved considerable progress in the development of the Samoud liquid propellant missile system with a declared range of 149 kilometres. A number of static tests of missile engines were conducted. In October 1997, Iraq carried out its first declared flight test of a Samoud missile. This flight test was declared a success by Iraq and demonstrated a significant step in Iraq?s indigenous missile production capabilities. Iraq continued active flight test activities in 1998.
20. Iraq has been working on the design and development of the Ababil-100 solid propellant missile with a declared maximum range just short of the 150 kilometre limit. Iraq is in the process of establishing the infrastructure for the production of solid propellant motors and other components for such a missile.
21. Other major activities by Iraq include efforts aimed at indigenous production of a short range missile; the development of remotely piloted vehicles; and, reverse engineering and modification of various missile systems available in Iraq.
22. Iraq has pursued the indigenous production of a battlefield missile with technologies which could be used in longer range systems. Several static and flight tests of indigenously produced missiles have been conducted.
23. Iraq has declared the development of a remotely piloted vehicle. The Commission is monitoring this programme due to its use of components from a monitored operational missile as well as missile related technologies and capabilities covered under the Plan for OMV.
24. Iraq has declared programmes related to reverse engineering or modification of a number of missiles available in Iraq. These projects are subject to monitoring as they use listed facilities for related design or manufacturing activities. Dual-use equipment, material and items covered by the Plan for OMV are associated with the projects.
25. It should be noted that after the adoption of resolutions 687 and 715 (1991), Iraq undertook a number of missile activities that are covered by the Plan for OMV. These were not declared by Iraq in accordance with the Plan. The most significant of these covert programmes was a project called J-1 to acquire surface-to-surface liquid propellant missiles through the modification of surface-to-air missiles already available to Iraq. This project was not declared to the Commission until 1995, that is, more than two years after it had been allegedly aborted.
26. The monitoring activities in the missile area take into account the established scope of ongoing missile projects in Iraq and are adjusted in response to the projects? overall progress and specific achievements and developments.
Current Monitoring System: Its Architecture
27. The missile monitoring architecture is based on a process that interleaves different inspection procedures, data collection efforts and analytical tools. These tools in the missile area include on-site inspections by resident and non-resident teams, remote camera surveillance, use of other sensors, declarations and notifications from Iraq, participation in aerial inspections and Export/Import monitoring.
28. Before proceeding to the discussion of the actual operation of the missile monitoring systems and tools used, it is worthwhile to address at least two notions that have prime significance: firstly, sites for inspection and secondly; dual-use items.
List of Sites
29. The Commission has developed and maintained a list of sites in Iraq for regular inspection by missile resident teams. This list includes facilities declared by Iraq under the Plan for OMV as being involved in missile related activities or possessing dual-use capabilities; facilities identified by the Commission, and some other sites. Sites which are included in the list are referred to as "listed sites". Currently, there are some 80 sites on the missile list.
30. The main purpose of the list is to assist resident teams in planning and executing routine on-site inspections and inthe verification ofIraq?s declarations. The list has never been intended to be the only source for the identification of sites for inspection activities under the Plan for OMV. The scope of monitoring is not limited in any way to "listed sites". The monitoring regime was rather established by the Security Council for the purpose of monitoring and verifying that, throughout Iraq, activities, sites, facilities, material and other items are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations under resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991). For this purpose, Iraq undertook, under the Plan for OMV, to accept unconditionally the inspection of any site, facility, activity, material or other items declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission; and to provide immediate and unimpeded access to any site, facility, activity, material or other items to be inspected. Under its missile monitoring system, the Commission has carried out inspections of sites not included in the list in order to ascertain that no proscribed activities or activities that were to be declared under the Plan for OMV, took place at those "non-listed" sites.
31. The sites and facilities in the current list in the missile area can be broken down into six main categories: key facilities; supporting facilities; dual-use facilities; sites involved in previous proscribed activities; operational sites and, other sites.
32. Key facilities are facilities declared by Iraq that are directly engaged in the ongoing missile development, testing or production programmes in Iraq. These facilities have equipment or capabilities to produce missile or major missile components for both proscribed and non-proscribed purposes. There are 12 such facilities on the list. They were singled out for special inspection procedures to ensure that all activities at these sites are for non-proscribed purposes. The procedures at these facilities include frequent no-notice inspections by resident teams, remote camera surveillance at multiple points, tagging of dual-use and other critical equipment, notifications by Iraq of all equipment movement and detailed semi-annual and, as required, monthly declarations from Iraq. Based on its experience, the Commission recently began to use more frequently at these facilities such inspection procedures as document searches, computer searches and interviews of key personnel.
33. Supporting facilities are declared facilities which are involved in the design or production of components or tooling for ongoing non-proscribed missile programmes in Iraq. In many cases, this involves the use of dual-use items, materials and equipment. There are 18 such facilities on the list. The Commission inspects these sites for the number and type of components or tools that they produce for missile programmes as well as for their dual-use capabilities. Inspections of these facilities are critical since the components and tools produced could be misused for proscribed purposes or diverted for undeclared activities. These facilities have been subject to a lower intensity of inspection activities than key facilities. A more intensive inspection of supporting facilities may be required in response to progress in Iraq?s missile activities.
34. Dual-use facilities are declared facilities which contain items and technologies listed in Annex IV of the Plan for OMV. As distinct from "key" or "supporting" facilities, dual-use capabilities at these facilities are not declared by Iraq as being used for the benefit of its missile programmes. There are 20 such facilities on the list. Such facilities are inspected to ensure that their missile related capabilities are only used in declared activities. The Commission maintains a minimal inspection presence through infrequent on-site inspections and remote camera surveillance of specific dual-use items. Based on experience, it is likely that some of these facilities would require more inspection efforts as more dual-use technologies and items might become available to Iraq.
35. Sites involved in previous proscribed activities are generally facilities which are currently abandoned. Inspections are done to ascertain that they remain so. There are eight such facilities on the list and they are generally subject only to aerial overflights.
36. Operational sites are those facilities which are involved in the maintenance or operation of non-proscribed missiles. On-site inspections are required to ensure that all missiles that require monitoring have been declared by Iraq and that the facilities are not involved in proscribed activities such as training for the use of proscribed missiles. There are some 10 facilities on the list.As it was assessed that Iraq was not producing indigenously or otherwise acquiring new missiles, the Commission, after an initial round of inspection of those sites, decided to limit further inspections of these facilities in order to respect Iraq?s legitimate concerns relating to national security.
37. Other "listed sites" are sites which have some relation to the Commission?s activities in Iraq, such as excavation sites at locations of the unilateral destruction of missile and related equipment, holding areas of proscribed components, former proscribed weapons and equipment hide sites, etc.
List of Dual-Use and Other Equipment
38. One way to collect the data required to assess Iraq?s compliance is to monitor, throughout Iraq, equipment and other items that could be used by Iraq in proscribed missile activities or in undisclosed activities that Iraq is required to declare under the Plan for OMV. The Plan established a list of dual-use items for the missile area. This list constitutes Annex IV to the Plan. The Annex contains technical definitions of equipment, components, items, materials and technologies that are considered important to develop and produce proscribed missiles in Iraq. The list was subsequently revised to elaborate specific items which would be subject to Export/Import monitoring. Modifications to the list were mainly based on an internationally accepted missile non-proliferation regime, the Missile Technology Control Regime. This modified Annex IV was approved by the Security Council in March 1995. Further modifications may be expected in the future in the light of experience.
39. The monitoring of dual-use items establishes surveillance of the most critical equipment, materials, tooling, components or technologies to seek to ensure that they are only used, in practice, for legitimate declared purposes and are not diverted to proscribed applications. Most of these items have applications in both proscribed and non-proscribed missile development or production. Many could also be used in non-missile related industries. There are numerous dual-use items and materials in Iraq. The Commission attempts to monitor them by a variety of methods depending on the nature of items, but primarily by maintaining running inventories of identified items at "listed" facilities. For example, 38 pieces of dual-use equipment are tagged in the missile area. The Commission also conducts specific inspections to verify that no dual-use items are present at other, "non-listed" facilities.
40. In addition to items in Annex IV of the Plan for OMV, the Commission monitors some other critical equipment located mainly at key facilities. Iraq is required to declare all equipment at key facilities and their movement. While other equipment with similar capabilities is likely to exist in Iraq, the Commission views the tracking of declared equipment associated with key missile facilities necessary to its effort to prevent the movement of declared capabilities to undeclared sites.
41. A number of items which were used or acquired by Iraq specifically for proscribed programmes in the past have been tagged by the Commission. While these items are not explicitly listed on Annex IV and while other such untagged items might exist elsewhere in Iraq, the Commission views the monitoring of these tagged items as important because of their association with past proscribed activities.
On-site Inspections
42. On-site inspections are the main tool used by the Commission for monitoring and verification in Iraq. The Commission has developed and employed a variety of inspections to meet specific objectives.
Baseline
43. In order to establish its current monitoring system in Iraq, the Commission conducted, in early 1994, baseline site inspections. They mostly covered Iraq?s declared missile research, development, testing and production facilities, and declared dual-use facilities. The objective was to determine specific requirements for monitoring procedures for each site. During an initial round of baseline inspections, 33 facilities were inspected to assess the level of technical capabilities of each facility related to both proscribed and non-proscribed missile activities, follow the production process at each facility, identify requirements for tagging and remote camera surveillance and elaborate specific details for Iraq?s declarations regarding each facility. All 33 facilities inspected were included in the site list in the missile area. The baseline inspections also assessed the overall status of each of the indigenous missile programmes declared by Iraq under the Plan for OMV.
44. The operation of the missile monitoring system revealed some weaknesses in initial assessments. As mentioned previously, the Commission assumed that Iraq would fully support the monitoring system. During over four years of missile monitoring, the Commission has learned that Iraq: sometimes provided incomplete declarations; had engaged in undeclared and even proscribed missile related activities; and, tended to understate the level of its achievement and technological skills.
45. In response to these events and Iraq?s recent improvements in its non-proscribed missile related capabilities, the Commission began a process of a basic review of missile design, development and production activities in Iraq at their new levels. The goal is to maintain the Commission?s ability to monitor effectively Iraq?s activities. The Commission conducted new baseline inspections related to missile and dual-use production equipment at the end of 1997, and Iraq?s solid propellant missile industry in the middle of 1998. Resultant assessments and recommendations are being incorporated into the monitoring system. Additional baseline inspections are still required to bring the current monitoring system up to speed.
Resident Teams
46. The centerpiece of the monitoring system is teams of resident inspectors stationed in the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC). No other tool is as flexible. Inspectors can be recruited with specific technical knowledge and trained to exercise a variety of mandated inspection procedures. Resident inspectors are tasked to carry out on-site inspections of "listed" and "non-listed" facilities, conduct analysis and assessment of specific areas of Iraq?s activities, participate in aerial inspections, etc.
47. The majority of on-site inspections by resident teams are done on a no-notice basis. On average, 350 inspections per year have been performed by missile resident teams. During on-site visits, inspectors observe ongoing activities at facilities, check the accuracy of Iraq?s declarations and confirm the presence of tagged and other declared items, if applicable. Inspectors might ask questions of the facility personnel to obtain better understanding of relevant activities and status of missile programmes.
48. No-notice inspections by missile resident teams did not include regular use of such procedures as document searches, computer searches, interviews of personnel or sample taking. The active and regular use of these procedures may become necessary in order to verify effectively Iraq?s compliance.
49. Missile resident teams interact on a regular basis with other resident teams in the BMVC. For example, the missile monitoring system covers essentially the same facilities and equipment as the nuclear monitoring system. Several items of equipment are under joint remote camera surveillance by the IAEA and the Commission.
50. Missile resident teams provide assistance to the Aerial Inspection (AIT) and Export/Import (EG) teams at the BMVC. For example, assistance to the AIT involves the interpretation of imagery or the identification of areas requiring photographic coverage. The work with the EG team is in the form of expert assessment of items imported by Iraq and their relation to Annex IV of the Plan for OMV. There has not been a significant inflow of such goods into Iraq. It is expected that the interaction between the missile and EG teams at the BMVC will increase in the future. This might necessitate the acquisition of dedicated personnel for missile resident teams to perform this specific coordination function.
51. The Commission has identified a requirement to improve the training of its resident missile inspectors. Their training and expertise have been declining to a level that could jeopardise the Commission?s objectives in ongoing monitoring. The Commission has begun the development of a new training programme with a goal of meeting the new requirements.
52. The Commission has attempted to maintain five to seven technical inspectors on missile resident teams in the BMVC. In response to increased workload and the diversification of the team?s tasks, it is expected that this number will need to be more than doubled in the future.
Non-resident Inspections
53. While missile resident teams have the responsibility to inspect sites on a daily basis, the Commission also sends non-resident teams to Iraq to conduct special monitoring inspections. Such inspections require specialised expertise, training, operational planning and support. Examples of such inspection missions are: missile tagging and tag checks; missile test activity observation; missile technology updates; baseline inspections; and, compliance inspections. Several missions went to Iraq to conduct discussions of monitoring activities with the Iraqi counterparts. Over 40 non-resident teams have been to Iraq on monitoring inspections and missions since 1994.
54. It is important to keep track of the technological progress of Iraq?s industries to ensure that the ongoing monitoring is properly focused. Technology update inspection teams go to Iraq, usually on a semi-annual basis, to assess advancements in the technology base and to make recommendations for improvements in the monitoring system. Inspectors on such teams bring fresh perspectives on missile related developments and on the application of emerging technologies for monitoring purposes. Technology update inspections are critical to keeping the monitoring system in the missile area up-to-date. There have been seven such teams in Iraq since 1994.
55. Pursuant to the Plan for OMV, in particular its paragraph 43(a), the Commission monitors specified operational missiles in Iraq to ensure that they are not modified for prohibited purposes. Since mid-1994, 22 non-resident teams went to Iraq to conduct inspections for this purpose. A more detailed discussion of relevant issues is presented in a section below dealing with operational missiles.
56. As the development of the Samoud missile system progressed, Iraq has engaged in more test activities, both static and flight. In order to properly evaluate these activities and test results, the Commission reverted to the practice of supplementing, on a temporary basis, resident teams with special equipment and personnel, including missile test engineers. This practice has proven to be very useful. Some 10 such supplementary groups have been sent to Iraq starting in late 1997. In the future, test engineers and specialists will have to be placed permanently on missile resident teams to cover effectively and in detail all missile test activities.
57. Other non-resident inspection teams were sent to Iraq as required. They were involved in baseline inspections, monitoring discussions and compliance inspections. Baseline inspections are discussed above. Monitoring discussions were carried out on numerous occasions to clarify, elaborate or resolve technical issues related to ongoing monitoring in the missile area. For example, during these discussions, issues related to formats of Iraq?s declarations and notifications, definitions of missiles, facilities, equipment and items subject to monitoring, deployment and operation of sensors and interaction between inspectors and Iraqi personnel have been addressed.
58. Seven compliance inspections have already been sent to Iraq since 1994 to verify information gained from inspections or received from other sources concerning Iraq?s compliance with its obligations under the Plan for OMV not to use, develop, construct or acquire proscribed items. Most of them carried out investigations of Iraq?s attempts, after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), to procure from abroad items or assistance for its missile programmes. A number of cases were identified when Iraq imported or sought to import missile-related items that it was required to declare under the Plan for OMV. Some of these efforts were not declared to the Commission. In one particular case, the Commission established that Iraq imported proscribed gyroscopes in 1995 that could be used in long-range missiles.
59. The Commission?s use of non-resident inspections is likely to increase in the future to meet a growing number of specialized tasks that would need to be carried out in the framework of the missile monitoring system.
Inspections of Non-Listed Sites
60. In order to seek to deter or uncover Iraq?s use of facilities or sites for undeclared or proscribed purposes, missile resident and non-resident teams conduct inspections of sites in Iraq that are not included in the missile site list. Such "non-listed" sites are designated by the Commission for inspection based on their assessed capability to be involved in proscribed activities or based on information that they are involved in undeclared or proscribed activities. Inspections of "non-listed" sites are crucial to the development of overall assessments of Iraq?s compliance with the Plan for OMV. The Commission expects that the importance of this type of inspection in the missile area will increase in the future to improve the effectiveness of monitoring.
Sensors
61. In addition to on-site inspections by expert personnel as its central element, the monitoring system in the missile area makes extensive use of technical devices. Cameras allow the surveillance of activities and equipment on a continuous basis. Application of tags ensures detection of tampering. As sensor technologies progress, the Commission intends to avail itself of emerging capabilities.
Cameras
62. The primary sensor in the missile monitoring system is remote surveillance cameras. Cameras installed at missile facilities and their workshops allow continuous observation of selected locations and recording of ongoing activities. The system is also capable of transmitting imagery back to a camera control room at the BMVC.
63. In the missile area, 74 cameras are installed at 15 "listed" facilities. They are mostly used to observe "check points".
64. The Commission, both through its BMVC missile resident teams and its headquarter?s staff, evaluates images recorded by the cameras to determine the nature of activities at locations and with equipment under camera surveillance, and to produce estimates of the quantity, quality and usage of components or missiles being produced at these locations. Examples of such locations are specified technological stages in the missile development and production such as flow forming; vacuum brazing; solid propellant mixing, casting, extrusion and curing; gyro balancing; hydrostatic testing; and missile final integration. Remote cameras have a particular value at static test stands for the testing of missile engines. They allow the recording of declared tests as well as the detection of any undeclared test activities at the declared stands. Temporary video cameras were also installed at storage areas to verify non-unauthorised access to such areas and ensure custody control of items in storage.
65. The Commission is planning an upgrade of its existing camera system and the deployment of advanced cameras in the missile area.
Instrumentation
66. As missile related activities progressed in Iraq, the Commission began to put more effort into technical evaluation of Iraq?s declared missile systems and their components. At the end of 1997, several specific issues for technical assessment of the Samoud missile were identified. The Commission resorted to additional technical instrumentation for independent and precise appraisal of specific missile parameters both through physical measurement and mathematical modelling. This called for the use of such instrumentation as precision scales and precision volumetric gauges. These were necessary to verify that declared missile characteristics such as weights of individual missile sub-systems and sections, volumes of propellant loads and matching parameters of the missiles actually used in tests. Such data is essential for verification that the declared system as a whole complies in practice with the Plan for OMV.
67. The Commission believes that the deployment in Iraq of its own system to track in-flight tests of missiles would considerably improve monitoring in the missile area. The Commission carried out a survey mission in December 1998 in preparation for the future use of the tracking system.
68. The Commission intends to use new sensors for monitoring activities in the missile area. Examples of emerging useful technologies under study are: remote sensors, real-time analytical samplers and detectors, and recorders of control units for production equipment.
Tags
69. Tamper-proof tags are being used in the missile area for inventory control and to prevent certain activities from being undetected. Their usage assisted in maintaining reliable inventories of dual-use and other equipment and controlling equipment movement. Tamper-proof tags are one of the main tools for verification of non-modification of declared operational missiles under monitoring. Tags are also used to control unauthorized access to some areas and to some items. The use of tags is relatively inexpensive and facilitates a whole range of monitoring activities.
70. Up to now, monitoring sensors including cameras, instrumentation and tags, have been provided by Governments on a "no-cost-basis". The Commission has relied on supporting Governments for necessary maintenance services and logistical support for the monitoring sensors.
Iraq?s Declarations
71. The Plan for OMV was designed following the established and proven method in arms control: verification of declarations provided by the party under monitoring. According to the Plan, Iraq undertook to provide, on a regular basis, full, complete, correct and timely declarations and notifications as specified in the Plan or designated by the Commission as well as to respond fully, completely and promptly to questions and requests from the Commission.
72. In the missile area, Iraq is required, under paragraph 43 of the Plan, to submit on a regular semi-annual basis:
a list of all its missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres, specifying various missile parameters, and information on any project and on any site or facility for such missiles;
information on any project and on any site or facility for missile research, development, modification or testing;
information on the development, production, acquisition and other activities related to items and technologies listed in Annex IV.
73. Under paragraph 44 of the Plan, Iraq undertook to notify the Commission of developmental and test launches of any missile.
74. The Commission provided to Iraq formats for these declarations. It has also identified requirements for additional notifications and communications from Iraq in response to developments in missile-related activities in Iraq or through experience the Commission has gained in the implementation of the Plan.
75. Upon receipt of declarations and notifications from Iraq, the Commission assesses them, updates its relevant databases and conducts, through resident and non-resident teams, a verification of their completeness and accuracy. Assessment and verification of Iraq?s declarations in the missile area is quite an enormous task. Each time they are submitted, semi-annual declarations alone contain some 1000 pages. Additional declarations and notifications, including on missile tests and equipment movement, are frequent and require follow-up actions on the part of the Commission.
76. The Commission?s confidence in Iraq?s compliance depends significantly on the openness, accuracy and completeness of Iraq?s declarations. The Commission?s experience with Iraq?s declarations in the missile area is that they have been generally complete and correct. On several occasions, the Commission has noted Iraq?s reluctance to declare, at an early stage, activities which should be under monitoring. An example is Iraq?s acquisition of a facility for the production of Ammonium Perchlorate (APC), a missile propellant listed in Annex IV in the Plan for OMV. Iraq began the development for this facility in 1995, without providing a notification to the Commission. Through an on-site inspection of a "non-listed" site, the Commission first detected such activity in early 1996 when it discovered a pilot plant for the production of APC. In late 1997, Iraq notified the Commission that it had begun the construction of a full-scale facility for the APC production. Such delayed disclosures disrupt the smooth functioning of the monitoring system.
77. In a number of cases, Iraq refused to provide the required declarations or to respond fully and promptly to Commission?s requests for clarifications. This has handicapped effective monitoring. In most of these cases, Iraq cited national security reasons for its refusals to comply with its obligations under the Plan for OMV.
78. If incomplete or delayed declarations were to become common in the missile area, the Commission will have to increase the intensity of its inspection activities by bringing under the inspection process design and management facilities, and by resorting to the increased use of document and computer searches at "listed" and "non-listed" facilities.
Operational Missiles
79. The Plan for OMV provides for the monitoring of missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres. Some such missiles are operational as they are deployed with Iraq?s Armed Forces. The objective of monitoring operational missiles is to ensure that they are not modified for proscribed purposes, for example to extend their ranges over the non-prohibited limit of 150 kilometres or to modify them for the delivery of chemical or biological warfare agents. Paragraph 43 (a) of the Plan requires Iraq to provide a list of all missiles with a range greater than 50 kilometres in Iraq, including sites and facilities where such missiles and related equipment are located.
80. At the initiation of the monitoring system, the Commission had established, in cooperation with Iraq, certain modalities for monitoring Iraq?s operational missiles. This was done to address security and national defence concerns expressed by Iraq and was motivated by the Commission?s decision to operate the least intrusive missile monitoring system in Iraq. For these reasons, the Commission waived an option to inspect missiles and associated facilities at times and locations of its choosing as it has a right to do under the provisions of the Plan for OMV.
81. The established modalities envisioned that after all declared missiles are tagged, the Commission would verify non-modification of the missiles by checking the integrity of the tags affixed. For this purpose, the Commission would send no more than three teams per year. It would select for each inspection up to 10% of all tagged missiles, a list of which would be provided to Iraq ten days prior to each inspection. Iraq presents the missiles selected by the Commission for inspection at locations of its choosing.
82. Initially, in 1994, the Commission decided not to tag SA2/Volga surface-to-air missiles in Iraq. Although such missiles fall under definitions contained in the Plan for OMV and Iraq attempted, prior to the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), to modify such missiles for a surface-to-surface role, the Commission decided again to resort to less intrusive monitoring procedures for such missiles in order to accommodate, to the maximum, Iraq?s stated security concerns. After August 1995, Iraq declared that, after the adoption of resolution 687 (1991), it had secretly conducted modifications of SA2/Volga missiles for a surface-to-surface role without declaring such activities to the Commission. In response, the Commission changed its earlier decision not to tag these missiles. During 1996, these missiles were tagged and added to the list of missiles for annual inspections.
83. Monitoring of SA2/Volga missiles in Iraq presents particular problems. In response to the Commission?s attempts to implement the relevant provisions of the Plan for OMV, Iraq raised objections to some inspection procedures and monitoring requirements citing national concerns. In some cases Iraq continues to refuse to accept some of them, including those related to reuse of specific components of these missiles for its programme to develop the Samoud surface-to-surface missile system. These issues remain mostly unresolved.
84. Currently, there are several thousand operational missiles of different types that are declared by Iraq under paragraph 43 (a) of the Plan for OMV. It includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and cruise missiles. There are no missiles on the current list that Iraq has produced indigenously.
85. Since 1994, the Commission has carried out 22 inspections related to tagging and checking operational missiles under monitoring. This includes 14 "annual" checks carried out pursuant to the established modalities. The Commission has not identified any evidence of proscribed modification of the tagged missiles.
86. The effectiveness of the established modalities for inspection of declared operational missiles depends on Iraq?s cooperation. In particular, the Commission has assumed that Iraq would declare all available missiles subject to monitoring. The Commission has so far been refraining from conducting specialized inspections to verify that all relevant missiles have indeed been declared by Iraq. In the future, the Commission may have to resort to regular inspections with this purpose in order to maintain effective monitoring of the operational missiles. This will be particularly important when Iraq starts to acquire new missiles either through indigenous production or importation.
Headquarters
87. The staff in the Commission?s headquarters in New York is responsible for advising the Executive Chairman on the day-to-day operation of the missile monitoring system, improvements to the system, and results of analysis of Iraq?s activities and assessments of Iraq?s compliance. The staff assists the Executive Chairman in the preparation of his reports to the Security Council.
88. The headquarters office conducts the assessment, in conjunction with resident teams in the BMVC, of Iraq?s declarations and data collected through various inspection efforts. It is engaged in the evaluation of imagery collected by the Commission?s aerial surveillance assets provided by supporting Governments and participates in the tasking for these assets in support of the ongoing monitoring in the missile area. The staff carries out, in support of the Joint Export/Import Unit, the technical review of information related to Iraq?s importation of dual-use goods. It is responsible for the planning and execution of non-resident inspections. For many of these inspections, assistance is sought from governments in the form of information, personnel, technical and logistical support, and training. Many non-resident inspections include members of the headquarters staff to provide for continuity and leadership.
89. One of the main day-to-day responsibilities of the headquarters staff is overseeing, recruiting, manning, equipping, training and other general management tasks in operation of the missile monitoring system.
90. Currently, there are six officers in the Commission?s headquarters in New York responsible both for disarmament and monitoring activities in the missile area.
External Support
91. The Commission has relied extensively on the support of Member States, in the form of personnel, equipment, services and information, to carry out its monitoring activities in the missile area.
92. Governments are the only source of personnel with technical expertise and the inspection skills required. The Commission has approached some 30 Governments with requests to provide experts for resident missile teams. Experts from 16 countries have participated in such teams since 1994. Missile technologies are limited to a few countries, the number of personnel involved in relevant industries is relatively small, generally over-employed, and very well paid. For these reasons, the Commission has found it increasingly difficult to obtain or retain qualified technical experts necessary for the ongoing monitoring in the missile area. Currently, the Commission can reliably depend on only a few Governments to provide, on a "cost-free basis", such personnel. In the future, the Commission will need to find additional sources of recruitment of its missile inspectors and will most probably have to bear considerable costs associated with the recruitment and training of technical experts and other inspection personnel.
93. In the missile area, the Commission?s monitoring system requires extensive technical support ranging from the technical assessment of Iraq?s missile designs and characteristics, to expert evaluation of development and production activities, to data analysis of both static and flight tests, to computer simulation of missile data, to the development, supply and service of monitoring sensors and technologies. The Commission has relied exclusively on Governments for such support. In the future, requirements for technical support will increase. The Commission is planning to approach a number of Governments with a request to designate national laboratories and establishments that would be able to provide, upon the Commission?s request, technical and analytical support for ongoing monitoring in the missile area.
Current Monitoring System Capabilities: Lessons and Assessments
94. Through more than four years of its monitoring activities, the Commission has identified capabilities and deficiencies of the current monitoring system in the missile area. Based on the provisions of the Plan for OMV, the current system was established and operated on the basis of a number of political, technical, logistical and financial assumptions and considerations. These issues need to be kept under continuing review and scrutiny to maintain the relevance and effectiveness of the missile monitoring system
95. Certain lessons have been learned about what the current monitoring system can do with a high degree of confidence or cannot do in the verification of Iraq?s compliance in the missile area. In between these two extreme points, a variety of Iraq?s missile related activities could be verified with various degrees of confidence.
What the Current Monitoring System Can Do with a High Degree of Confidence
96. In the Commission?s view, the current missile monitoring system can:
reliably monitor activities declared by Iraq related to missile design, development, testing and production.
reliably monitor missile related production capabilities in Iraq using declared or identified equipment, in particular dual-use items and technologies.
follow missile related technological developments in Iraq. The Commission maintains a detailed knowledge of Iraq?s declared missile projects, their activities and capabilities. If any unexpected leaps in technological levels were to be detected by the Commission, it could be a clear indicator of undeclared activities.
detect modifications to declared operational missiles. Although the established modalities should deter Iraq from conducting any proscribed modifications and any modifications of the tagged missiles could not occur without detection, the actual discovery by the Commission of such modifications, if done on a small number of missiles, may require up to three years.
What the Current Monitoring System Cannot Do
97. In the Commission?s view, the current missile monitoring system cannot:
be relied upon to detect undeclared missile activities on a scale of design or low-level prototype production, even at "listed" facilities. Without a continuous presence of inspectors at such facilities, there would be enough time, before an inspection team?s arrival, to remove evidence of undeclared or proscribed activities of such a scale. Reliable detection could not be achieved without a significant modification of current inspection practices. Larger scale missile production activities leave significant evidence that would require more time to remove. Activities on that scale, declared or not, stand a fair chance of being detected overtime.
be relied upon to detect undeclared activities at an early stage. Much more intensive inspection procedures including document and computer searches at programme management and design facilities in Iraq, would need to be applied on a regular basis to ensure timely detection of such activities at an early stage.
track monetary expenditures in support of missile activities. Early indications of undeclared or proscribed programmes and procurement activities could be detected through access to financial records. Inspections of banks and other financial institutions, and document and computer searches at programme management facilities would be required to detect undeclared or proscribed activities through tracking monetary expenditures and transactions.
be relied upon to detect undeclared importation of proscribed items if they are not notified to the Commission and used by Iraq at "non-listed" facilities or put in storage.
be relied upon to identify proscribed or other missile activities that Iraq might decide to carry out abroad.
98. The ultimate objective of ongoing monitoring in the missile area is to detect in a timely manner and to deter the deployment by Iraq of an operational force of proscribed missiles. Under existing conditions in Iraq, the current monitoring system is deemed able to accomplish this task in relation to indigenous production and deployment of large quantities of missiles required for an operational force of significance. Detection of Iraq?s acquisition of such a force through importation would largely depend on receiving information from a supplier Government. The ability to discover any retained proscribed missiles and their operational assets is questionable at this juncture, as the monitoring system has not been engaged in such efforts. Were this to be attempted, substantial changes in inspection procedures that are being practised under the current monitoring system in the missile area would be required.


Appendix II
THE CHEMICAL MONITORING SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION
1. The Plan for OMV addresses ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq?s compliance with its unconditional obligation not to use, retain, possess, develop, construct or otherwise acquire any chemical weapons (CW) or any stocks of chemical warfare agents or any related subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities.
2. The General objectives for monitoring in the chemical area is to monitor and to verify that activities, sites, facilities, materials and other items, both military and civilian, are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations. The system of chemical monitoring was established in Iraq in October 1994.
3. The Goal of the current monitoring system is to monitor dual-capable activities, sites, facilities and materials that have legitimate uses for non-prohibited purposes and have never been used for CW purposes, but which due to their nature could be used for the development, production or acquisition of chemical weapons. To this end, the verification of Iraq?s compliance with its obligations not to retain stocks of chemical weapons, their subsystems and components and CW research, development, support and manufacturing facilities has been pursued by the Commission separately in the course of the verification of Iraq?s CW programme under paragraphs 8 and 9 of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).
4. The monitoring system is focussed on the verification of:
the total national quantity of the production, processing, consumption or storage of dual-use (declarable) chemicals;
sites and facilities that are involved in the production, processing, consumption or storage of all the above mentioned chemicals;
sites and facilities that are involved in the production, processing or storage of organophosphorus chemicals or are involved in production of organic chemicals by chlorination;
acquisition of equipment or technologies intended for the production and processing of the above mentioned chemicals and sites and facilities that are involved in the production of such equipment; and
sites and facilities that at any time have been involved in the production of munitions intended for CW purposes and/or in providing support to the CW programme.
CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE OF CHEMICAL MONITORING
5. The Concept of chemical monitoring is is based on:
identification of sites, facilities, items, materials and activities to be monitored on the basis of information obtained through the verification of Iraq?s CW programme, the declarations provided by Iraq according to the Plan for OMV, baseline inspections and aerial surveillance;
determination of appropriate monitoring and verification activities and procedures to be applied for monitoring and verification of specific sites, facilities, items, materials and activities;
implementation of inspection rights established by the Plan for OMV; and
development, handling, maintenance and upgrading of the chemical monitoring data-base.
6. Full knowledge of Iraq?s CW programme is required for the most effective implementation of the Plan for OMV. This is important to evaluate the level of technical developments achieved by Iraq in the area of research and production of CW, including stability, storage and shelf-life of CW agents, synthetic routes used for their industrial production, equipment and materials used for the production of CW agents and types of munitions filled with these agents. Such knowledge would allow the Commission to assess the complete infrastructure of CW-related activities.
7. Information on the facilities that have been involved at one time in research and development activities and in providing support to the CW programme is of particular importance. While production facilities can be identified independently on the basis of their special features, R&D facilities can only be determined on the basis of Iraq?s full disclosure of its CW programme.
8. Chemical monitoring is also enhanced by the export/import monitoring mechanism. The export/import monitoring mechanism covers Iraq?s procurement/imports of declarable items. The chemical monitoring system is responsible for the verification of the further use of declarable items at the sites listed as end-users. To date these arrangements work satisfactorily.
Iraq?s declarations under the Plan for OMV
9. According to the requirements of the Plan, Iraq shall provide semi-annual declarations detailing: the types, quantities and location of chemicals that could be used for the development, production or acquisition of chemical weapons, but which also have significant uses for non-prohibited purposes, as well as chemicals which have little or no use except CW purposes. Iraq shall also declare sites and facilities that are involved in the production, processing, consumption, storage, import or export of any such chemicals. In addition, Iraq?s declarations should comprise any acquisition of equipment and technologies capable for the production and processing of listed chemicals. Lists of declarable items of equipment and chemicals are included in the annexes to the Plan. These lists are broader than the lists in the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, given the fact that they are based on the Commission?s knowledge of Iraq?s specific actions to develop and produce chemical weapons.
10. Iraq?s declarations required under the Plan for OMV have been significantly improved over the period of the last four years. However, they are still not accurate and complete. For example, the Commission has repeatedly found declarable items of equipment and chemicals not included in Iraq?s declarations. Each such case is subject to investigation. Under the Plan, the Commission has the right to destroy undeclared items of dual-use equipment and materials. In September 1997, 197 pieces of glass chemical production equipment, originating from the former CW production facility, were destroyed as determined by the Commission.
Baseline process
11. To evaluate special features of sites, facilities, items, materials and activities to be monitored and their potential capability for proscribed use, the Commission conducts baseline inspections in Iraq. These inspections are conducted with non-resident teams of international experts. The process is aimed at developing base line inspection protocols. The protocols outline recommended inspection procedures, including the types and sequence of inspections and the required verification techniques for each facility, depending on its specific parameters and capabilities. An essential part of the protocols is the assessment of the dual-use capability of the facility. The Commission updates these protocols on a regular basis, depending on changes in site configurations and equipment.
Listed monitoring sites
12. As a result of the evaluation of Iraq?s declarations, some 166 sites and facilities are included in the list of chemical monitoring sites. These comprise some 120 sites and facilities declared by Iraq and an additional 46 sites and facilities designated by the Commission.
13. The 120 declared sites and facilities include some 100 main facilities declared by Iraq with respect to declarable items and materials. These cover chemical and petrochemical facilities, including production/ formulation/ storage of pesticides and herbicides, production of mineral fertilizers, oil refineries, consumers of declarable chemicals, and the production of declarable equipment. They also cover facilities which are still under construction. Twenty of the 120 sites, are included in the list on the basis of Iraq?s declarations of its prior CW activities.
14. Forty-six sites are included in the list on the basis of the Commission?s designation. These comprise some 20 sites with research and development capabilities, about 16 military sites such as NBC-training schools, research centers and ammunition depots, and about 10 governmental and private companies involved in the procurement and distribution of declarable items and materials.
15. Some 40 of 166 listed chemical sites are also covered by the monitoring activities in other areas: biological, missile and nuclear. Those sites are mainly chemical complexes for the production of explosives, biochemical and pharmaceutical products, as well as the production of munitions and items of equipment of dual-use character.
16. Listed sites are spread throughout Iraq. About 20 sites and facilities are located in the South of Iraq, some 30 facilities in Iraq?s North, the majority of the remaining sites are in central Iraq. Operating from the BMVC in Baghdad, the Commission is able to reach each listed site in Central Iraq within two to three hours, and in the North and in the South of Iraq within five to six hours. However, it takes an average period of two months to inspect all listed chemical sites. The absence of regional monitoring centers or bases in Northern and Southern Iraq, and the non-availability of fixed-wing aerial transportation in Iraq limit the Commission?s ability to shorten the early-warning time of inspections. Thus, Iraq has effectively several hours warning of inspections in the North and the South.
CHEMICAL MONITORING RESOURCES AND TOOLS
17. The chemical monitoring system comprises the following resources and tools:
Chemical resident team at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center (BMVC);
support from the other resident teams at the BMVC;
Chemical team in New York;
non-resident teams of experts;
aerial surveillance means;
chemical laboratory at the BMVC;
monitoring cameras and sensors, other inspection equipment and instruments; and
means of transportation in Iraq.
The Resident Team at the BMVC
18. On average, the Chemical team comprises 12 to 14 inspectors and technicians. This includes the chief inspector, deputy chief inspector, operations officer, inspectors, laboratory chemists, one explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expert and one English/Arabic linguist. Normally, chemists, chemical engineers, NBC-defense officers and laboratory chemists serve with the Chemical monitoring team.
19. The Commission?s requirements cover a broad spectrum of personnel. They range, for military personnel, from Lieutenant Colonel/Major to Sergeant, and, for civilians, from experienced chemists and chemical engineers to freshly graduated analytical chemists. In recruiting personnel for the Chemical monitoring team, the Commission gives preference to experts who have experience in working in Iraq. To date, all members of the resident team have been seconded by their Governments upon the Commission?s request. Their regular duty tour in Iraq is three months.
20. Since October 1994, more than 50 governments have contributed personnel to the Chemical monitoring team at the BMVC. As a result, the Commission was able to recruit the most qualified and experienced personnel to serve as chief inspectors and deputy chief inspectors. These two positions require, top professional expertise and knowledge, management skills to supervise, organize and lead a group of international experts. Furthermore, it requires the ability to interact with the Iraqi counterparts.
21. The short duty tour for personnel in the Chemical monitoring team limits significantly the Commission?s ability to provide a thorough training programme for newly recruited personnel. Personnel recruited only for a three months tour of duty could not be tied up with a training programme of several weeks. Moreover Currently it takes the average inspector some two months to learn "on the job" the infrastructure of Iraq?s chemical activities. As a result, only towards the end of the duty tour, do the inspectors become really efficient and able to fulfill the requirements of the monitoring process.
22. The main functions of the resident monitoring team are:
to verify and to monitor listed chemical sites in Iraq through: on-site inspections, cameras and sensors, and sampling;
to maintain, update and upgrade the monitoring data base;
to conduct the chemical analysis in the laboratory at the BMVC;
to install, maintain and repair sensors at the listed chemical facilities; and
Support from other resident teams
23. At present, cooperation and coordination between the various disciplines within the monitoring system is well established. For the purpose of chemical monitoring, cooperation with the export/import monitoring team and the aerial inspection team is especially important.
24. The characteristics of listed chemical sites could be changed significantly upon the arrival of declarable items and materials. After their arrival at the site, it is the responsibility of the Chemical monitoring team to certify that notifiable items have been properly delivered to the declared customer site and were consumed or used strictly in accordance with the original notification.
25. Lists of items relevant to the implementation of the monitoring and verification in the chemical area are included in Annex II of the Plan. These lists have also been used in the implementation of the mechanism for export/import monitoring under paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 715 (1991) with respect to the sale or supply of items to Iraq by other States, covered by the Plan. This requires close interaction with the Export/Import group.
26. The aerial inspection team provides reconnaissance capabilities valuable to the resident team to support the preparation and the conduct of on-site inspections. Aerial surveillance allows the resident team to observe changes in infrastructures and configurations of listed sites in a timely way.
Headquarters
27. The Chemical team in New York is responsible for the development and implementation of the concept and system of chemical monitoring in Iraq. This includes the identification of the scope of monitoring (sites, facilities, items, materials and activities to be monitored) through the evaluation of Iraq?s declarations, the results of aerial surveillance and knowledge of Iraq?s CW programme. The personnel in the headquarters are also responsible for the strategy and tactics of the implementation of the chemical monitoring system. The Chemical team in New York processes all information and maintains the Commission?s chemical data base. The Chemical team in New York also recruits personnel for the resident team in Iraq and experts for non- resident inspections. In addition, the team provides training for new inspectors and assures the continuous supervision of the daily activities. Furthermore, procurement and maintenance of equipment for the chemical laboratory at the BMVC, monitoring sensors, and verification equipment and materials have to be organized by the Chemical team in New York.
28. At present, the Chemical team in New York comprises three senior chemical experts, one data-base manager who is also responsible for the implementation of various administrative matters, and one data collator. In general, this composition meets the requirements of the current system.
Non-resident Teams
29. The Commission also utilizes non-resident teams of experts. Non-resident teams comprise highly qualified experts for base-lining and assessment type missions. Those teams of specialists operate in Iraq in the format of short missions. This approach also allows the Commission to apply areas of highly specialized scarce expertise, such as ground penetrating radar and special analytical instruments.
The Chemical Laboratory at the BMVC
30. The Commission has had a chemical laboratory at the BMVC since 1995. This laboratory is equipped with suitable analytical instruments (Gas Chromatography, Mass Spectroscopy, Infrared Spectroscopy etc.). Its main task is to analyze air samples taken at various sites by the Commission?s automated air samplers. The character of this laboratory is designed to conduct routine analyses of chemical samples taken for verification purposes. The laboratory continues to be upgraded.
Monitoring Cameras, Sensors and other Verification Equipment
31. The Commission has 30 cameras installed at seven chemical sites. The purpose of these cameras is to detect changes in the configuration and use of selected declarable items of equipment and to increase the confidence in Iraq?s activities through the use of sensors. The cameras are not designed to and cannot replace on-site inspections.
32. Sensors are always installed in combination with cameras to detect potential tampering of the sensors. The Commission operates 23 air samplers at 15 listed chemical sites which give a picture of chemical activities at the sites. Their magazines have to be exchanged every 4 weeks and be analyzed at the laboratory at the BMVC.
33. During the last two years the Commission undertook to introduce open path infrared technology as an additional tool for the chemical monitoring. This analytical method enables the Commission to establish a chemical profile (fingerprints) of various chemical facilities in Iraq through measuring their emissions. The extended routine use of this method and additional new techniques would enable the Commission to remotely detect changes in chemical activities of any facility without even entering the site. New approaches could also include e.g., physical methods for the non-destructive examination of ammunition for verification purposes and mobile beam type samplers for sites and activities to be verified. Both instrumental methods would be mounted in special vehicles and would be highly mobile.
34. The Commission also uses other verification equipment and materials. These include chemical agent detectors, protection equipment and decontamination materials. The resident team is responsible for providing chemical, biological and nuclear safety for all resident and non-resident inspection teams in Iraq. The Chemical monitoring team with its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialist is also responsible for providing safe work conditions to all the Commission?s activities in Iraq with respect to explosives and conventional ammunition.
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
35. Despite increased and improved technical monitoring tools, inspections carried out by expert personnel still remain the most important element of the monitoring process. The critical issue for effective chemical monitoring is unrestricted and timely access to any site or facility in Iraq.
36. In comparison with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Commission under the Plan for OMV, has far stricter inspection procedures and rights. Under the Plan the Commission has the right to access to any site or facility with notification provided at a time it considers appropriate, depending on the nature of the inspection site and reasoning for inspection. It has the right to establish special modes for monitoring and verification, including the use of instruments. In the course of the on-site inspection, the Commission has the right to request, copy and examine any information and documentation, to photograph and videotape any items, to conduct interviews with any personnel, to install verification equipment, to take samples for analysis, to tag materials and equipment.
37. Within the scope of the chemical monitoring, the Commission conducts the following types of inspections:
inspections of listed sites to verify current activities;
inspections of listed sites to replace or repair installed cameras and sensors and to verify tagged equipment and materials;
inspections of listed sites to verify documents, records and computer files and to conduct interviews;
base line inspections of newly designated sites to evaluate their capabilities; and
aerial overflight of listed and newly designated facilities.
38. Listed chemical sites in Iraq with dual-use equipment that produce, possess or consume declarable chemicals cannot be used for the production of chemical warfare agents without additional modifications due to their parameters and current configuration of chemical production equipment. However, several such facilities currently do have capabilities to produce precursor chemicals.
39. Iraq also has legitimate industrial facilities which are capable of producing munitions and devices suitable for chemical fill, as well as their components and subsystems, including appropriate fuses and boosters for munitions.
40. The goal of on-site inspections of listed sites is to monitor and verify that these dual-use activities, sites, facilities and items are not used for proscribed purposes and that the infrastructures of these sites are not modified or exceed their legitimate requirements.
41. To achieve this goal within the scope of its rights to establish special modalities for monitoring and verification, the Commission marked critical pieces of dual-use chemical production equipment with tags. There are 833 tagged pieces of equipment located at 20 listed chemical sites and facilities. According to the established procedure, Iraq shall notify the Commission 30 days in advance of the movement of tagged and declarable equipment and chemicals and on their future use. The Commission reviews such proposals for approval.
42. The Chemical team in the Commission?s headquarters in New York is responsible for the evaluation and assessment of Iraq?s proposals to move or change equipment. The resident team at the BMVC through on-site inspections is responsible for the verification of the implementation of proposals approved by the Commission.
43. In practice, in the period of four years since the chemical monitoring began, the majority of Iraq?s proposals on the movement and future use of declarable items were accepted by the Commission. On several occasions Iraq?s proposals were rejected by the Commission, on the grounds that the proposed movement and use would result in the creation of infrastructure, which could be used directly for proscribed purposes without even minor modifications.
44. In several cases Iraq proceed with unauthorized movement of dual-use items. All unauthorized activities with dual-use items were stopped by the Commission, when detected. Subsequently, the Commission investigated each such case.
45. One of the most important issues related to the conduct of on-site inspection is to ensure the safety of inspectors. In the course of baseline inspections and daily verification activities, the Commission has developed general safety rules and safety protocols for all major listed chemical facilities. As a result, the Commission has an excellent safety record in its monitoring and verification activities in Iraq.
46. One of the crucial parts of the current chemical monitoring system is Iraq?s cooperation with the Commission. In statistical terms, the majority of the chemical inspections have been carried out with acceptable Iraqi cooperation.
ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM
47. The Plan for OMV covers all activities, sites, facilities, materials and other items in Iraq and includes detailed inspection procedures to monitor and to verify Iraq?s compliance with its obligations. It provides a solid basis for the Commission to fulfill its monitoring mandate.
48. The current system of chemical monitoring has been focussed on the implementation of only part of the Commission?s mandate. It has been focussed on the verification of the remaining dual-use activities, facilities and materials that have legitimate uses for non-prohibited purposes and had never been used for CW purposes. It also covered, but only on a case by case basis, the verification of undeclared activities, and facilities.
49. The chemical monitoring system in its current configuration is able to verify Iraq?s compliance with its obligations only at listed facilities declared by Iraq or designated by the Commission. The current system is also able, on a case by case basis, to detect undeclared activities carried out outside the listed sites.
50. Within the scope of the current monitoring system, it is also possible, by using all techniques and resources available to the Commission, including aerial surveillance, on-site inspections and the base-lining process, to detect the construction of new dual-capable facilities in Iraq.
51. The verification of Iraq?s compliance with its obligations not to retain stocks of chemical weapons, their subsystems and components and CW research, development, support and manufacturing facilities has been pursued by the Commission separately, in the course of its disarmament activities. Accordingly, the current monitoring system has not been designed to verify unresolved issues from the past programme, including unaccounted for chemical munitions, equipment, related materials, components and documentation.
IMPROVEMENT OF THE CHEMICAL MONITORING SYSTEM
52. Further improvement is required to increase the effectiveness of the current system of chemical monitoring and to meet future necessities. Additional requirements should be considered with respect to two possible options. Firstly, that not all disarmament issues have been solved within the verification of the past CW programme. Secondly, that sanctions could be eased or lifted. Both options would require additional resources and techniques in the field of chemical monitoring.
53. The efficacy of the current chemical monitoring system could be strengthened through personnel augmentation, introduction of new and additional verification equipment and techniques, improvement of the infrastructure and support, shortened access time to the listed sites and refinements with respect to notification requirements.
Personnel
54. Experienced, qualified and knowledgeable personnel in the Commission?s headquarters in New York and in the resident team at the BMVC still remain the most important element of the monitoring system. They are the load-bearing pillars of the system. Recruitment procedures for personnel, seconded by supporting governments for a period of three months, do not allow the maintenance of continuity in monitoring operations in Iraq. Both are indispensable to cover the broad spectrum of monitoring requirements.
55. The Commission must seek special arrangements with governments on the extended services of personnel for a duty period of at least six months, with the possibility that those personnel would be made available again in the future. The Commission should also be able to issue for some personnel in the resident team at the BMVC five to six fixed-term contracts, each for a period of two to three years. The same approach should be applied to personnel in the Chemical team at the Commission?s headquarters in New York. The minimum duty tour for personnel in New York should be two years. Such arrangements would enable the Commission to introduce an extensive training programme for the personnel in the Chemical monitoring team and would allow the preparation of highly professional experts familiar with both, the past proscribed programme and current chemical activities.
56. The office space of the resident team at the BMVC should be at least doubled. This is required tomeet current requirements, to accommodate the present analytical equipment in the chemical laboratory, to maintain the proper storage of other verification equipment and materials and to assure normal working conditions. Additional space is also necessary to store and handle the Commission?s growing collection of demilitarized chemical and biological munitions at the BMVC. These munitions have been gathered by the Commission in Iraq in the course of its activities, and are available at the BMVC for demonstration and training purposes.
57. The office space currently available to the Chemical team in New York does not meet basic necessities. It is seriously inadequate in terms of both handling Iraq?s declarations and other monitoring data and the accommodation of personnel, neither in terms of space nor of security.
Equipment
58. Chemical analytical capabilities at the BMVC could be improved, by introducing faster and simpler screening processes. The equipment should be enhanced to identify additional chemicals. Environmental sampling, and mobile analytical capabilities should also be expanded to be used in the course of on-site inspection.
59. To date, supporting governments have provided all analytical instruments and other verification equipment and materials on a no-cost basis. One Government also shouldered responsibility for the complete maintenance, spare parts and repair of the laboratory equipment. The Commission should be able to allocate in its budget sufficient funding for the maintenance of the chemical laboratory at the BMVC, and to have contracts for equivalent services. Additional funding has to be allocated for the procurement of new analytical instruments and other verification equipment. The acquisition and maintenance of such instruments and equipment are very expensive. Due to wear and tear and in response technological advances, the instruments will have to be replaced regularly.
60. The system of cameras and sensors should be upgraded and brought up to the latest state of technical development. The following options could be considered: installation of new digital cameras, introduction of new types of seals (i.e. electronic seals which could be scanned remotely), creation of additional capabilities to handle and transfer information electronically, and new sensor technology. All these improvements have in parallel a direct impact on the infrastructure and general support, which also have to grow in parallel.
Notification requirements
61. List A of Annex II contains chemicals capable of being used for the development, production or acquisition of chemical weapons, but which also are usable for non-prohibited purposes. According to Annex II, the chemicals listed include their chemical forms and mixtures.
62. For improved implementation of the Plan in the chemical area, the Special Commission would need to further clarify the notification requirements with respect to sale and supply to Iraq of relevant items. On the basis of the practical experience gained by the Commission, Iraq and Member States should be informed that the Commission does not require notifications for chemicals from list A of Annex II present in, for example, cosmetics, medicines, soaps and paints.
Additional requirements
63. If disarmament issues are not solved within the verification of Iraq?s proscribed CW programme, the chemical monitoring system should be able to compensate in some way for this important gap. Specific requirements would be required would depend on the nature and scope of the unresolved issues.
64. At present, main unresolved issues of Iraq?s CW programme include unaccounted for munitions, production equipment and precursor chemicals. To increase the Commission?s degree of confidence that there are no chemical weapons, related materials and production equipment retained in Iraq, the Commission would also need, in addition to the chemical monitoring system in its current scope, to cover a large number of undeclared sites, facilities and activities, both military and civilian. This would require additional resources and expertise in the BMVC. The Chemical monitoring team would need to be re-enforced with experts in chemical munitions and chemists specialized in R&D and the production of organophosphorus chemicals. In addition, the Commission would need to apply new verification techniques, including non-destructive equipment to verify types of munitions.
65. The easing or lifting of the sanctions regime could also have a major impact on the resources required for the full implementation of the chemical monitoring system. Iraq?s mineral oil industry with its downstream products and Iraq?s mineral fertilizer industry are directly influenced by the sanctions. These industries in particular could have an exponential growth rate, after the easing or lifting of the sanctions. This could not only include the significant import of spare parts, but also the expansion of their infrastructures. Refinery downstream products in connection with basic chemicals, such as chlorine and phosphorous could also provide the chemical basis for proscribed activities. In parallel to the growth of Iraq?s chemical industry the scope of Iraq?s declarations will also increase significantly. Therefore, would need to increase its resources significantly. This includes the number of personnel in the Chemical monitoring team at the BMVC and in New York and additional cameras and sensors.
Appendix III
THE BIOLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM

Requirements of the Plan for ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV.) in the biological area
1. The provisions in the Plan for Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV) addresses, inter alia, Iraq?s unconditional obligation not to use, retain, possess, develop, construct or otherwise acquire any biological weapons or related items such as stocks of agents or any related subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities. The Plan established a list of dual-use items for the biological area as found in Annex III.
General objectives for monitoring in the biological area
2. These are to monitor and verify through inspections and through aerial overflights, as well as through the provision of information by Iraq that activities, sites, facilities, material and other items, both military and civilian, are not used by Iraq in contravention of its obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).
Goal of the current monitoring system
3. The current goal is to monitor and verify dual-use activities, sites, facilities and materials that have significant uses for non-prohibited purposes, but which due to their nature could be used for the development or production of biological warfare (BW) weapons. The verification of Iraq?s compliance with its obligations not to use, retain or possess stocks of biological weapons, their subsystems and components and BW research, development, support and manufacturing facilities remaining from the past has been pursued by the Commission separately in the course of the verification of Iraq?s proscribed biological weapons programme under the applicable resolutions. The scope and detail of the Commission?s mandate in the biological area under the Plan are extensive due to the enormity of items with dual-use capability in the biological field in Iraqand necessitates a broad effort in the monitoring of Iraq.
CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE OF BIOLOGICAL MONITORING
4. The current biological monitoring activities are focussed on the verification of:
a) the total national quantity of the production, processing, consumption or storage of dual-use biological items;
b) sites and facilities that are involved in research, development, production, processing, consumption, storage or testing of dual-use biological items or other support or manufacturing facility;
c) acquisition of dual-use equipment, technologies or material;
d) research conducted with, or at facilities capable of exploiting dual-use biological equipment or material and;
e) sites and facilities that at any time have been involved in the proscribed biological programme.
Knowledge of the BW programme
5. A full account of Iraq?s planning, R&D, resources, facilities and personnel involved in its proscribed BW programme is an essential prerequisite to a monitoring system that would have a reasonable level of efficiency and credibility. With the current low level of confidence inthe verification of Iraq?s proscribed programmes, the confidence in monitoring is greatly diminished. The fact that Iraq?s declarations on its biological weapons programmes have been deeply deficient raises serious challenges with respect to OMV in the biological area. On technical, industrial and scientific developments of Iraq?s BW programme it has not been possible to compile a comprehensive assessment because Iraq has not been transparent in its FFCD nor in its clarifications of the account of its proscribed BW programme.
6. The implementation of the OMV system for biology is different from OMV work in the nuclear, missile and chemical fields. The resources and facilities needed for proscribed biological research or production can be relatively small in size and simple in technology and therefore more difficult to detect. As an example, Iraq has declared that it produced 2,200 litres of Aflatoxin, using various small volume glass jars. Iraq states it had weaponized this biological warfare agent.
7. The monitoring system described can be effective at best, at sites declared by Iraq, to deter relevant equipment and activities from being diverted to proscribed purposes. This requires Iraq to make full disclosures of all sites, governmental and non-governmental, that possess equipment and facilities capable of dual-use biological activities.
Iraq?s declarations under the Plan for OMV
8. Semi-annual declarations: According to the requirements of the Plan, Iraq shall provide semi-annual declarations. Iraq is obliged to declare its holdings of dual-use materials and equipment. The information provided by Iraq is a comprehensive statement of a site?s overall activities, resources and capabilities. The lists of declarable items of equipment and materials are included in the annexes to the Plan. This includes, for example: production equipment; microorganisms; biohazard containment equipment and decontamination equipment; equipment for the release and/or dispersal; equipment for breeding of vectors of human, animal or plant diseases; and munitions, rockets or missile warheads capable of disseminating biological warfare agents. Due to the nature of biological dual-use equipment and raw materials, the size and scope of the semi-annual formal declarations is much larger than for the other disciplines.
9. Reviews of semi-annual declarations are carried out following the receipt of the declarations every January and July. The declarations are analysed and verified through on-site inspection and comparative examination. The verification takes place in the period directly following the submission of the declaration, in an attempt to determine the completeness and accuracy of the data submitted and to confirm the information included in the declaration.
10. The Commission?s assessments, coupled with inspection, have repeatedly shown that the declarations have been incomplete, inaccurate, or both. On numerous occasions, discrepancies have been noted between reports submitted by sites to the Commission through Iraq?s National Monitoring Directorate (NMD), and the originals maintained at the sites. This has been a recurrent problem. Several years after the initiation of OMV, the biological team continues to find declarable equipment, materials and even whole sites that should have been declared by Iraq, but were not.
11. Monthly declarations: Through bilateral discussions with Iraq the Commission generated a number of specific elements unique to the facilities, termed ?monitoring parameters?. These varied across a wide spectrum of items and included elements such as changes in numbers and types of personnel, research and production activities, water and electrical power usage, inventory of microorganisms types, animal usage, materials received, products generated. The objective was to establisha more dynamic mechanism which could measure change from the baseline established through declarations and on-site inspections. Some key facilities are required to submit updated reports on a scheduled (monthly) basis along with supporting documents which are then verified by resident monitoring teams.
Baseline process
12. Protocol building or baseline inspections of sites in Iraq were undertaken during the summer of 1994. Prior to April 1995, an interim monitoring process was put in place. This process was in preparation for biological monitoring, which began in April 1995. The Commission evaluated dual purpose technologies, activities, materials, items and equipment which could contribute to a biological warfare capability and identified those sites or facilities that through possession of such characteristics could contribute to such a capability. Protocols outline the basic facts of the site, the reason for OMV, a general description of areas, equipment, technologies and activities of interest under OMV, site diagrams, maps, previous inspection findings and inspection procedures and assessment of the dual-use capability of the facility. These protocols are continuously updated by the Commission.
On-site inspections
13. The main and indispensable tool for monitoring has been continued on-site inspections. The knowledge gained by physical inspections of sites and workplace interviews with site personnel is essential.
14. Non-resident inspection teams are also an integral part of the monitoring system. A non-resident team is a short term team which can be staffed with issue specific personnel and devote all their attention to a single issue or task.
15. Listed sites: Under the current monitoring system, listed sites have been identified based on Iraq?s declaration and as designated by the Commission. There are currently over 250 listed sites and Iraq is required to provide semiannual declarations for 91 of them.
16. The range of possible sites encompassed by biological monitoring needs to be broad because of the dual-use nature of biological technology and the ease with which civilian facilities can be converted for biological weapons purposes. Many civilian enterprises maintain dual use equipment with legitimate function such as in dairy, food and drink industries, storage depots, heavy engineering, manufacturing and production facilities. Additionally, organizations that conduct research where technical expertise is found such as universities, colleges, disease control centers, breweries/distilleries, agricultural facilities, import and supply agencies and hospitals are included in the monitoring system.
17. Listed sites are categorized according to: their technical capability; the capability to be converted; the present field of activity; and the known former involvement of the site in prohibited activities. The frequency of inspection is determined according to their category.
18. Non-listed sites: Inspections of non-listed sites have been performed and have led to the discovery of undeclared dual use equipment.
Equipment:
19. Certain keydual-use equipment has been inventoried and tagged by the Commission. This inventory was established through tagging missions in which items of dual-use biological equipment were physically labeled with a tamper-indicating, bar-coded tags. At the time of tagging, the location, source, history of use and other essential descriptive details were obtained for subsequent insertion into the equipment inventory data base. The Commission?s biological database lists currently 1,334 items of tagged equipment.
20. Sampling: Sampling of dual-use equipment, weapons and weapons material has been undertaken. This was mainly performed by non-resident inspection teams, because of the specific expertise required, for example shipping and handling capabilities; and, their respective analysis capabilities in supporting countries. Although biological samples are not taken on a routine basis by the resident team, the capability of doing so in a manner which fulfils forensic requirements does exist. New sampling systems are under development. Consideration is given to include portable detection capabilities. This would increase overall understanding of activities on a site and would increase the deterrent effect of monitoring.
The Biological Monitoring Team at the BMVC
21. The resident team is based at the BMVC and is composed of 8 to 10 experts provided by governments, generally for a three month tour of duty. Due to the broad spectrum of sites and activities under biological monitoring, a range of expertise and a diversity of background is required in the resident team. The team has benefitted greatly by engaging highly qualified personnel with a diversity of expertise. Inspectors are recruited with backgrounds in fields of biology, veterinary science, pharmacology, medicine, bio-process and genetic engineering.
The task for the resident monitoring teams are the following:
planning, preparation and conducting inspections ;
interviewing Iraq?s personnel;
performing spot-checks, checking inventoried items of equipment and end- product therefrom and inventorying of new items of equipment upon import into Iraq;
taking samples and packaging for transport;
checking records on site;
conducting an inventory of production equipment and microorganism stocks;
debriefing members after inspections and assess results of those inspections;
assessing information gathered by monitoring inspections. This necessitates inter alia, the filling in of questionnaires and equipment identification data sheet, the inclusion of results from samples or other types of analysis, additional conclusions from monitoring inspections or evaluations of reports by Iraq made pursuant to the site protocol;
making recommendations and provide advice on new sites, on any relevant changes in activities at sites (constructions, expansions, change of focus, export or import of items of interest, know-how) and on corresponding monitoring actions to be taken and their modalities and;
interacting with other disciplines at the BMVC, for example, providing biological input to teams, in particular chemical, missile and export-import on activities or other observations that may have biological implications.
Support from other monitoring teams
22. The Biological Team has performed cross-discipline inspections with all of the other disciplines. Teams have discovered considerable amounts of declarable equipment. The inclusion of inspectors from other disciplines should continue to be a part of future biological monitoring.
23. The review of goods to be imported by Iraq by the Joint Export/Import Unit in New York is a valuable tool in identifying activities that may require further on-site inspection. Notifiable dual-use equipment and expendable supplies are tracked to the end-user and inspections are conducted to verify receipt and record stated purpose. The availability in Iraq of inspectors to supplement the Export/Import monitoring system has also proven valuable.
Support through aerial surveillance
24. The Aerial inspection team provides support to the biological monitoring team on an increasing basis. Aerial inspections obtain new information on changes in sites and new structures or equipment. The recent addition of digital photography capabilities has allowed for faster transmission to New York of imagery for analysis.
25. Imagery provided by U2 and Mirage aircraft are useful in the identification of changes in the external site structure and building configuration at certain facilities. This information has been used for follow-up inspections. The continued availability of these resources are seen as an important part of future monitoring.
Monitoring Cameras, Sensors and other Verification Equipment
26. Although important in other areas, cameras are only a secondary tool in the biological area. Information acquired via cameras is not in itself sufficient, in the biological area to determine whether proscribed activities are taking place at that location. Some sites such as facilities with fermentation equipment have been equipped with remote camera monitoring systems. The tapes from camera surveillance are reviewed regularly by members of the resident teams to assess the validity and appropriateness of activities within video monitored facilities.
27. Increased use of remote sensors are planned to measure and log a range of process parameters such as: temperature; motion/movement; and, light change. They can be used to monitor key processes, equipment or locations. Alarms can be set to alert the monitoring team to operations which are outside the normal parameter range. These alarms can then be linked to cameras or directly to the BMVC if deemed necessary. The sensors provide data on the frequency and duration of production runs which can be used to assess declared production quantities.
Headquarters
28. The biological team at the headquarters in New York identifies the monitoring scope (sites, facilities, items, materials and activities to be inspected). The team is required to assess, process, store and retrieve large amounts of data in various forms. All the incoming information (site inspection reports, monitoring parameters, declaration, aerial photography and NMD correspondence) is reviewed and assessed. Based on the assessment, the activities of the resident team can be focused on certain aspects or tasked to follow up particular issues. It does therefore require not only the latest information handling technology but also adequate secure document storage facilities. The team must have access to secure modes of communication with the resident team at the BMVC. The personnel at headquarters also recruit personnel for the resident teams in Iraq and experts for non-resident inspections. In addition, the team provides training for new members of the resident team and supervises the daily activities of the resident monitoring teams in Baghdad.
29. At present, the biological team in New York comprises four experts and one data base manager and one administrative data entry clerk. In general, this composition meets the requirements of the current system.
FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF THE BIOLOGICAL SYSTEM
30. Full disclosure by Iraq of its BW programme would provide a solid baseline for biological OMV. The verification of Iraq?s compliance with its obligations under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991) has been pursued by the Commission, separately, through the verification of Iraq?s proscribed biological weapons programme. The monitoring system has been focussed on dual-use activities, facilities and materials in order that they are not converted for proscribed activities. It was not designed to uncover undisclosed elements of the proscribed BW programme and was predicated on the successful elimination of existing proscribed items. If disarmament issues related to the verification of Iraq?s proscribed BW programme are not resolved, the biological monitoring system should be expanded.
31. Continuing support from governments is critical to the operation of OMV. In the Biological area, support is provided in the form of personnel, technical, analysis and information. The Commission must seek special arrangements with governments for an extended tour of duty period for at least four months, with the option to be made available in the future. Several governments have provided essential sample analysis services which will also be needed in the future. The Commission is kept informed by governments of certain technological advances that may be of use to the Commission?s monitoring activity. The Commission is also supported by many governments in the provision of information related to Iraq?s compliance with the Council?s resolutions.
32. The effectiveness of the monitoring system is proportional to Iraq?s cooperation and transparency, to the number of monitored sites, the number of inspectors, quantity and capability of inspection support elements. Monitoring in the biological area can be at best a deterrent at sites undergoing inspections. The monitoring system substantially increases the risk to Iraq that proscribed biological activity can be detected.

Appendix IV
INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

1. The Commission?s monitoring operations in Iraq rely heavily on the availability to all disciplines of common infrastructure and support services for their operational use. These services include such things as Export/Import monitoring, aerial support, remote camera monitoring system, personnel, transport and facilities.
Export/Import Monitoring Mechanism
2. The Export/Import monitoring mechanism, which was approved by Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), was designed to provide for timely information about any sale or supply to Iraq by other States of items listed in the Commission?s and the IAEA?s Annexes to the Plans for OMV.
3. The mechanism is a support element, albeit an important one, in the overall OMV system in Iraq. The central feature of the mechanism is the provision of information by the Government of Iraq and by Governments of exporters on imports by Iraq, and intended and actual exports to Iraq of relevant items. The other significant feature of the mechanism is inspection.
4. In New York the system is operated by a Joint Unit, composed of personnel from the Commission and the IAEA. The Joint Unit has an Export/Import Group which operates in Iraq, inspecting newly arrived items subject to monitoring, as well as conducting inspections at facilities throughout the country, checking for undeclared imported notifiable items. The Group works in conjunction with relevant experts from the other resident monitoring teams (chemical, missile and nuclear), as it relies heavily on their expertise in assessing identified items. Once newly imported goods have been inspected by the Group, they become subject to monitoring by the relevant resident teams in each discipline.
5. The items listed in the Annexes to the Plans for OMV are, in some cases, extensive and some of the items are not necessarily contained in any other arms control regimes. This presents some States with difficulties in understanding what should be notified. In addition, practice has shown that in some instances the description of items to be notified is not sufficiently clear to allow precise interpretation.
6. In order for the system to be effective in the future, it is recommended that the current lists of notifiable items be studied with a view to providing increased specificity and clarification. Once that is done, it will be possible to increase awareness about the requirements of the system. It will also give Governments a more practical basis on which to base national legislation. A further recommendation is to consider strengthening Export/Import Monitoring at points-of-entry to Iraq, thereby ensuring that goods required to be reported under the mechanism are immediately incorporated into the overall monitoring system.
7. The resources, including personnel and infrastructure, required to support the system in the future will be dependent on the number of relevant items being exported to Iraq. This, in turn, will derive from the contents of the lists of notifiable items and the status of the sanctions regime. The same considerations will apply to the number of personnel in the Joint Unit in New York and its group at the BMVC.
Aerial Operations and Support
8. In respect of aerial operations, the Plan for OMV includes the right of the Commission to overfly any area, location, site or facility in Iraq and to operate its own aircraft with appropriate sensors from such airfields in Iraq as its deems most appropriate for this work.
9. The Commission currently employs four types of aircraft:
One high altitude surveillance aircraft (U2)
One medium altitude surveillance aircraft (Mirage IV)
Five UH-1H helicopters
One L-100 transport aircraft
10. The U-2 and Mirage IV aircraft are dedicated imagery collection platforms. The UH-1H helicopters are used as a platform for imagery collection by an Aerial Inspection Team (AIT). The helicopters are also used for transportation, as is the L-100.
11. The prime function of the Commission?s aerial surveillance activities is to take photography of "listed sites". This imagery is used to: detect changes and activities at "listed sites"; deter Iraq from undertaking prohibited, or non-declared dual-use activities which could be detected from aerial surveillance; and, assist resident and non-resident inspection teams by providing a tool from which line diagrams of sites can be drawn.
12. The U2 and Mirage aircraft are also used to take imagery of "non-listed" sites of possible relevance to the Commission?s mandate. If, after analysis, on-site inspection is required, the imagery is then used for ground inspections teams to prepare inspections. Helicopters cannot be used for this purpose as their presence would alert the Government of Iraq in advance to a potential inspection at the site, thereby eroding the credibility of the inspection.
13. The U2, Mirage IV and helicopters can be used for site security surveillance during ground inspections. The U2 has a maximum endurance of some 12 hours flight time, equating to some 2,500 nautical miles coverage. This permits an extended "loiter" time over sites. The Mirage can fly for 40 minutes, covering some 300 nautical miles. The helicopters can remain in situ almost indefinitely as they can be rotated out when refuelling is required.
14. The Commission currently has no ability to conduct aerial surveillance at night but has been investigating the acquisition of such a capability.
15. The L-100 is currently used exclusively for the transport of inspectors and materials between Bahrain and Iraq. The aircraft is capable of carrying up to 92 passengers, or a mix of up to two vehicles and passengers.
16. Currently, the Commission operates only light helicopters which are not able to carry all the required verification equipment and tools to listed sites. The helicopters can be used in a limited transport role; they can carry ten passengers for very short distances, thereafter the number of passengers decreases in relation to the requirement to carry additional fuel. There is no capability for carrying vehicles, nor the required verification and tools to listed sites. The current flight arrangements also require 12 hours notification to Iraq. Therefore, four-wheel drive vehicles are the main transportation means in Iraq for the Commission?s team. This does not meet the Commission?s air transport requirements.
17. Over the years, the Commission?s use of its aerial assets for surveillance purposes and transportation have been restricted.
18. Since the inception of aerial inspection missions in 1992, modalities governing the operation of the Commission?s helicopters require the Commission to provide Iraq with a geographically defined "box" within which aerial activity will take place. This box is provided to the National Monitoring Directorate some 12 hours before the helicopter mission. The use of the boxes where sites are isolated, or some distance from Baghdad, degrades the element of surprise (and thus credibility) achieved during aerial inspections. Iraq claims that it requires the boxes in order to warn the air defence of the operating area of the Commission?s aircraft. Under current modalities, the Commission is unable to fly unrestricted aerial missions over Baghdad.
19. On a number of occasions, Iraq has prevented the Commission?s helicopters from overflying sites which it declared sensitive. The means by which such flights have been prevented include physical interference with the conduct of the flight and threats to shoot the aircraft down.
20. Iraq has refused to allow the Commission to exercise its rights to land helicopters throughout Iraq, by restricting the number of landing sites. It has also refused to allow the Commission to land the L-100 aircraft at any site in Iraq except Habbaniyah Air Base some 80 miles from Baghdad and the BMVC. Thus the aircraft cannot be used for inspection purposes.
21. The operational constraints on the Commission?s aerial activities, have a clear derogatory impact on the ability of the Commission to conduct credible aerial missions. Iraq must honour all its obligations under the Plan for OMV, particularly with respect to aerial operations.
22. Aerial requirements for the OMV system in the future, desirably, should include:
- A high/medium altitude imagery collection capability, under the control of the Commission. It must be able to operate day and night to collect imagery and undertake surveillance at sufficient height to prevent the Government of Iraq from detecting what is being observed. The Commission also needs the capability for prolonged loiter time. To be effective, the product from all such missions should be made available to the Commission in real time, or shortly after the mission is completed.
- "UH-1H" type helicopters to collect high quality, low altitude imagery, undertake surveillance, provide transport for small groups of inspectors and provide medical evacuation capability. These helicopters will also be used as platforms for other forms of airborne sensors which the Commission may choose to employ.
- "CH 53G" type helicopters. Primarily for the transport of large inspection teams and vehicles throughout Iraq, thereby obviating the requirement to rely on ground transport.
- The ability to use various forms of Infra-red imagery collection.
- Access to high resolution commercial satellite imagery to provide an unobtrusive and undetectable means of collecting imagery.
Cameras and Sensor Monitoring Systems
23. The video and sensor monitoring system (Remote Monitoring System ? RMS) is employed in Iraq as a tool to support the Commission and IAEA in their monitoring activities. The system provides electronic on-site surveillance of designated sites located throughout Iraq. Surveillance is conducted through real-time viewing and the collection of recorded images by video equipment in conjunction with supporting communications equipment. It is also conducted through the collection of air samples and power data through special sensor equipment. The system allows the inspectors to detect unusual activities in real time to allow for a quick response to inspect sites as required. The RMS has proved to be capable of assisting the inspectors but it should not be interpreted as an effective stand-alone system. It has to be employed in conjunction with all other OMV assets to be useful and effective.
24. The current RMS has been operating for over four years. During this time it has undergone some improvements in its design and communications links to ensure the system remains functional, and also to extend the life of its components. Its effectiveness has been enhanced through the use of video review stations (Multi Optical Review Equipment ? MORE) in the BMVC to support the review and analysis process.
25. A number of technical teams were sent to Iraq to work on the system during its implementation and additional technicians with specific skills have been employed on a case by case basis to enhance the system.
26. The RMS supports real time viewing, time-lapse videotape recording and sensor recording. Time-lapse recording is done through a system of image retrieval by camera and recorded to a videotape. The images can be transmitted via radio frequency links from the site to the BMVC where the result can be seen as an image on a computer screen as a "near" real time view. Data of power usage at sites is recorded via sensor on data cards that can be down loaded to a computer for review.
27. The RMS system operates under the existing maintenance regime and environmental conditions. The system has, however, its operational limitations. Disadvantages of the system are that; the cameras are limited in their capability; the system has required a significant amount of manpower to maintain and adapt; some sites cannot be accessed through communications links because of the type of communications employed; and, communications links suffer degradation primarily due to the environmental conditions.
28. The system?s components may no longer be logistically sustainable, as the manufacturers of the components may no longer be willing to support repair or replacement other than at considerable cost. Consequently, there is a requirement to address issues with upgrading the system as it stands in order for it to be robust and supportive of the mandated monitoring.
29. The current technology uses a mix of digital and analogue techniques to deliver an adequate image for review. Depending on the inspection requirements, this standard can be improved by upgrading analogue and digital technology or by using purely digital technology. The areas that need to be upgraded include: cameras; power supply sub-system; communications links; image storage, retrieval, and review mechanisms; and improved sensors. The upgrade would need to be done as a complete system rather than on a piece-meal basis. This level of technology should be flexible to allow for easy component upgrades as required.
30. Initial outlay for improving the system to meet current needs could be between $4-5 million with ongoing costs being approximately $900,000 per year. These figures incorporate equipment upgrades, commercial communications costs, manpower and logistic support resources. The system is supported by one operator and five technicians in the field, as well as through management and coordination from the headquarters in New York. Manpower support (operational and technical) may need to be increased to operate and maintain the existing or an upgraded system.
Personnel
31. Since the establishment of the monitoring system in mid-1994, the Commission has had a requirement for staff to support its monitoring operations in Iraq. This staff is currently composed of personnel from a number of governments as well as a small group of United Nations staff stationed in New York, Baghdad and Bahrain.
32. The Commission will have to increase the number of its personnel, in all locations, in direct relation to projected increases in the size of the monitoring activity. If regional monitoring sub-centres are established in Iraq it will result in a further increase in the Commission?s staff.
33. The Commission?s resident teams depend on a high degree of technical expertise to conduct monitoring inspections. Hitherto, the Commission has depended almost exclusively on personnel provided by governments, serving on a three month basis. The Commission has identified several problems with this arrangement. Continuity of operations are impacted severely by the short-term presence of experts. Additionally, training of short-term personnel in the methods and techniques of monitoring, as well as Iraq?s activities, is very difficult to do.
34. The Commission is considering using a mixture of long and short-term personnel. Long term personnel would be technical experts employed by the Commission on United Nations established posts supported by the budget of the Commission. Short-term personnel would be supplied by supporting governments.
35. The long term personnel would provide continuity to the Commission?s operations and could be trained in the technical details of both Iraq?s current activities and its past proscribed programmes.
36. The Commission will still require the provision of short term technical experts from governments. Short term personnel bring technical skills and knowledge that can not generally be obtained on a long term basis. These personnel would be recruited for specific tasks which would not require the longer training period. The Commission will likely have to reimburse the supporting governments for the cost of such highly technical personnel.
37. In addition to expert personnel, the Commission will require: medical; communication; administrative; logistical; operational; maintenance, aerial and technical support services to all resident and non-resident monitoring teams. Monitoring teams will be further supplemented with specialised linguists and computer experts.
Training
38. The Commission?s most powerful and valuable tool in its monitoring system is inspectors. The Commission has relied on the technical knowledge and inspection skills of personnel provided by Governments on a short-term basis. Over the past four years of operation of the monitoring system, this has generally served the Commission?s objectives.
39. In the future, improvements would be required to maintain efficient inspection teams, in particular resident teams in the BMVC. As mentioned above, the Commission is considering the use of a mixture of short and long-term technical experts and support personnel for its monitoring teams. If this is to be implemented, the Commission will have to dramatically alter the training of its inspectors.
40. For long-term inspectors, the Commission would need to create a specialized training programme. The Commission is considering a training programme of several weeks in duration in which a cadre of long-term inspectors would receive training on a variety of general and specialized subjects, and practical exercises. The Commission would be able to recruit from this cadre its inspectors. Such a system would provide for both Commission?s guaranteed access to appropriate experts trained as international inspectors, and a continuity in the Commission?s inspection operations in Iraq and in its assessments of Iraq?s compliance over time.
41. The training programme will need to include, inter alia, the Commission?s mandate, inspection procedures and practices, activities under monitoring in Iraq, export/import regulations for Iraq, Iraq?s proscribed weapons programmes, Iraq?s technology level, etc. The trainees would require a thorough familiarization with specific inspection techniques and tools, the operation of the Commission?s remote camera/sensor systems, lists of facilities and dual-use equipment and other elements of other monitoring system architecture.
42. For short-term inspectors, the Commission intends to create an abridged training programme containing many of the subjects from the longer duration training programme and suited for specific tasks that they are expected to perform during their term of duty. The programme for each inspector or a small group would begin on their joining the Commission?s inspection team. It will need to include a preparatory period and the on-job training.
Facilities
43. The Commission currently operates facilities in Baghdad, in Bahrain, and at the headquarters in New York. The facility in Baghdad is designed to house all of the services required by the resident and non-resident inspection teams for both the Commission and the IAEA, including, inter alia, office space, transportation, computer support, medical services, communications (including remote camera monitoring), storage, training, vehicle maintenance and administration. The Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC) has been in operation since August 1994. The BMVC is located in the Canal building along with several other United Nations organizations. On several occasions since October 1994, the Commission has been forced to expand its use of the facility, at the expense of these other United Nations organizations, in order to meet its mission requirements. The BMVC?s current office space in the Canal building is barely meeting the Commission?s and the IAEA?s requirements.
44. In the future, the Commission expects it will require space nearly double of that of its current requirements. This will either require the dedication of the Canal building to the Commission?s mission or the construction or refurbishment of a new facility to meet its requirements. This will have substantial budgetary implications. The future annual operating cost of the BMVC cannot be estimated at this time until decisions on the future size and structure of the Commission have been made.
45. Additionally, the Commission is considering the establishment of regional monitoring sub-centres in Mosul and Basrah, in order to limit the notification time for inspections in those regions. This would provide an additional deterrent to Iraq for using such outlaying facilities for undeclared or proscribed purposes. This would require the strengthening of the coordination infrastructure, a review of operational procedures, and the placement of staff to effect the coordination. The establishment of such sub-centres would require a variety of support services similar to those provided at the BMVC, however, on a smaller scale. It is possible that these centres could be operated only during certain periods each year to reduce the overall cost. Construction or refurbishment of facilities to house such sub-centres would have a significant budgetary impact. Annual operating costs of such facilities cannot be estimated at this time until decisions on the future size and structure of the Commission have been made.
46. In order to support the Commission?s and IAEA?s resident and non-resident teams, the Commission maintains a large number of logistical, technical, communications and transportation equipment necessary to conduct operations in both Bahrain and Baghdad. The Commission?s logistical support includes, inter alia, office supplies and equipment; field support equipment such as camping equipment, trailers, generators; and protective clothing as required to support each team. The Commission?s technical equipment includes computers and computer support, global positioning system receivers, chemical sensors, video and still cameras, two-way radios, and other equipment as required. The Commission maintains a fleet of vehicles in both Baghdad and Bahrain in order to support the Commission?s and IAEA?s teams. These vehicles include sedans, four-wheel drive vehicles, mini-buses, and trucks.
47. As stated earlier, the Commission?s projected increase in size will require a corresponding increase in the size of the logistical, technical, communications and transportation equipment. The Commission expects that much of this equipment will have to be upgraded or replaced to support the projected expansion of the Commission?s and IAEA?s monitoring operations.
48. The Commission?s new facility, currently under construction in Bahrain, will provide office space, computer services, storage, logistical support, training, and administration for the Commission?s and IAEA?s resident and non-resident teams as well as for its Bahrain Field Office support staff. The new facilities are expected to provide for the Commission?s long term needs.
49. The Commission?s headquarters in New York provides for the management operation, and administration of all of its activities. The Commission has constantly experienced severe space limitations in the headquarters. In the future, the Commission would require an increase in its headquarters staff with a consequent need for expansion of its office space. This is expected to have substantial budgetary considerations for both initial refurbishment and annual operating costs.





?The missiles that are being destroyed allegedly fly 11 miles too far, so they must be destroyed, 11 miles seems a bit strict but ok so be it.?
Read the Blix report. The Al Samoud 2 missiles have a traveling distance of 310.6 mile too far. You may be counfusing the Al Samoud 1?s with the Al Samoud 2?s.

?I am being told that we suspect that Saddam has these weapons, we have no proof but we suspect this to be so.?
how much more do you need. Remember he is the one needs to account for them. He can?t even show where the missing WMDs are that we know he has.

?He has no ties to 9/11 even though the administration tried for a time to make an unbelievably weak argument to the contrary, which in fact turned out to be laughable at best.?
but you think it?s ok for him to be the one who stages the next undeclared act of war on US soil?

?are truly a threat but do not have oil and gas reserves like North Korea become an even bigger threat?
USA will deal with North Korea, unfortunately we don?t have the military recourses that we did 10 years ago. The reason they chose to go for Iraq first has to do with election politics.